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Introduction
By Marta de la Torre and Randall Mason
T     on the research on values and
economics of cultural heritage which was started at the
Getty Conservation Institute in .1 The early results 
of this project highlighted some issues fundamental to the
ﬁeld that were in need of further consideration. Among
these were the lack of recognized and widely accepted
methodologies for the assessment of cultural values, as
well as the diﬃculties of comparing the results of eco-
nomic and cultural values assessments.
The research we report in this publication starts
to address these issues by focusing on methods of identify-
ing, articulating, and establishing cultural signiﬁcance.
Cultural signiﬁcance is used here to mean the importance of
a site as determined by the aggregate of values attributed
to it. The values considered in this process should include
those held by experts—the art historians, archaeologists,
architects, and others—as well as other values brought
forth by new stakeholders or constituents, such as social
and economic values.2
Value has always been the reason underlying her-
itage conservation. It is self-evident that no society makes
an eﬀort to conserve what it does not value. Why, then,
this current interest in values? Until recent times, the
heritage ﬁeld was relatively isolated, composed of small
groups of specialists and experts. These groups deter-
mined what constituted “heritage” and how it should be
conserved. The “right to decide” of these specialists was
validated by the authorities who funded their work. 
There was a tacit agreement between the groups with the
power to act.
In recent decades, the concept of what is heritage
has evolved and expanded, and new groups have joined
the specialists in its identiﬁcation. These groups of citi-
zens, of professionals from other ﬁelds, and of representa-
tives of special interests arrive in the heritage ﬁeld with
their own criteria and opinions—their own “values”—
which often diﬀer from our own as heritage specialists. 
This democratization is a positive development in
our ﬁeld and bears witness to the importance of heritage
in today’s society. Nonetheless, this aperture has brought
new considerations to the discussions and has made them
much more complex. Today the opinions of experts are
often a few among many, in an arena where it is recog-
nized that heritage is multivalent and that values are not
immutable. In this changed environment, the articulation
and understanding of values have acquired greater impor-
tance when heritage decisions are being made about what
to conserve, how to conserve it, where to set priorities,
and how to handle conﬂicting interests.
As conservation professionals, we are familiar
and comfortable with the assessment methods used by
traditional heritage experts. However, to identify and
measure “social” values, we must venture into new areas.
The stakeholders of social values are usually members of
the public who have not traditionally participated in our
work or had their opinions taken into consideration.
Today, as we recognize the importance of including all
stakeholders in the process, we must turn to other disci-
plines to bring these new groups into the discussions.
The papers in this report present some tools that
have been used in other ﬁelds and that hold promise for
the tasks at hand. The ﬁrst paper oﬀers a review of the
issues associated with the assessment of values in relation
to cultural heritage. As an introduction to the methods
presented in other contributions, it includes an overview
of the “expert” methods already in use in the cultural ﬁeld
and identiﬁes some of the challenges that lie ahead as we
attempt to integrate these more traditional tools of the
cultural ﬁeld with others that must be imported to serve
new needs. The anthropological and ethnographic meth-
ods presented by Setha M. Low are some of the methods
introduced relatively recently to assess social values, and
they are already being used to bring new groups of stake-
holders into the values identiﬁcation process. The ﬁeld of
environmental conservation has a relatively long tradition
of consultation with a broad spectrum of stakeholders.
Approaches from the environmental ﬁeld are often held
up as examples to be emulated in the heritage ﬁeld, and
Theresa Satterﬁeld’s contribution analyzes the assessment
tools most used in that discipline. Her balanced evaluation
should help us as we consider importing into our ﬁeld
some of those methods.
Economists seem to have the most developed 
and widely accepted value assessment tools. However, as
has been discussed in our earlier report on the economics
of heritage,3 these tools might not be as accurate in meas-
uring cultural values as has been accepted in the past. 
A number of economists are now searching for ways 
of honing their tools to make them more useful in the
heritage ﬁeld. Susana Mourato and Massimilano Mazzanti
give us a detailed account of the tools used in their ﬁeld
and of the weaknesses and strengths of the various meth-
ods. Not surprisingly, recognizing that conservation is
multidisciplinary, their conclusions point to collaboration
with other disciplines.
Discussions of values, of how social contexts
shape heritage and conservation, and of the imperative of
public participation are issues that challenge conventional
notions of conservation professionals’ responsibilities.
How to champion conservation principles (traditional
ones, centered on the sanctity and inherent meaningful-
ness of material heritage) while managing an open, demo-
cratic process that may conclude by underselling conser-
vation in favor of other social goals? This issue gets to the
essential nature of the ﬁeld and of conservation as a pro-
fession: “Are we advocates? Are we neutral professionals
and experts?” 
Conservation professionals are faced with two
particular challenges arising out of these social and politi-
cal contexts: challenges of power sharing and challenges
of collaboration. Broader participation poses a challenge
to the roles and responsibilities of conservation profes-
sionals: some suggest that bringing conservation policies
and decisions in line with democratic values would under-
mine the authority of conservation professionals and
would even amount to an abdication of professional
responsibility. In other words, democratization of conser-
vation decision making could contradict the professional
devotion to conservation—what happens when the
democracy of voices decides that a heritage site can be
destroyed? Do we as conservation professionals have a
right, or even a responsibility, to speak against the demo-
cratic will? 
But the probability is not that actual decision
making power will be democratized but, rather, that the
process of value elicitation will be included. Democratiza-
tion of the processes of consultation and assessment of
heritage values is not likely to be a threat to the sover-
eignty of the ﬁeld, but it still requires a change of attitude
and training. The inevitability of trade-oﬀs and compro-
mises and the respectful and meaningful gathering of dif-
ferent modes of valuing have to be recognized. 
Using new methods from diﬀerent ﬁelds means
collaborating with more and diﬀerent professionals
(anthropologists and economists, for instance). Such
collaboration raises questions about who is in charge of
which part of the process. What are the relative roles and
contributions and responsibilities of this diﬀerent cast 
of characters? Does the conservation professional’s role
become that of an orchestrator of specialists? Or of one
specialist among others? It seems that the conservation
professional has moved to play the dual role of specialist
and orchestrator. The tasks associated with the latter
function call for new ways of thinking as well as for 
new skills.
In the last paper of this report, David Throsby
provides us with some principles that can help to shape
the new role of the conservation specialist. Advocating
the principles of sustainability, we can moderate the dis-
cussions of a broad set of stakeholders while setting in
place a number of ﬁlters that will promote decisions in
this arena that protect the heritage while making it rele-
vant to society.
The challenge ahead is to continue searching for
the means to serve the public good by preserving material
remains of the past.
Notes
. R. Mason, ed., Economics and Heritage Conservation (Los
Angeles: Getty Conservation Institute, ); E. Avrami and
R. Mason, eds., Values and Heritage Conservation (Los Angeles:
Getty Conservation Institute, ).
. Value can be deﬁned simply as a set of positive characteristics
or qualities perceived in cultural objects or sites by certain
individuals or groups.
. Mason, ed., Economics and Heritage Conservation.

Assessing Values in Conservation Planning: 
Methodological Issues and Choices
By Randall Mason
C —whether they are concerned
with giving a building “heritage” status, deciding which
building to invest in, planning for the future of a historic
site, or applying a treatment to a monument—use an
articulation of heritage values (often called “cultural
signiﬁcance”)1 as a reference point. Assessment of the
values attributed to heritage is a very important activity 
in any conservation eﬀort, since values strongly shape the
decisions that are made. However, even though values are
widely understood to be critical to understanding and
planning for heritage conservation, there is little knowl-
edge about how, pragmatically, the whole range of her-
itage values can be assessed in the context of planning and
decision making. This paper aims to explore value assess-
ment as a particular aspect of conservation planning and
management.2 Purposely broad in scope, what follows
sets a context for the other contributions in this volume 
by relating issues of value and methodology, as seen by
diﬀerent disciplines, to the problems of conservation plan-
ning and policy.
Methodologically, assessment of heritage values
is fraught with diﬃculties. These problems stem from fac-
tors such as the diverse nature of heritage values (there
are many kinds of values—cultural, economic, political,
aesthetic, and more—some of which overlap or compete),
the fact that values change over time and are strongly
shaped by contextual factors (such as social forces, eco-
nomic opportunities, and cultural trends), the fact that
these values sometimes conﬂict, and the wide variety of
methodologies and tools for assessing the values (as used
by a wide variety of disciplines and professions).
All models for values-based conservation include
a step in which the signiﬁcance of the site or building 
in question is established (Figure ).3 Too often, experts
determine signiﬁcance on the basis of a limited number 
of established criteria. As an alternative to this approach,
this paper argues for a deliberate, systematic, and trans-
parent process of analyzing and assessing all the values 
of heritage.
For purposes of planning and management,
value assessment presents a threefold challenge: identify-
ing all the values of the heritage in question; describing
them; and integrating and ranking the diﬀerent, some-
times conﬂicting values, so that they can inform the reso-
lution of diﬀerent, often conﬂicting stakeholder interests
(Figure ).
This paper explores issues, methodologies, and
tools4 applicable to value assessment, and its goal is to
generate guidance for selecting appropriate methodolo-
gies (strategies) and tools (tasks) to assess heritage values
as part of integrated conservation planning. This research
goal stems from the realization that the conservation
ﬁeld, at present, is not very proﬁcient at gauging all the
values of heritage.
This paper proceeds from a few assumptions
regarding the problems of value assessment in conserva-
tion planning:
• heritage conservation is best understood as a
sociocultural activity, not simply a technical practice; it
encompasses many activities preceding and following any
act of material intervention; 
• it is important to consider the contexts of a her-
itage conservation project—social, cultural, economic,
geographical, administrative—as seriously and as deeply
as the artifact/site itself is considered; 
• the study of values is a useful way of understand-
ing the contexts and sociocultural aspects of heritage con-
servation;
• heritage values are, by nature, varied, and they
are often in conﬂict; 
• traditional modes of assessing “signiﬁcance” rely
heavily on historical, art historical, and archaeological
notions held by professionals, and they are applied basi-
cally through unidisciplinary means; 
• consideration of economic values, a strong 
force shaping heritage and conservation, is outside the
traditional purview of conservation professionals, and
their integration with cultural values presents a particular
challenge;
• no single discipline or method yields a full or
suﬃcient assessment of heritage values; therefore, a com-
bination of methods from a variety of disciplines should
be included in any comprehensive assessment of the val-
ues of a heritage site; 
• conservation management and planning should
employ a strategy of inclusiveness by calling on diﬀerent
disciplines and bringing in the views of “insiders” and
“outsiders” in the planning process; 
• a more encompassing assessment of heritage
values, and integration of these diﬀerent values, will lead
to better, more sustainable conservation planning and
management;
• the test of more eﬀective conservation planning
is its responsiveness to the needs of stakeholders, commu-
nities, and contemporary society.
In the remaining sections of this paper, four
speciﬁc questions are explored (in the same sequence that
one would encounter them in a planning process):
• Characterizing values: How can the wide range 
of heritage values be identiﬁed and characterized in a way
that is relevant to all the disciplines and stakeholders
involved? 
• Methodological issues and strategies for assessing
heritage values: What kinds of methodological strategies
and speciﬁc assessment tools are available and appropriate
for assessing heritage values?
• Tools for eliciting heritage values: How can the views
of the many parties with a stake in a heritage site be
accommodated in the conservation planning process,
including its speciﬁc value-assessment phase?
• Integrating assessments and guiding decision making:
Once the range of heritage values has been articulated,
how can they inform decision making?
Figure  Planning process methodology.
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Characterizing Values
As a prelude to speciﬁc discussions of value assessment,
this section delves into characterizing the notion of value
as a guiding idea in heritage conservation. One of the
core assumptions of this paper is the usefulness of the
“values” perspective to illuminate conservation and man-
agement planning issues and make these activities more
eﬀective. 
Values in Conservation
Values is most often used in one of two senses: ﬁrst, as
morals, principles, or other ideas that serve as guides to
action (individual and collective); and second, in reference
to the qualities and characteristics seen in things, in partic-
ular the positive characteristics (actual and potential).5
This paper is concerned directly with the second deﬁni-
tion. The perspective taken here is an anthropological
one, and it values the attempt to understand the full range
of values and valuing processes attached to heritage—
as opposed to the normative, art historical view common
in the conservation ﬁeld, which a priori privileges artistic
and historical values over others. 
Figure  The cultural signiﬁcance/value assessment process. This three-part model of value assessment is a more detailed rendering of the “Cultural
signiﬁcance/value assessment” oval occupying the center of the planning process methodology (Figure ). With the diﬀerent parts of the value-
assessment process identiﬁed, planners can apply a logical sequence of tasks to generate and collect knowledge about values and use this within
the overall planning process.
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Value suggests usefulness and beneﬁts. Heritage
is valued not as an intellectual enterprise but because 
(as one aspect of material culture) it plays instrumental,
symbolic, and other functions in society. This will become
clearer below, as diﬀerent types of heritage value are
described.
In the sphere of material heritage, the simple
question of “What is the value of this thing?” provokes 
a whole range of answers, all meaningful and legitimate—
and therein lies an important issue. In a given moment, 
a given heritage site, building, or object has a number of
diﬀerent values ascribed to it—heritage is multivalent. As
an example, take a hypothetical old church: it has spiritual
value as a place of worship; it has historical value because
of the events that have transpired there (or simply because
it is old); it has aesthetic value because it is beautiful and a
ﬁne work of architecture; it has economic value as a piece
of real estate; it has political value as a symbolic represen-
tation of a certain kind of social order; and so on. What’s
more, the diﬀerent values that can be discerned corre-
spond to diﬀerent stakeholders or expert observers. 
This multivalence is an essential quality of heritage and,
as argued below, logically suggests a pluralistic, eclectic
approach to value assessment.
A second important insight about heritage values
is that they are contingent, not objectively given. The
values of heritage are not simply “found” and ﬁxed and
unchanging, as was traditionally theorized in the conser-
vation ﬁeld (i.e., the notion of heritage values being
intrinsic). Values are produced out of the interaction of an
artifact and its contexts; they don’t emanate from the arti-
fact itself. Values can thus only be understood with refer-
ence to social, historical, and even spatial contexts—
through the lens of who is deﬁning and articulating the
value, why now, and why here? For conservation profes-
sionals, this requires some substantial rethinking of the
kinds of research and knowledge that are needed to sup-
port conservation. Traditionally, values were articulated
by experts’ analysis of heritage as a work of art or a record
of the past. Only recently has the conservation ﬁeld begun
to embrace such factors as economics, cultural change,
public policy, and social issues—and they have yet to be
fully integrated into the ﬁeld. 
“Where do values come from?” has been a ques-
tion of considerable debate. Should material culture rec-
ognized as heritage be said to have some intrinsic value
(unchanging and universal), or should heritage value be
seen as radically and essentially extrinsic and constructed 
out of the various social contexts of the object, building,
or site? The answer seems to lie somewhere in between:
value is formed in the nexus between ideas and things.
The viewpoint adopted in this research borrows from
both ends of this spectrum: on one hand, everything
anointed as heritage will, by deﬁnition, have some kind of
heritage value (aside from whether the value is primarily
historic, artistic, or social). In other words, anything
deﬁned as heritage is said to intrinsically and tautologi-
cally possess some kind of heritage value (though the
nature of that value is not intrinsically given). On the
other hand, the contingent/constructed viewpoint rightly
points to value-formation factors outside the object itself
and emphasizes the important social processes of value
formation. Recognizing the fundamental contingency 
of heritage values does not preclude the possibility of
some values that are universally held (or nearly so). These
socially constructed values—think of the Great Pyramids,
for instance—are seen as universal because they are so
widely held, not because they are objective truths. 
Value Typologies
The pragmatic questions at hand are: how can a wide
range of heritage values be identiﬁed and characterized in
a way that () informs policies and planning decisions, and
() is relevant to all the disciplines and stakeholders
involved? 
Values in heritage conservation have traditionally
been treated in one of two ways: () one kind of value pre-
dominates and blots out consideration of others; or ()
values are treated as a black box, with all aspects of her-
itage value collapsed into “signiﬁcance.” The ﬁrst treat-
ment is problematic because whole categories of value
can be excluded a priori. For instance, if the economic use
value of a historic site is allowed to predominate, the
tourism activity that maximizes those economic values
can quickly obscure or erode the site’s historical values
(visitor traﬃc destroys historic context and even the
resources themselves, perhaps by careless visitors climb-
ing on ruins or taking fragments as souvenirs). The sec-
ond kind of treatment (the “black box”) is problematic
because in collapsing all values to an aggregate statement
of signiﬁcance, the diﬀerent types of heritage value are
mystiﬁed or rendered secondary and are thus neglected.
An example of this would be a historic church or mosque
that is classiﬁed by authorities and understood by the sec-
ular public primarily as a building of historical or artistic
signiﬁcance; this circumstance can obscure another

important value of the building as a sacred site of wor-
ship. By hanging the determination of signiﬁcance too
much on the artistic value of the religious building, the
other (“secondary”) value of religious worship or even 
of musical performance can be eroded, even though it
would not be diﬃcult to conserve all of these values
simultaneously.
There are so many diﬀerent kinds of values, and
the interactions among them are so complex, that a more
eﬀective way of treating this issue has to begin with a
clear, eﬀectively neutral, agreed-upon way of characteriz-
ing diﬀerent types of heritage value—as seen by the wide
variety of stakeholders in conservation eﬀorts. A typology
of heritage values would be an eﬀective guide to characteri-
zation and would move conservation stakeholders closer
to having a lingua franca in which all parties’ values can be
expressed and discussed. By use of such a typology—a
framework that breaks down signiﬁcance into constituent
kinds of heritage value—the views of experts, citizens,
communities, governments, and other stakeholders can
be voiced and compared more eﬀectively.
Any eﬀort to break down and describe the values
attached to a particular heritage site immediately encoun-
ters conceptual and practical diﬃculties. The diﬀerent
articulations of heritage value (in terms of historical asso-
ciation, artistic merit, or dollars) are at some level diﬀerent
expressions of the same qualities, seen through diﬀerent
eyes. The units and yardsticks used by art historians,
sociologists, and economists, for instance, are not readily
comparable or translatable. In addition to these diﬀer-
ences in epistemology and modes of expression, there are
real diﬀerences in how a particular type of value is
assessed by diﬀerent stakeholders—for instance, the
economic value as assessed by a corporation operating
and owning a heritage site, versus a typical resident of a
nearby village. A third diﬃculty in characterizing values
lies in the fact that values are always changing in some
respect, and we should expect this as part of the essential,
social nature of heritage. For all these reasons, heritage
values cannot be objectively measured and broken 
down in the same sense that a chemist, for instance, can
analyze and break down a compound to determine its
constituent parts.
While the subjectivity and contingency of
heritage values make it diﬃcult to establish a clear frame-
work or even a nomenclature of values (akin to a
chemist’s elements and compounds), this is precisely what
is needed to facilitate the assessment and integration of
diﬀerent heritage values in conservation planning and
management. So the concept of values needs to be bro-
ken down and deﬁned in a typology, at least provisionally.
By suggesting a typology in the remainder of this section,
we wish to highlight its provisional nature. It is not
claimed that this (or any) typology will be appropriate 
for all sites or situations—it is simply an attempt to 
create a common starting point from which a modiﬁed
typology can be constructed in a variety of heritage plan-
ning situations.
The practical aspects of discussing typologies
should also be emphasized. Establishing a typology of
values will facilitate discussion and understanding of the
diﬀerent valuing processes at play in heritage conserva-
tion. This kind of knowledge ultimately can guide practi-
tioners’ choices of appropriate assessment methods for a
wide range of heritage values. Typologies also constitute
a ﬁrst-order research tool, ordering and organizing knowl-
edge so that research builds on itself—it keeps practition-
ers from having to continually reinvent the wheel. The
beneﬁt of using a common typology of values is that it
lends comparability to the evaluation of diﬀerent projects.
Table  Summary of heritage value typologies devised by various scholars and organizations 
(Reigl ; Lipe ; for the Burra Charter, Australia ICOMOS ; Frey ; English Heritage ).
Reigl () Lipe () Burra Charter () Frey () English Heritage ()
Age Economic Aesthetic Monetary Cultural
Historical Aesthetic Historic Option Educational and academic
Commemorative Associative-symbolic Scientiﬁc Existence Economic
Use Informational Social (including spiritual, Bequest Resource
Newness political, national, other Prestige Recreational
cultural) Educational Aesthetic

This is an important goal of research on conservation
planning—establishing some grounds for comparison
among many types of heritage projects and deriving best-
practices guidance applicable to many diﬀerent situations.
Finally, the typology is both an analytical tool and a way
to advance wider participation in the planning process.
Value categories correspond to diﬀerent stakeholder posi-
tions voiced in heritage debates and projects, and devising
and debating the typology are themselves means of stim-
ulating participation.
As one would expect, given the conceptual com-
plexities outlined so far, ﬁnding agreement on a typology
or a nomenclature of heritage values has proven problem-
atic. Nearly everyone interested in heritage—citizen,
scholar, writer, professional, or organization—has a
slightly diﬀerent conception, advanced from a particular
perspective, of how to describe these characteristics of
heritage. Consider the sampling of heritage value typolo-
gies devised by diﬀerent scholars and organizations and
summarized in Table .6 In most instances, they describe
the same pie, but slice it in subtly diﬀerent ways.
Typologies implicitly minimize some kinds 
of value, elevate others, or foreground conﬂicts between
the cultivation of certain values at the expense of others.
In the Burra Charter, for instance, economic values are
minimized because they are seen as derived from cultural
and historical values and are therefore given secondary
consideration.
It is apparent that there are several distinct, if not
fully separable, categories of heritage value—economic,
historical, spiritual, political, educational, aesthetic, artis-
tic. If one were to map these value schemata, there would
be a great deal of overlap even between such diﬀerent
frameworks as Frey’s (from economics) and Reigl’s (from
art history). The typology suggested in English Heritage’s
recent paper on sustainability is perhaps the most com-
prehensive and balanced (English Heritage ). This
breakdown is well oriented to conservation practice
because the value categories focus on how heritage is
used and valued (contingently, and by people other than
elites and experts), whereas many other typologies res-
onate more with connoisseurship and professional values
and are strongly inﬂuenced by the notion of heritage’s
intrinsic value.
A broad distinction is often made between eco-
nomic and cultural values as the two primary meta-
categories of heritage value. This distinction has served as
a starting point for the research undertaken by the Getty
Conservation Institute on values-related issues most rele-
Table  Provisional typology of heritage values.
Sociocultural Values Economic Values
Historical Use (market) value
Cultural/symbolic Nonuse (nonmarket) values
Social Existence
Spiritual/religious Option
Aesthetic Bequest
vant to conservation. However, defending a hard-and-fast
separation of economic and cultural spheres is untenable.
Economic behavior cannot be beyond, or separate from,
culture, which by deﬁnition is “ways of living together” or
attitudes and behaviors passed on. Indeed, economics is
one of the most dominant (sub)cultures—ways of living
together—in many societies.
Nevertheless, the economic-cultural distinction 
is widely shared and remains a very useful analytic con-
venience. The economic-cultural distinction resonates
because: () it highlights privatization and the inﬂuence 
of market logic into ever more spheres of social life, a
most pressing contemporary social issue; () it connects
to traditional debates around notions of economic base
and cultural superstructure and their relation in modern
societies; and () perhaps most important for our present
purposes, economic and cultural spheres represent two
quite distinct attitudes/perspectives toward the subject 
of values and valuing.
Provisional Typology
The provisional typology shown in Table —which is
neither exhaustive nor exclusive—is oﬀered as a point of
departure and discussion.
This typology includes the kinds of value most
often associated with heritage sites and conservation
issues, but it does not assume that every heritage site has
every type of value. The working assumption behind the
typology presented here is that these categories encom-
pass most of the heritage values that shape decision mak-
ing and that must be considered in conservation planning
and management. The danger in using such a typology is
that it may suggest that one framework of values speaks
equally well to all heritage sites, issues, and cultural
milieus. If it were used in this normative way, and as an a
priori framework, it would preﬁgure too much about the
values of a heritage site. It is reiterated, therefore, that any
value typology should serve only as a starting point and
that value types will have to be adjusted and revised for
each project/setting.
The two major categories—sociocultural and
economic—do not actually refer to diﬀerent, discrete sets
of values. Economic and cultural are two alternative ways
of understanding and labeling the same, wide range of
heritage values. There are substantial overlaps between
the values each column in Table  helps identify. The
major diﬀerence between them resides in the very diﬀer-
ent conceptual frameworks and methodologies used to
articulate them.7
The same point must be made concerning the
subcategories within the “sociocultural values” group;
they are not distinct and exclusive; in fact, they overlap
quite extensively. This intermingling contrasts with the
categories of the “economic values” column, which are
intended to be distinct and exclusive of one another.
SOCIOCULTURAL VALUES
Sociocultural values are at the traditional core of conser-
vation—values attached to an object, building, or place
because it holds meaning for people or social groups due
to its age, beauty, artistry, or association with a signiﬁcant
person or event or (otherwise) contributes to processes 
of cultural aﬃliation. 
The types of sociocultural values outlined below
overlap. For instance, a quality deﬁned as a spiritual/
religious value (a congregation’s ongoing use of a historic
church, for example) could also be deﬁned as a historical
value (the history of generations worshiping in the church
and playing a role in the development of the surrounding
community) or as an artistic value (the particular design
of the building and its furnishings) or as a social value
(used for nonreligious gatherings—for instance, a holiday
concert or soup kitchen). While these uses are closely
related, it is important to understand these as diﬀerent
values, because they correspond to diﬀerent ways of con-
ceptualizing the value of the heritage, to diﬀerent stake-
holder groups, and therefore to diﬀerent bases for making
management or conservation decisions.
Notice that there is no separate category for polit-
ical value. The reason: all values attributed to heritage are,
in fact, political, in that they are part of the power strug-
gles and exertions that determine the fate of heritage.
Values occupy center stage when it comes to the deci-
sions—the politics—about the conservation of heritage.
Historical Value
Historical values are at the root of the very notion of
heritage. The capacity of a site to convey, embody, or
stimulate a relation or reaction to the past is part of the
fundamental nature and meaning of heritage objects. His-
torical value can accrue in several ways: from the heritage
material’s age, from its association with people or events,
from its rarity and/or uniqueness, from its technological
qualities, or from its archival/documentary potential.
There are two important subtypes of historical
value that merit mention. Educational/academic value is
a type of historical value. The educational value of her-
itage lies in the potential to gain knowledge about the past
in the future through, for instance, archaeology or an
artist’s creative interpretation of the historical record
embodied in the heritage. Artistic value—value based on
an object’s being unique, being the best, being a good
example of, being the work of a particular individual, and
so on—is also a type of historical value.
Cultural/Symbolic Value
History and heritage are core elements of all cultures—
the ideas, materials, and habits passed through time—
so cultural values are, like historical value, a part of the
very notion of heritage. There is no heritage without
cultural value. Cultural values are used to build cultural
aﬃliation in the present and can be historical, political,
ethnic, or related to other means of living together (for
instance, work- or craft-related). As used in this typology,
cultural/symbolic value refers to those shared meanings
associated with heritage that are not, strictly speaking,
historic (related to the chronological aspects and mean-
ings of a site).
Political value—the use of heritage to build or
sustain civil relations, governmental legitimacy, protest, 
or ideological causes—is a particular type of cultural/
symbolic value. These values stem from the connection
between civic/social life and the physical environment
and from the capacity of heritage sites in particular to
stimulate the kind of positive reﬂection and political
behavior that builds civil society. Political/civil value can
be manifestly symbolic, or it can stem from research and
understanding of how heritage sites are created and
evolve, and from learning about who has shaped the envi-
ronment. Like all heritage values, political value can be
interpreted through a positive lens—as a key contributor
to civil society—or, more cynically, it can be interpreted as
a political tool used to enforce national culture, imperial-
ism, postcolonialism, and so on.

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Craft- or work-related values are often very
important aspects of heritage. A building embodies the
methods used to design and make it, and the values
relating to the process of making and building are often
separate from (or lost among) more static historical or
aesthetic values.
This category also includes heritage values used
to stimulate ethnic-group identity, in cases in which the
group does not have a strong religious aspect.
Social Value
The concept of social value follows closely the notion 
of “social capital,” a widely used concept in the social sci-
ence and development ﬁelds. The social values of heritage
enable and facilitate social connections, networks, and
other relations in a broad sense, one not necessarily
related to central historical values of the heritage. The
social values of a heritage site might include the use of
a site for social gatherings such as celebrations, markets,
picnics, or ball games—activities that do not necessarily
capitalize directly on the historical values of the site but,
rather, on the public-space, shared-space qualities. The
kinds of social groups strengthened and enabled by these
kinds of values could include everything from families to
neighborhood groups to ethnic groups to special interest
groups (e.g., bird-watchers).
Social value also includes the “place attachment”
aspects of heritage value. Place attachment refers to the
social cohesion, community identity, or other feelings 
of aﬃliation that social groups (whether very small and
local, or national in scale) derive from the speciﬁc heritage
and environment characteristics of their “home” territory.
Spiritual/Religious Value
Heritage sites are sometimes associated or imbued with
religious or other sacred meaning. These spiritual values
can emanate from the beliefs and teachings of organized
religion, but they can also encompass secular experiences
of wonder, awe, and so on, which can be provoked by
visiting heritage places.
Aesthetic Value
Aesthetic value is widely agreed to be a category of socio-
cultural value, though it refers to a wide range of quali-
ties. In the main, aesthetic refers to the visual qualities 
of heritage. The many interpretations of beauty, of the
sublime, of ruins, and of the quality of formal relation-
ships considered more broadly have long been among the
most important criteria for labeling things and places as
heritage. The design and evolution of a building, object,
or site can be another source of aesthetic value. It is also
argued that the category of the aesthetic can be inter-
preted more widely to encompass all the senses: smell,
sound, and feeling, as well as sight. Thus, a heritage site
could be seen as valuable for the sensory experience 
it oﬀers. Aesthetic value is a strong contributor to a sense 
of well-being and is perhaps the most personal and indi-
vidualistic of the sociocultural value types. 
ECONOMIC VALUES
Economic valuing is one of the most powerful ways in
which society identiﬁes, assesses, and decides on the rela-
tive value of things. The papers in this volume by David
Throsby and by Susana Mourato and Massimiliano
Mazzanti beautifully characterize and analyze in some
detail the notion of value and valuing as seen by the disci-
pline of economics. Economic values overlap a great deal
with the sociocultural values (historical, social, aesthetic,
and so on) described above, and they are distinguished
most because they are measured by economic analyses. 
In other words, economic values are diﬀerent because
they are conceptualized in a fundamentally diﬀerent way
(according to a fundamentally diﬀerent epistemology, one
not commensurable with the narrative epistemologies
used for sociocultural values). According to neoclassical
economic theory, economic values are the values seen
primarily through the lens of individual consumer and
ﬁrm choice (utility) and are most often expressed in terms
of price. Not all economic values, however, are measured
in terms of market prices.
Economic values stemming from the conserva-
tion of heritage are often, by deﬁnition, understood to be
a public good—reﬂecting collective decisions rather than
individual, market decisions—and are therefore not cap-
tured by market price measures. There is an important
distinction between what values can legitimately be repre-
sented in terms of price (privately held values, which can
be traded in a market) and what factors shape resource
allocation decisions (public ones, collectively held, and
provided outside of markets). Accounting for these gaps is
one of the goals of the research eﬀort. A diverse set of
economic valuation methods, therefore, will be needed to
span this gap between private/market values and pub-
lic/nonmarket values.
The diﬀerent economic values outlined here, and
the relations among them, are summarized in the paper
by Mourato and Mazzanti in the present volume.8 The
main distinction they draw is related to use versus nonuse
values, corresponding to the types of economic values
measured through markets and outside of markets.9

Use Value (Market Value)
Use values are market values10—the ones most easily
assigned a price. Use values of material heritage refer to
the goods and services that ﬂow from it that are tradable
and priceable in existing markets. For instance, admission
fees for a historic site, the cost of land, and the wages of
workers are values. Because they are exchanged in mar-
kets, these values can be easily expressed in terms of price,
and they are susceptible to economists’ many analytical
tools based on neoclassical theory.
Nonuse Value (Nonmarket Value)
Nonuse values are economic values that are not traded in
or captured by markets and are therefore diﬃcult to
express in terms of price. For instance, many of the quali-
ties described as sociocultural values are also nonuse
values. They can be classed as economic values because
individuals would be willing to allocate resources (spend
money) to acquire them and/or protect them. 
The economics ﬁeld describes nonuse values as
emanating from the public-good qualities of heritage—
those qualities that are “nonrival” (consumption by one
person does not preclude consumption by someone else)
and “nonexcludable” (once the good/service is provided
to anyone, others are not excluded from consuming it). 
A public archaeological site would exhibit these qualities
very clearly. Markets fail to provide public goods and ser-
vices, and nonuse values therefore pose a diﬃcult
methodological problem for economists.
In large part, nonuse values are an alternative
way of looking at the sociocultural values described and
distinguished above. Sociocultural values and nonuse
values are two ways of slicing the same pie, as it were.
Nonuse values are often broken down into the
following, closely related categories (which are not
exhaustive) in order to specify exactly which qualities of
heritage motivate economic decisions:
Existence Value: Individuals value a heritage item
for its mere existence, even though they themselves may
not experience it or “consume its services” directly.
Option Value: The option value of heritage refers
to someone’s wish to preserve the possibility (the option)
that he or she might consume the heritage’s services at
some future time.
Bequest Value: Bequest value stems from the wish
to bequeath a heritage asset to future generations.
Intrinsic Values
How does the typology suggested here align
with the “intrinsic value” arguments made
regarding heritage—and also made vis-à-vis
nature in environmental conservation? This
typology is premised on the assumption that
values are fundamentally contingent—in other
words, that they are socially as well as spatially
constructed. But can one assume that some 
of the values of heritage are intrinsic (if not
ﬁxed or absolute)—i.e., that some kind of
historic value is intrinsic to the whole notion 
of something being identiﬁed as heritage? 
This intrinsic-value argument in heritage con-
servation would be analogous to the “intrinsic”
argument in environmental conservation,
through which it is assumed that “natural”
characteristics (wildness) are intrinsically
valuable. This idea parallels the notion of
authenticity in the heritage ﬁeld, which
presumes that some kind of historic value is
represented by—inherent in—some truly old
and thus authentic material (authentic in that it
was witness to history and carries the authority
of this witness). Thus, if one can prove authen-
ticity of material, historical value is indelibly
established.

Methodological Issues and Strategies
It was asserted above that questions of value and valuing
are not, for the most part, susceptible to technical solu-
tions. Values are embedded in culture and social relations,
which are ever in ﬂux. Political realities—the patterns of
power that join and separate the various stakeholders in
the heritage—are ever present: they are sometimes on the
surface of conservation activities; often they lurk just
beneath. The practical goal in devising value-assessment
methodologies, approaches, routines, and tools11 is there-
fore not to search for the single best answer; nor is it to
yield objectivity, technical precision, or a one-size-ﬁts-all
technique for eﬀective conservation planning. Rather, the
focus on methodologies (on the process of generating
knowledge) will bring relevant information to bear, will
lend transparency to the process, and will abet the goal of
achieving wider, meaningful participation in the process.
This section of the paper airs a number of issues
regarding methodological strategies for assessing heritage
values and goes on to discuss a number of tools that are,
or could be, used for assessment. In a survey of these
available tools, one recurring theme is the conservation
ﬁeld’s great potential for borrowing or adapting proven
value-assessment methods from disciplines such as
anthropology and economics.
Before describing speciﬁc methods and tools,
some strategic issues underlying the choice of methods
and tools should be rehearsed. This section highlights
four such issues:
• some general issues and conditions surrounding
the activity of value assessment;
• quantitative and qualitative methods for value
assessment, and the fundamental epistemological and
practical diﬀerences between them;
• the need for a “toolbox” methodological
approach to heritage value assessment, one that ﬂexibly
combines a wide variety of assessment tools;
• identiﬁcation of stakeholders and the widely
recognized political issue of participation—in other
words, the political and pragmatic imperative to give
voice to experts, professionals, and other “insiders” to
conservation, planning, and decision making, as well as to
give voice to laypeople, local communities, and other
“outsiders” to the process.
General Issues and Conditions
Methodological choices for value assessment must, at
some juncture in the management planning process,
engage a few broad and fundamental issues (Figure ).
First, the value assessment process actually
consists of a few discrete but closely related parts. Value
assessment is not a simple matter of simultaneous
identiﬁcation and measurement, like taking the tempera-
ture. Assessment can be broken down into three parts:
identiﬁcation, elicitation and elaboration (including
exploring connections and overlaps), and ranking and
prioritization.
Second, we can assume that no single value-
assessment method will give perfect, total, or even ade-
quate knowledge to inform conservation decisions on the
ground. Given the varied nature of heritage values,
knowledge about them is best gained by adopting a num-
ber of quite diﬀerent perspectives (epistemologies) and, it
follows, methodologies. To gauge suﬃciently all heritage
values of a project or site and to inform conservation
decisions on the ground, a suite of varied methods—
quantitative or qualitative, economic or anthropologi-
cal—is likely to be the best course. A further challenge,
addressed below, lies in matching appropriate methods to
all the values identiﬁed in making a typology.
Third, context is one of the watchwords by
which one can assure a varied, robust perspective on
which values to assess. Context, as used here, refers to
physical, geographical surroundings; to historical patterns
and narratives; and to the social processes with discernible
impact on heritage and its conservation. These include
the cultural, social, economic, and other conditions
contributing to signiﬁcance, as well as the management
setting and physical surroundings of the site. Heritage
sites and objects must be understood in relation to their
contexts—in other words, holistically. One cannot fully
understand a site without understanding its contexts,
which, perforce, extend beyond the site itself both liter-
ally and conceptually.
Conservation professionals have traditionally
been very skilled in looking at certain contexts of her-
itage—relating to physical deterioration, environmental
conditions, and other physical factors; or to art historical
narratives and aesthetic canons—and have developed
methodologies and tools for analyzing these contexts. 
But an understanding of heritage values in the fullest
sense requires that conservation professionals cast a 
wider net and consider more and diﬀerent contexts of
conservation—economic, cultural, and political. As a
corollary to this, conservation professionals and planners
must reach out to other ﬁelds and disciplines—which have
already gained some experience in assessing such contex-
tual issues—and bring more rigor to this engagement.
For instance, in approaching conservation plan-
ning for an archaeological site, it is often imperative to
understand and deal with the pressures and opportunities
presented by tourism development—not just the tourism
activities that happen on the site but also the values that
shape decisions well before and well after the actual visit.
Such planning requires an understanding of economic
forces, methods of economic analysis, public policy,
cultural tensions, and trade-oﬀs that often accompany
tourism development, as well as the relationship of these
factors to traditional conservation aims and principles.
Moreover, the meaning of the archaeological site to the
communities living around it may well be one of the driv-
ing forces behind the eﬀort to plan and conserve. In this
case, conservation professionals need to understand the
values as seen by that community, which suggest a whole
range of methodologies for articulating those values
(ranging from ethnographic studies, to focus groups and
interviews, to community involvement and “mapping”
processes).
Fourth, several complications ﬂow from the fact
that values come from people—they are opinions. Values
come into play only when they are articulated and cham-
pioned by stakeholders. But whom does one consult or
ask? How broad is the net of informants and spokespeople
and experts? Where can one draw the line to limit the
number of voices so that the diversity of values is repre-
sentative and manageable and not overwhelming? There is
no universal solution to this dilemma, but neither does
one have only intuition to follow. These questions are
addressed by constituency analysis and the ethnographic
methods described below. Another complication relates to
how one asks the questions—or, in the terms laid out
above, how does one elicit values? As Theresa Satterﬁeld’s
research shows, asking for numerical responses and
narrative responses to value-elicitation questions yields
somewhat diﬀerent sets of values (see Satterﬁeld,
“Numbness and Sensitivity in the Elicitation of Environ-
mental Values,” herein; see also Satterﬁeld, forthcoming).
First, one should aim for a diversity of tools and forms 
of knowledge (not only numerical, not only narrative);
second, one can seek out the kinds of values and stake-
holders that usually prove most elusive—disadvantaged
communities, spiritual values, a sense of place.
Quantitative and Qualitative Methods
Economic and cultural modes of conceptualizing and
gauging value represent two distinct and somewhat
incommensurate ways of looking at value—one quantiﬁ-
able and based on individual preferences, the other
resistant to quantiﬁcation and premised on collective
meaning. In the main, economic values are best elicited
and expressed by quantitative research methods. Mathe-
matics is, after all, the fundamental language of modern
economics. Conversely, cultural values submit to quantiﬁ-
cation only ﬁtfully and inadequately. Qualitative research
methods, ranging from narratives and analyses written by
experts to interviews of ordinary citizens, elicit cultural
values more eﬀectively.
Grand claims have been made that economic
methods based on neoclassical theory yield a comprehen-
sive assessment of heritage values—these methods trans-
late all types of value, it is said, into terms of dollars by
simulating markets or assuming that markets exist for
them. Such claims are fraught with problems, though.
The best assessment of heritage values, many agree,
comes from a complementary use of economic and
cultural methods. (In his paper in this volume, David
Throsby reaches this conclusion, arguing from the
perspective of an economist thinking about the value of
culture and the arts.)
Quantitative and qualitative methodologies
derive from quite diﬀerent epistemologies. Both provide
ways of taking samples, making proxies of complex reali-
ties that cannot be described in toto. The two approaches
can be seen as attempts to measure the same values, 
albeit from diﬀerent perspectives, with diﬀerent tools and
discourses, and with diﬀerent results. The information
generated by both kinds of methods is disjunct—it is
diﬃcult, if not impossible, to measure and compare 
them on the same scale. Though they may be seen as
competing paradigms, the information they generate is
often complementary.
The particular strengths and weaknesses of quan-
titative and qualitative approaches need to be considered
carefully. By their very nature, some kinds of values resist
being compared or scaled—spiritual values, for instance—
and thus are more susceptible to humanist, qualitative
methods. The scalable results of quantitative methods are
more easily cross-compared—thus, quantitative methods
remain the lingua franca for policy makers. Quantitative
methods focus on causal relationships and depend on vari-
ables isolated from their contexts. However, as mentioned
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above, values and other forms of meaning are produced
out of the interaction of artifacts and their contexts, not
from the artifact itself. This arena is where qualitative
research methods have a particular strength; they are sen-
sitive to contextual relationships (as opposed to causal
connections) and are therefore indispensable in studying
the nature and interplay of heritage values.12
A Toolbox Approach
Since a full assessment of heritage values will require a
diverse suite of methods and a ﬂexible approach, how
does one begin to match methods to values? Can the
values in the provisional typology be matched up with
speciﬁc methods? Not in a hard-and-fast sense. The kinds
of tools that have been brought up—expert analyses,
quantitative/economic studies of use and nonuse values,
ethnographic assessments—are by design quite broad in
their sweep. In each instance, the speciﬁcs of the method
(the survey questions, the data collected, the experts con-
sulted) would have to be designed, on a case-by-case basis,
to respond to the range of values associated with the proj-
ect and to the personnel available to manage them. But it
would, for instance, be sensible to imagine a planning
process that used assessments with such components as
economic impact analysis; surveys of tourists, including
both narrative questions and quantifying methods such as
a willingness-to-pay study; ethnographic studies centered
on local communities (ethnic groups, indigenous people,
recent migrants); interviews with local political oﬃcials
and businesspeople; and thorough analyses of the histori-
cal, artistic, educational, and other values of the site from
the scholarly/expert community.
The aim of the toolbox approach is to get all
relevant heritage values on the table, building the fullest
practicable account to inform policy making and decision
making. The variety of values represented in the typology
requires the use of a variety of tools in their assessment.
To manage this variety of available tools in the planner’s
toolbox, the notion of triangulation is useful. Triangula-
tion, which requires the use of a suite of diﬀerent meth-
ods in complementary ways, should be at the core of
an approach to eliciting and assessing heritage values. 
The underlying principle is that the layering of diﬀerent,
complementary pieces of information will produce a
more accurate answer than would the pursuit of one or
two pieces of information.
Given their diversity, the elicitation of heritage
values for a site requires casting this type of broad net by
layering diﬀerent approaches to yield the most robust
results. In this vein, Denzin and Lincoln () describe the
contemporary social researcher as a bricoleur: one who
patches together diﬀerent methods to glean diﬀerent sorts
of knowledge, iteratively, opportunistically, to build the
best composite answer to the question at hand. In the con-
text of assessing the social impacts of environmental poli-
cies, William Freudenburg has suggested a somewhat
more structured, systematic version of the triangulation-
bricoleur idea. He outlines a three-part method: ﬁrst,
employing secondary research techniques using existing,
archival data (both qualitative and quantitative); second,
conducting primary research using ethnographic ﬁeld-
work techniques; and third, using “gaps and blinders”
techniques (such as structured second-guessing, consulta-
tion, and public involvement) both to ﬁll in the blanks of
knowledge and to correct for the researchers’ own biases
(Freudenburg ).
The goal of a ﬂexible and useful methodology 
for value assessment has to be kept in the perspective of
the larger goal of seeking more sustainable practices and
policies for heritage conservation. It is a truism that the
same approach will not work in all places, in all cultural
contexts, for all kinds of heritage—it must be adaptable
and variable. With this ﬂexibility in mind, the frameworks
developed here aim to be meaningful for a range of stake-
holders, take a broad view of values as motivations
behind conservation, and accept wide participation as an
inherent aspect of conservation. The methodological
approach to value assessment proposed here must not
only be ﬂexible—the ideas and approaches should be
transferable and useful. These are among the ingredients
of more sustainable conservation.
It is signiﬁcant that all of the experts contributing
papers to this volume reach the same basic conclusion
regarding future research: the formulation and testing 
of some kind of toolbox approach—well “integrated,” 
as Mourato and Mazzanti emphasize, across disciplinary
lines as well as value types—is the next, urgent step to 
be taken.

Stakeholders and Participation in 
Value Assessment
Having at one’s disposal the most eﬀective methods for
eliciting and assessing heritage values is important. How-
ever, the real power of a values-based approach comes
through using these tools to cultivate the values as felt,
conceived, and realized by actual groups concerned with
the stewardship of actual heritage sites. Engaging heritage
values “on the ground”—so to speak—requires engage-
ment with questions of inﬂuence, competition, power,
and politics. One must venture questions such as: Who
participates in heritage value assessment? Whose values
are counted? Thus, who has power to shape conservation
outcomes?
There are several diﬀerent sources of heritage
value: community and other culture groups, the market,
the state, conservators, other experts, property owners,
and ordinary citizens. In assessing values, the simplest
political guideline is trying, as a matter of equity and accu-
racy, to work toward wide participation and account for
the views of all the relevant valuers.13
The question of stakeholders is an essential 
issue in value assessment. The importance of stakehold-
ers to the notion of values and value assessment is clear—
stakeholders do the valuing. Thus, identifying the stake-
holder groups and employing methods designed to reach
and hear them in light of their particular character and
capacity are required of any methodology for heritage
value assessment. As it is widely believed that widening 
of the circle of stakeholders involved in a project
improves both the process and the outcome, constituency
analysis and identiﬁcation of stakeholders is an extremely
important task.
INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS
As shorthand for addressing calls for wider participation
and stakeholder involvement in conservation, consider
the gross distinction between insiders and outsiders to the
conservation planning and decision-making process. The
distinction stems from the notion that some stakeholders
are “at the table” where values are identiﬁed, assessed, and
ranked and where decisions are made, while other legiti-
mate stakeholders are not present.
Insiders are those who can participate in the
process by right or might—actors with power, such as
public oﬃcials, bureaucrats, policy makers, those who
inﬂuence them, and (to an extent) conservation profes-
sionals and other experts invited into the process.
Outsiders constitute everyone else with a stake in the her-
itage in question but with little or no leverage on the
process. In some instances, outsiders are actively excluded
from the process; in other instances, they have no knowl-
edge of the process or lack ﬂuency in the language of con-
servation and policy and perhaps even lack an inclination
to participate. More and more frequently, eﬀorts are made
by both sides to shift outsiders to the inside. Outsiders can
be brought into the decision-making process or else they
can force themselves in—which happens often enough.
Outsiders are not simply nonprofessionals; con-
servation professionals, in fact, are often outsiders in that
they have little access to making or shaping the most
important decisions aﬀecting a site. It must be noted that
the values and interests of outsiders and insiders do not
necessarily conﬂict (despite the opposition implied in
these labels). Though they have a diﬀerent relation to the
decision-making processes, stakeholders on both sides
might very well ﬁnd common ground and beneﬁt by the
same course of conservation action.
The notion of including outsiders in conserva-
tion planning is fundamentally a political issue, a matter 
of power and authority. In one respect, such inclusion can
be addressed formally by bringing outsiders into the
client/steering group of a project, acknowledging out-
siders’ rights to property or use of a site, and so on. The
politics of participation can also be addressed in choosing
methodologies and designing the planning/management
process. Choosing methods is not only a matter of choos-
ing among diﬀerent expert/academic discourses; it also
embodies a political gesture as to whose analysis, voices,
and values are included in the decision-making mix.
Participation needs to be addressed at both levels: formal
membership in the process and design of the process.
The outsider/insider distinction also highlights
practical problems. While the values typologies discussed
here might make sense to us as conservation profession-
als, what would be the value categories for outsiders?
Would they be diﬀerent? What kind of language and
phrasing and communication would most eﬀectively abet
their participation? In devising and applying a typology for
a project, these questions must be considered. By what
methods can those conservation professionals, oﬃcials,
decision makers, and other stakeholders at the table gen-
erate knowledge about the value assessments of those
outside the process?

The insider/outsider idea may be useful for
identifying participants in the present. But a third set 
of actors (constituencies) may also be brought into the
process design—potential stakeholders. These could
consist of groups who may in the future exercise some
interest in the heritage site in question—future genera-
tions, for instance—or who may exist at a distance from
the heritage site (literally or metaphorically) but take
some interest in it (for example, the “community” 
of a nation’s citizens). These stakeholders, too, should be
accounted for in value assessment.
ADDRESSING PARTICIPATION PRACTICALLY
But how can one address participation practically?
Rhetorically, we all agree on the call for more participa-
tion. In principle, it is widely recognized that rigorous and
meaningful participation needs to be seen as a valuable
part of the planning process and integrated into many
aspects of assessment and planning. But it will take real
changes in professional attitudes as well as continual test-
ing of new, context-appropriate methods. Professionals
need to be open to other, nonexpert views about heritage
values and decisions and embrace alternative ways of
understanding value, negotiating diﬀerences, and so on.
The urban planning, environmental conserva-
tion, and development ﬁelds—and working with each, 
the discipline of anthropology—have wrestled with this
issue a great deal, and a vast amount of practical and intel-
lectual work has been done on participatory issues.14
Such concerns have also made some inroads in heritage
conservation. Progressive examples of participation in 
the heritage ﬁeld include Australia’s Burra Charter
process, the Main Street process pioneered in the United
States, and numerous more local eﬀorts being pursued,
for instance, in Canada (Kerr ).
Insiders and outsiders have to get integrated not
only in how their responses to value elicitation are
expressed and recorded but at the level of how they frame
questions of value. Therefore, insiders and outsiders
should be included in the composition of project teams
and through the planning process itself (in eﬀect, becom-
ing insiders instead of outsiders). The alternative to this
kind of eﬀective integration of insiders and outsiders—
generating separate assessments of diﬀerent types of
stakeholders and simply collecting them—would fall short
of a full assessment of a project’s heritage values.
In terms of the methods and planning process
involved in this research, there are a couple of ways to
address practically the issue of wider participation. 
First, a thorough constituency analysis is needed to iden-
tify all stakeholders: inside and outside, near and distant,
present and projecting into the future. This analysis
should inform composition of a project team and a con-
sultation process representing as many diﬀerent relevant
stakeholder positions as possible. The constituency analy-
sis should also be revisited periodically throughout the
project, as new or diﬀerent groups may come to light. 
A second measure for ensuring participation is the kind 
of ethnographic-economic suite of methodologies
suggested throughout, the basic purpose of which is to
engage many stakeholders in the assessment of heritage
values driving conservation planning and management,
engaging them with elicitation tools congruent with their
“ﬂuencies” and the values they tend to hold dear.
Tools for Eliciting Heritage Values
How can the views of the many parties with a stake in 
a heritage site be searched out, articulated, and brought to
the table?
This section concerns the tools used in the “elici-
tation/elaboration” part of the value assessment process
(see Figure ). At this stage, where the values have already
been identiﬁed and a typology for the site has been
created, the methodological issue is choosing tools appro-
priate to elicit and characterize (elaborate upon) the diﬀ-
erent heritage values. Several kinds of tools are detailed
below; they include, for instance, economic impact stud-
ies, contingent valuation studies, ethnographic studies 
of particular culture groups, historic contexts written by
historians, or scholarly analysis of artistic merits. As noted
previously, certain methodologies are better suited to
gauging particular values.15 There are no hard-and-fast
rules to guide the choice of tools, only rules of thumb.
Tools Suited to Cultural Values
A wide range of methodologies is used in a large number
of ﬁelds relevant to matters of heritage conservation.
Which kinds of methods are best suited to gauging
cultural values in a broad, comprehensive (though not
necessarily exhaustive) way? We make several assump-
tions from the start: that gauging cultural values
adequately will require a suite of diﬀerent methods; that
this suite will likely include both quantitative and qualita-
tive methods; that one of the goals of the suite approach
is inclusiveness; that this suite will have to be adjusted as it
is applied from project to project.

The conservation ﬁeld has traditionally relied on
expert appraisals (of artworks, buildings, and other
objects, by art historians, architects, and archaeologists)
for guidance on what to conserve. And the ﬁeld has tradi-
tionally relied on scientiﬁc and documentary methods to
analyze the physical conditions of heritage and to deter-
mine how to conserve.16 Expert appraisals from a number
of diﬀerent disciplinary perspectives will continue to be
an important input to value assessment, though they have
already started to be combined and integrated with other
kinds of assessments (detailed below), attuned to captur-
ing the values of other stakeholders.
Art historical canons of taste, beauty, innovation,
and authenticity—along with age or perception of age—
have traditionally been an important source of valuing for
the conservation ﬁeld. The works of Reigl, Ruskin, and
other nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century art histori-
ans and critics are foundations of these methods of valu-
ing heritage, which were marshaled by art historians and
by collectors themselves. These experts ﬁxed the value 
of things, and then conservators ﬁxed those things materi-
ally. The values themselves and conservation decisions
stemmed from judgments made by a connoisseur and/or
scholarly expert trained in the canons of taste, authentic-
ity, and historical signiﬁcance.
The work of Cesare Brandi and Paul Philippot—
and, before them, Boito and Giovannoni and others—
underscored the need for conservation professionals to
understand the object within its broader context and
thereby helped advance the notion of conservation as 
an interdisciplinary, technical, and humanities-based
discipline, well beyond its craft origins.17 As a maturing
discipline, conservation method has involved the develop-
ment of standard approaches to the documentation and
analysis of art/architectural histories, formal and material
compositions, and physical conditions. These tools and
methodologies have provided additional insight into
assessing values, in that they inform understanding 
of the evolution of and use of objects and places, identify
original elements and materials, help interpret artists’/
creators’ “original intent,” and relate changes to intrinsic
factors (design, material composition, and so on) and to
extrinsic factors (environment, human intervention or
lack thereof, and so on).
But this notion of context was narrowly drawn—
pegged to some physical contact with the heritage itself.
The values beyond those apparent from visual-textual-
iconographic-material analysis by conservation experts
and connoisseurs have been explored minimally. However,
we need a more social conception of context to get at the
values that go beyond the site itself but that aﬀect the
site—for example, cultural change, economic markets,
the dynamics of civil society, the politics of nationalism
and ethnic conﬂict, and so on.
Other ﬁelds related to conservation (rural devel-
opment, ecological conservation) have more avidly
sought to understand contextual issues and to bring them
into the analytical territory familiar to practitioners. 
A wide range of qualitative methodological approaches is
used in humanities and social science disciplines and pro-
fessional ﬁelds (especially urban planning, the develop-
ment ﬁeld,18 and environmental conservation) to study
social phenomena. Most methods are rooted in a certain
discipline—for instance, ethnography with anthropology,
archival research with history, mapping with geography—
but the spread of interdisciplinary research and a broadly
held, catholic attitude toward the use and mixing of quali-
tative methods make it somewhat misleading to identify
certain methods with only their originating disciplines.
The main direction in the social sciences and humanities
has been “pollination” across disciplines.
The following general methodologies are oﬀered
as a spectrum of basic approaches, not speciﬁc to any one
arena but, rather, applied in anthropology, archaeology,
geography, sociology, city planning/urbanism, and vari-
ous hybrid ﬁelds.19 Each one is newly used in heritage
value assessment and has potential use for assessing values
in conservation planning.
EXPERT ANALYSIS (TEXTUAL/ICONOGRAPHIC/
FORMAL/SEMIOLOGIC)
Detailed analysis of particular objects, things, symbols,
and texts is the stock-in-trade of experts in any academic
or professional ﬁeld. As noted above, in the conservation
ﬁeld, this type of analysis has historically been exempliﬁed
by the connoisseurship judgments of art historians, cura-
tors, and collectors.
An expert interprets values and other phenomena
through theoretical screens (tacitly making a great many
epistemological assumptions) and interprets how they are
embedded in their wider contexts. Often the outcome is
some appraisal of the value of the object or phenomenon
according to a scale of values internal to the profession.
Such disciplinary distinctions purposely tend to isolate the
judgments of these experts from other inputs (if expert
knowledge is not set oﬀ from others’ knowledge, it loses
its value), so they work against the goal of wider participa-
tion. Who are these experts? They are the professionals

trained in nearly any humanistic or professional ﬁeld:
historians, art historians, architects, anthropologists,
geographers, and so on. Since these analyses are inher-
ently the province of experts—analyses are de facto
valuable if they are done by experts—there are few oppor-
tunities to compare or verify the judgments made.
ETHNOGRAPHY
Ethnography includes methods of describing and record-
ing the characteristics of a culture. Ethnography is usually,
though not necessarily, qualitative. It relies on informa-
tion-gathering activities such as interviews, oral histories,
observation, and recording of the characteristics of mate-
rial culture. With a number of particular information-
gathering tools at hand, ethnography seems well suited as
an approach to eliciting heritage values.
Initially seen as a positivist methodology, ethnog-
raphy has come to focus on recognizing the subjectivity 
of the observer as well as on recording the characteristics
of the culture that is the object. Many ethnographic
approaches have been developed in the ﬁeld of anthropol-
ogy, from participant observation studies of exotic cul-
tures early in the twentieth century to “thick description”
(emphasizing the embeddedness of cultural practices/
features in their myriad contexts, knowledge of which is
built up by thick description) to today’s very value-
sensitive approaches to representing the many voices
contributing to culture.
These types of applied social anthropology are 
of particular interest to heritage conservation. Indeed,
some anthropologists and designers have jointly
employed ethnographic methods as part of land- and
community-planning projects, synthesizing information
about social and physical contexts and using this informa-
tion to generate design and planning solutions. Setha
Low’s paper in this volume describes the speciﬁc ethno-
graphic approach she and her colleagues have used in
studying and planning heritage projects.
The tools Low and others have employed include
interviews, focus groups, mapping exercises, and struc-
tured observation techniques (Low ; McHarg ).
These eclectic but structured ethnographic methods have
been adapted to heritage conservation as the rapid ethno-
graphic assessment procedure (), a planning method
developed with the U.S. National Park Service.20
Likewise, an applied ethnographic methodology
called participatory rural assessment () is often used 
in the public health and development ﬁelds (particularly 
in agricultural development eﬀorts in less-developed
countries).  consists of a ﬂexible menu of ethno-
graphic and public-involvement techniques aimed at
understanding the values and knowledge that local
populations—traditional cultures and nonliterate groups 
in particular—wish to sustain as they encounter 
Western, nongovernmental organization eﬀorts to mod-
ernize and develop their economies.  not only aims 
to glean knowledge about the values and skills of non-
experts and the unempowered, it also aims directly to
empower them.21
Surveys and Interviews
As mentioned above, ethnographic methodologies often
employ interviews and surveys as data collection tools.
Surveys are used in myriad ﬁelds, from market research 
in the business world to those done to collect data for
sociological studies. They can be designed and conducted
in a great many ways (to elicit simple data or complex
responses, gathered in person, on paper, by telephone,
and so on). Interviews, too, can be designed in a variety 
of ways—structured or unstructured, using graphic or
written or recorded responses. Interviews can be under-
taken strategically, focusing on a few key informants, 
or extensively, with samples of hundreds. An enormous
literature of applied work exists on these tools.
Other Participatory Methods
The ﬁeld of planning/urbanism is another source of
methods for engaging multiple stakeholders in planning
and management eﬀorts. Since the s, many methods
have been applied in many kinds of projects. Dealing with
decisions on urban, social, environmental, infrastructural,
and economic development issues, planners have
employed varied means for understanding how ordinary
citizens ascribe value and how this aﬀects development
decisions. Methods often include surveys, public meet-
ings, focus groups, and key-informant interviews; vision-
ing, Delphi, and other group processes; mediation and
conﬂict resolution, in cases where a clear dispute has
arisen; institutionalizing the involvement of existing com-
munity groups; and even the creation of new community
groups (or capacity building among existing groups).
MAPPING
Plotting data on a map or plan is one simple and dis-
tinctive way of organizing information. Mapping 
can be exceedingly simple or very complex. It is so broad 
and basic a way of handling data that it is perhaps a 
stretch to call it a methodology; but in the broad deﬁni-
tion being used here, it does constitute a way of generat-
ing knowledge.

Mapping is already a basic methodology in
conservation, as part of the assessment of the physical
conditions of the heritage being studied. Conservation
professionals, architectural and landscape designers, and
planners routinely use mapping and mapped information
(existing conditions) as the most basic methodology for
approaching any project.22 The analytical potential of
mapping techniques has been made more powerful by the
introduction and wide use of desktop geographic infor-
mation systems () and the digital databases linked to
them.  systems are not in themselves a method of value
elicitation; they are a tool for organizing and analyzing
data in the service of planning and management.
Another distinctive kind of mapping methodol-
ogy is interactive mapping, when the choice and record-
ing of information on a map is not managed by profes-
sionals, experts, or decision makers but, rather, by com-
munity members or other nonprofessionals. Examples 
of interactive mapping include “mental mapping,” done
as a kind of survey; community-generated maps (such 
as the “parish map” process pioneered by the English
group Common Ground, which stimulates communities
to represent the identity of their place in innovative ways);
and the informal rocks-and-dirt “maps” included in some
 models.23
PRIMARY (ARCHIVAL) RESEARCH AND 
WRITING HISTORICAL NARRATIVES
The basic humanistic methodology of research, interpre-
tation, and writing a narrative account remains one of the
most eﬀective to construct and express knowledge about
values. Constructing a story, based on primary and other
research, is a particular way of documenting and describ-
ing social phenomena. Narratives deal with causation 
in a more circumspect way than, for instance, do statistical
methods. Often the contexts and settings of a phenome-
non are bundled into stories alongside human actors and
institutions. Understanding is gained by the unfolding 
of a story through characters and inﬂuences, not, by con-
trast, through abstracting relationships among isolated
variables.
In the last few decades, the work of social histori-
ans has gained more and more inﬂuence in the heritage
ﬁeld. Historians’ work speaks most directly to the associa-
tional (often termed historical) values that are a major
motivation behind conservation.
SECONDARY LITERATURE SEARCH
Secondary literature research perhaps goes without say-
ing, but it should not be overlooked as an expedient,
strategic methodology for quickly generating information
relevant to a project. It has become especially time eﬀec-
tive, given the widening availability of online biblio-
graphic and information-search resources.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This simplest of quantitative methods is widely used by
the whole range of qualitative disciplines, signaling the
virtual impossibility of really separating qualitative and
quantitative epistemologies. One application of the sim-
plest kind of descriptive statistics is content analysis (of,
say, media coverage or interviews: how many times was
aesthetic value mentioned versus economic value?). More
commonly, demographic analysis is used to characterize a
population in shorthand. Tabular data are gathered in
tables and sometimes mapped or presented graphically,
giving an eﬀective, though often quite cursory, account of
the current state of a population. (Multivariate statistics
are also used widely by social scientists, to understand and
theorize relations among diﬀerent phenomena. As noted
in the earlier discussion of quantitative and qualitative
methods, multivariate statistics is scientiﬁc in the sense
that it attempts to isolate variables and ﬁnd causal rela-
tionships, whereas descriptive statistics aims to build more
simple contextual understanding.)
Tools Suited to Economic Values
The various tools devised by economists24 to assess the
values of cultural heritage are adapted from those devised
earlier to measure the value of environmental resources
as part of environmental conservation decisions. Earlier
work by the Getty Conservation Institute and the grow-
ing cadre of cultural economists has summarized and
evaluated these contributions to heritage valuation.
Mourato and Mazzanti, in the present volume, provide 
an excellent summary of this past and present work in the
cultural economics of heritage, and their own work is
clearly on the cutting edge of economic thinking about
heritage values (see also Mason ; Hutter and Rizzo
). In light of Mourato and Mazzanti’s contribution to
this volume, a very brief summary of economic tools for
value assessment will do.


REVEALED-PREFERENCE METHODS
Revealed-preference methods draw and analyze data from
existing markets for heritage-related goods and services.
Economic impact studies have become very popular
because of the use of a quite simple method, and they
often suggest clearly that investment in a heritage project
will yield tangible economic gains. By measuring eco-
nomic investments and employment gains directly related
to conservation activity, and multiplying this on the the-
ory that these direct investments yield secondary gains as
they ripple throughout the economy, impact studies iden-
tify exact returns on investment (which is to say, increases
in the value of the heritage). Impact studies may be useful
in identifying some use values and some externalities of
heritage investments, but they are often suspect because
of double counting and because they fail to account for
the opportunity costs of heritage investment.
Hedonic pricing methods can measure nonuse her-
itage values only as they are reﬂected in related market
transactions. They measure the increments in ﬁnancial
value gained, for instance, from the proximity of a real
estate parcel to a particular heritage resource.
Travel-cost methods measure heritage values
through the proxy of travel expenditures related to the
use/consumption of heritage sites or objects. By only
recording values when they are translated into individual
decisions to travel, these methods give highly partial
accounts of heritage values.
STATED-PREFERENCE METHODS
Stated-preference methods rely on the creation of hypo-
thetical markets in which survey respondents are asked to
make hypothetical choices, which are then analyzed as
value judgments.
Contingent valuation methods measure total value
ascribed to a heritage site by an individual (expressed as
willingness to pay for it) but do not break down the value,
leaving it undiﬀerentiated. The method draws informa-
tion from individual appraisals and decisions, in hypothet-
ical markets, and does not see the collective picture at all,
except by aggregation and inference. This method is
beginning to be used more extensively for heritage proj-
ects, because it yields the sought-after conversion of quali-
tative values into quantiﬁed prices. (In the case of her-
itage, the corresponding concept of willingness to accept
compensation for loss of a resource can also be relevant.)
It should be noted that the insights and conclusions drawn
from contingent valuation studies of heritage resources
have been limited to instances where they are carried out
under very stringent conditions.
Choice modeling is a potentially very interesting
method for heritage in that it does break down the speciﬁc
attributes of the overall value expressed by study partici-
pants. Therefore, it could be used to measure the values
(the utility to individuals) associated with the diﬀerent
characteristics of a heritage site, according, for instance,
to the typology outlined above. Though people do
respond well to these types of scenarios and comparisons,
the method presumes very well informed participants,
and it will not capture well the intangible, diﬃcult-to-
price values (such as spiritual values).
Economic methods in general have gained a
great deal of credibility by () presenting data in a seem-
ingly objective form (prices), and () appealing quite
directly to the business-thinking mentality of global
decision makers and, increasingly, of society at large. Eco-
nomic methods are used more widely and for new pur-
poses, and they are gaining credibility. But there remains a
great danger in relying on quantitative economic methods
alone—this is a view strongly endorsed by some econo-
mists, including some of those involved in ’s research.
The neoclassical economic model is so well reﬁned, so
tightly theorized to block out uncertainties, that it sets a
tone in which other values seem a priori excluded (or 
devalued). This situation is problematic in several
respects, among them that people cannot talk about cer-
tain kinds of value in monetary terms; cognitively, quanti-
tative language doesn’t work very well, for instance, to
express spiritual values. In other situations, the ability to
express a commonly held qualitative value in quantitative
terms has been critical to getting proconservation deci-
sions made, so the urge to quantify remains very strong.
All the methods described in this section need
professional economists to direct them; there are many
technical problems to be dealt with, and the methods can
easily be abused if applied in an uninformed manner. But
the stated-preference methods, which include extensive
survey processes, open up a lot of common ground (and
potential collaboration) with the approaches used by
anthropologists and other social researchers. The ways
that economists create and adjust survey instruments are
basically identical to the ways that anthropologists do it
(an iterative process of piloting, reﬁning, rolling out).

Matching Tools to Values
In the transition from a typology of values to their assess-
ment, there should be a deliberate eﬀort to match assess-
ment tools to values. The choice of tools aﬀects values—
some tools give a more accurate or detailed view of cer-
tain values than others. For instance, economic impact
studies foreground the economic use values stemming
from decisions of tourists but don’t directly address all the
sociocultural values of a site. This circumstance is analo-
gous, one could say, to chemistry analytics: in a given situ-
ation, some compounds are best detected by gas chro-
matography, others by mass spectrometry.
There is no set recipe or methodology for match-
ing values with tools. What follows is the author’s sugges-
tion of how an iterative process of trial and error, along
with triangulation with a variety of methods, would con-
stitute a useful approach to matching tools to values.
As a ﬁrst step, one tool specially suited to gauging
each type of value identiﬁed (e.g., historical, artistic,
spiritual, use) should be sought. At the minimum, there
should be a broad tool suited to economic values and 
a broad tool suited to cultural values. There should be 
a tool focused on experts’ input, as well as a tool focused
on public, layperson perspectives. A particular tool can be
used to gauge more than one kind of value (for instance,
an ethnographic assessment could be designed to assess
spiritual as well as social values). Here are some more
general guidelines:
• Make sure the diversity of tools, and the
“ﬂuencies” they represent, match the diversity 
of values that have been identiﬁed.
• Choose experts and professionals with an eye
toward their capacity to understand and accept
the methodologies of others.
• Complement qualitative and quantitative tools.
• Make the process of assessment iterative, to the
extent allowed by budget and resources; start
broadly, then adjust to more speciﬁc tools.
• Attempt to give voice to outsiders as well as
insiders.
Integrating Assessments and
Frameworks for Decision Making
Once the broad array of values linked to a site are
assessed, how does one go forward? How does one con-
nect these assessments with the diﬃcult, politicized work
of prioritization and decision making? (In reference once
again to Figure , how might one connect the “assess-
ments and analysis” phase of management planning with
the “response” phase?) As with most issues regarding
planning processes, there is no prescription, but this sec-
tion outlines a series of steps—necessarily conceptual,
until they are developed in relation to particular proj-
ects—for building on the value assessments to tackle deci-
sion-making tasks. These steps must realistically involve
some integration and even prioritization of the values
assessed. Suggesting how this can be done—without pre-
scribing it—is the goal of this section.
The second part of this section describes (in
broad terms) how sustainability principles could be
adapted to provide some frameworks for making and
evaluating management planning decisions both within
projects and across multiple sites.
The steps are described conceptually, not as a
rote set of tasks and not to the level of detail that would
perforce arise from actually adapting and executing them.
While specifying the steps in great detail would need 
to be done in the case of a speciﬁc site, project, and team,
that process is beyond the scope of this paper. (Thus, 
to take this research further requires some application,
testing, and ﬁne tuning of these suggested steps.) 
Integrating Value Assessments
Four steps are suggested for integrating value assessments
and implementing as part of the planning process:
creating statements of signiﬁcance, matching values to
physical resources and site characteristics, analyzing
threats and opportunities, and making policies and taking
actions. The steps, which are discussed below, are not to
be undertaken in a linear fashion—indeed, some of them
can and should be done in parallel (see Figures  and ).
CREATING STATEMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE
Statements of signiﬁcance ﬂow directly out of the value
assessments. Their function is synthesizing the reasons
behind all the actions one might propose for the site—
conservation, development, interpretation, and so on—
and providing clear positions that would form the basis 

of later decisions and evaluation.Generating a statement
of signiﬁcance is standard practice in conservation plan-
ning in, for instance, the United States. The professional
team looks at all the varied values and assessments, culls
and winnows from these the dimensions of signiﬁcance
and meaning, and articulates signiﬁcance in terms that
will be understandable to all stakeholders (and indeed,
they should be understandable to the general public, to
decision makers, investors, and so on).
The statements proposed here depart from the
convention by emphasizing the plural, and perhaps even
contradictory, nature of a site’s signiﬁcance. The state-
ments do not necessarily have to be boiled down to one or
two points, nor do they need to reﬂect a single consensus
or universal view about the site. In fact, one would expect
conﬂicting statements of signiﬁcance to be articulated for
a site (for instance, one set of stakeholders may see signiﬁ-
cance overwhelmingly in terms of proﬁt, while other
stakeholders’ signiﬁcance would exclude the possibility 
of proﬁt-making activity.) Thus, the plural statements is
emphasized, and it signals the intent of this step to iden-
tify the main themes of signiﬁcance arising from the value
assessments, as interpreted from the perspectives of the
various stakeholder groups involved.
The creation of statements involves two distinct
parts. First is the cataloguing and articulating of all aspects
of site signiﬁcance. In this sense the statements are
unabashedly plural. These would be framed by the overall
set of values and stakeholders identiﬁed earlier in the
process. It is important to stay away from statements that
privilege some values over others—that is, if one decides
early on that value A is less important than values B and
C, the tendency in case of conﬂict would be to sacriﬁce 
A for the sake of B and C; if the values are not ranked,
more eﬀorts are likely to be made to ﬁnd policies that
respect them all. Second, one can begin to introduce some
sense of priorities by assessing and stating the uniqueness
or importance of the site’s values vis-à-vis other sites in
the nation/region/world (whatever the decision-making
domain is).
This recognition and articulation of the relative
importance to the values—without ranking categorically
their importance for the site—is borrowed from Pearson
and Sullivan () and from Kerr (). They suggest at
this point an assessment of the degree or level of signiﬁ-
cance of each value, as seen against the universe of site 
and values in the decision-making domain. This is not
where one would say that the historical value of the site is
more important than its recreational value. Rather, what
is suggested is an evaluation of the degree of importance
of a particular value (unique, important, typical, etc.) of a
site when compared with that value in related sites.
MATCHING VALUES TO PHYSICAL RESOURCES
AND SITE CHARACTERISTICS
Management, plans, and decisions must integrate articula-
tions of value and the physical properties and resources of
the site. This integration has traditionally been part of the
analysis contributed tacitly by conservation professionals,
but the correspondences between values and the physical
attributes of heritage need to be made explicit. Without
consciously evaluating the connections between speciﬁc
physical aspects of heritage and speciﬁc values, as well as
the appropriateness of the tools chosen to the values pres-
ent, it will be diﬃcult to predict or monitor how values
are aﬀected by material interventions or management
decisions.
Therefore, some sort of mapping of the values
invested in speciﬁc site elements and characteristics is an
important reference both for informing decisions and for
evaluating their results. In ’s model planning process
(Figure ), this matching occurs at the end of the assess-
ment phase, in which assessment of physical conditions 
is linked with the assessment of signiﬁcance. How this is
achieved practically and in detail can be worked out in any
number of ways, in light of a speciﬁc planning project. 
At the least, all types of value identiﬁed in the values
assessments should be “mapped” onto the site; all the
main physical elements of the site could be linked with
speciﬁc types of value.
The beneﬁts of this step would be twofold: ﬁrst,
simply, a clear delineation of how each of the values
identiﬁed for the site is expressed, embodied, or otherwise
represented in the materials of the site (ranging in scale
from artifacts to buildings to landscapes); second, key
“complexes” of (material) resources and (immaterial)
values could be identiﬁed. By identifying these complexes,
the planning/management team is deliberately associat-
ing the values held with regard to the site to the actual
physical resources making up the site. For instance, the
key historical value complex for a historic building might
associate the site’s most important historical events, narra-
tives, and concepts with the arrangement of buildings on
the site or with the decoration of particular rooms or with

landscape elements such as walls or hedgerows. The most
important complexes will likely be the focus of conserva-
tion and management interventions.
ANALYZING THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES
Against the background of the statements of signiﬁcance
and their association with particular material aspects 
of the site, the analysis should turn to the potential threats
to the identiﬁed complexes of material and signiﬁcance.
Threats can be quite varied and could be categorized, for
instance, according to the following categories: physical
threats stemming from environmental factors, from van-
dalism or violence, from neglect or poor management, or
from economically driven redevelopment; and social, cul-
tural, or political forces that produce changes in meaning
and valuing. Conservation planners should not be looking
only for threats, however. The opportunities encountered
at sites should also be brought into this analysis, as
decisions to take advantage of opportunities (whether
economic, political, interpretive, logistical) are very likely
to have an impact on the value-material complexes—
sometimes positive, sometimes negative.
The professional team, by this juncture, should
be able to identify the threats. The threats, of course, can
only be deﬁned against the context of the conservation/
management goals of the stakeholder groups governing/
inﬂuencing the site. One stakeholder’s threat may be
another’s opportunity.
MAKING POLICIES AND TAKING ACTIONS
At this point, the planning process has moved on to the
“response” section of Figure . Here the actions needed
involve not so much integrating values but, rather, acting
upon them. The speciﬁc steps by which these actions are
worked out and implemented will vary widely from site
to site, depending more than anything on institutional
setup, organizational cultures, and other issues raised in
the management context assessment.
In light of the plural, varied, often conﬂicting
nature of heritage values and in light of the political
processes inescapably shaping and usually governing deci-
sions about conservation, are there any generalizations
that can be made about conservation decision making? 
It is argued here that there are some robust principles
useful for framing decision making in any number of
circumstances. These suggestions take up the next and
ﬁnal section.
Assessing Management Context
Well before the integration steps outlined in this
section, an assessment of the management con-
text needs to be undertaken. This is best under-
taken at least as early as the physical conditions
and values assessments are begun, and perhaps
earlier (see Figure ).
Management context refers to a number of factors
that aﬀect the capacity of people and organiza-
tions to decide, direct, and implement any plans
that are formulated. This includes pragmatic
concerns such as ﬁnancing, institutional archi-
tectures, legal and regulatory frameworks, and
available personnel, as well as political factors
such as the patterns of power and inﬂuence
known to shape the interactions and capacities
of the various stakeholders in the site. The
issues arising in the management context—
especially those of power relationships—are
crucial to the ultimate success of management
planning and must be dealt with as systemati-
cally and as openly as possible.
The management context assessment 
through which these factors are documented
and analyzed has not been studied in detail,
though some version of it is part of most man-
agement planning processes. The review—
and possibly the adaptation—of some of the
methods for management assessment used in
the ﬁelds of urban planning and business man-
agement can provide a starting point for the
conservation ﬁeld.
Frameworks for Decision Making
A number of decision-making processes and protocols are
available and widely used in other ﬁelds, but none of them
are a priori appropriate to heritage conservation or robust
across all situations. Therefore, no speciﬁc decision-
making tools are advocated here. However, this paper
does suggest frameworks for decision making, establish-
ing a series of guides useful for assembling information 
to fuel decision making and frameworks for evaluating
decisions afterward.
While there are no prescriptions or recipes for
heritage conservation decision making, guidance for
planning/management decisions (ranking, prioritizing)
can be drawn from other ﬁelds—in particular, environ-
mental conservation. Research, application, and evalua-
tion of decision making have been the subject of consider-
able work in the environmental sphere, and much of this
is quite relevant to heritage conservation decisions. The
concept of sustainability, in particular, has been an eﬀec-
tive and inﬂuential organizing principle in environmental
decision making. Although full sustainability remains 
an ideal, sustainability principles have, in practice, been
merged with extensive experiences in cultivating public
participation. The result is a growing body of practical
lessons drawn from the use of sustainability principles.
The use of sustainability principles for guiding
such complex decisions is the state of the art in the envi-
ronmental conservation ﬁeld. There are many parallels
between heritage planning/management decisions and
environmental decisions: comparable complexities in the
systems and processes being managed, diversity and
incommensurability of values attributed to the resources
being conserved, and political diﬃculties and power diﬀer-
ences among stakeholders, to name a few.
A recent publication by several scholars and
practitioners in the environmental ﬁeld provides a good
source of intelligence for addressing the decision-making
challenges set forth in this paper (Sexton et al. ). Hav-
ing identiﬁed critical issues and cases in environmental
decision making, Sexton and colleagues evaluated state-
of-the-art decision-making tools. The conclusion reached
was that there are no hard-and-fast rules or procedures for
making eﬀective decisions. The goal of fostering inte-
grated decision making requires a lot of experimentation
and improvisation. The authors oﬀered the following
guidelines, derived from twenty or so years of experience
with decision-making strategies in the environmental
conservation ﬁeld (Sexton et al. , –):
• build mutual trust and understanding;
• adopt sustainability as a unifying principle;
• take shared responsibility;
• institutionalize public participation;
• continually reﬁne and use decision-making tools;
• collect and analyze important information
(gather data for evaluation);
• use incentives to encourage innovation.
For the most part, the advice represented in these points is
not speciﬁc to environmental issues and resources and is
readily applicable to any other ﬁeld. In order to retool and
reorient this research for the heritage conservation ﬁeld,
though, the notion of sustainability needs to be rethought
in terms applicable to heritage. The following section con-
siders the second of these guidelines and discusses how
sustainability principles for heritage conservation might
be approached.
SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES FOR 
HERITAGE CONSERVATION
Principles of sustainable development have proven quite
useful, inﬂuential, and robust, not only in environmental
conservation and the fostering of ecological sensitivity in
the development ﬁeld but also, increasingly, in the urban
development ﬁeld. Sustainability has already been pro-
posed as an ideal and as a guide to policy in the heritage
ﬁeld (English Heritage ; / ). David
Throsby has proposed a set of sustainability principles
that could form the basis of a useful set of guidelines and
norms for decision making in the conservation-planning
model (see Throsby, “Cultural Capital and Sustainability
Concepts in the Economics of Cultural Heritage,”
herein).25 The principles are built on the notion of sustain-
ability developed in the ﬁelds of ecological conservation
and economic development and adapted in light of
Throsby’s notion of cultural capital (heritage resources) 
as analogous to natural capital.26
The notion of sustainability accords with the
principles underlying values-based conservation planning
in that it adopts a holistic view of resources (in this case,
cultural resources) and their contexts and aligns with the
goal of taking account of the widest range of heritage val-
ues. It deals directly with the problem of making decisions
in the present but for the very long term—essential for
acknowledging the role of heritage as an inheritance to be
stewarded and passed on to future generations. Sustain-
ability has also proven to be politically resonant (even after
twenty or so years) and practically useful because the prin-
ciples are a ﬂexible frame of reference rather than a ﬁxed

benchmark or rigid method (and, not surprisingly, sustain-
ability has been criticized for the same reason by those
who wish for inﬂexible environmental standards).
Ideally, the sustainability principles will inﬂuence
the planning model in several ways, at several stages. First,
they constitute an ideal, which could shape the setting of
project goals, the composition of the stakeholder group,
the analysis of signiﬁcance and management contexts,
and the evaluation of project outcomes. The principles
will have most direct impact, however, at the policy-set-
ting stage: the principles would be designed to serve as
tests, or criteria, against which the policies (and thus the
actions that follow from them) can be judged. Individually
and as a group it can be asked, Do these policies meet the
tests of sustainability? Each decision can be evaluated
(informally, or with formal indicators) against each of the
principles. The same tests can be applied to the actions as
they are being formulated. In this way, the sustainability
principles play the role of guidelines.
The fact that sustainability principles are a ﬂexi-
ble, negotiable set of standards could be seen as a weak-
ness. In the environmental ﬁeld, a distinction is made
between “strong” versus “weak” sustainability in the envi-
ronmental sphere. Strong sustainability insists on immedi-
ate and total conformance to sustainability principles and
is not negotiable—so it is generally seen as infeasible (and
therefore unsustainable!). Weak sustainability allows
change, is ﬂexible, and doesn’t attempt to freeze things in
place. These two versions of sustainability parallel the
notion of distinguishing “sacred” versus “tradable” her-
itage27 and the a priori privileging of cultural values over
economic values by preservationists (or vice versa by
investors or policy makers). Whereas it is easy to insist on
the total protection of things deemed sacred, in light of
practical considerations, this is not possible and becomes
mere rhetoric. A more pragmatic strategy recognizes the
need for trade-oﬀs and recognizes that some heritage is in
fact tradable or convertible to other forms of capital.
Sustainability principles also recognize the moral
aspect of sustainability, through principles regarding inter-
generational and intragenerational equity, which overarch
and strengthen the scientiﬁc, economic, and pragmatic
arguments for sustainability. The notion of equity, which
requires moral vision and ethical reﬂection, should be
closely allied with our collective sense of professional
ethics and purpose. These ideas could, indeed, provide the
conservation ﬁeld with something of an ethical-moral
compass as it navigates through a period of great change.
So as we see, sustainability holds great potential
as a framing concept for the task of integrating heritage
values, yet the concept needs to be developed further and
applied to speciﬁc projects. As in the environmental and
development applications of sustainability, sustainability
indicators could be created to bring rigor and clarity to the
application of sustainability principles.28
Additional work is needed to make the argument
for using these sustainability principles and to describe
how they can be used in real situations. For instance, how
are the various sustainability criteria/tests weighted? Are
they all equally important in a particular project? Also,
what exactly is being sustained—cultural resources them-
selves (buildings, artifacts, sites) or cultural memory and
meaning? Answers to these questions can help connect
the sustainability principles with the issues of heritage
values and valuing.
Finally, decisions need to be continually evaluated
and checked against the original aims set out at the
beginning of the process. This continuous revisiting of
the eﬀectiveness of decisions is a key ingredient to the
successful implementation of planning measures and 
to the realization of eﬀective management for heritage
conservation.
Notes
. The Burra Charter gives a central role to cultural signiﬁ-
cance (Marquis-Kyle and Walker ). See Tainter and
Lucas () for a critical history and analysis of the
signiﬁcance concept, and Tomlan () for a collection of
views appraising and criticizing the signiﬁcance concept in
the context of historic preservation in the United States.
. The operational, applied context of this research is the
model process for conservation planning used by the Getty
Conservation Institute (see Figure ). This model, which is
similar to others employed around the world by conserva-
tion agencies and professionals, draws on a collective body 
of knowledge and experience accumulated over decades of
application.
. “Value-based management” is the coordinated and struc-
tured operation of a heritage site with the primary purpose
of protecting the signiﬁcance of the place as deﬁned by
government authorities or other owners, experts, and other
citizens or groups with a legitimate interest in the place.
. A note on terminology: methodologies refers to strategies for
assessing heritage values; examples of two diﬀerent method-
ologies would be ethnographic research and cost-beneﬁt
analysis. The term tools, as used here, refers to speciﬁc
research protocols to implement a methodological

approach; examples of tools would be oral history, expert
iconographical analysis, or contingent valuation analysis.
. These deﬁnitions parallel the distinction made in the ﬁeld 
of environmental conservation between “held” values (the
principles or ideologies that guide environmental profession-
als and advocates in their work or that constitute the “cause”
of environmentalism) and “assigned” values (assigned by
people and groups to the natural resources themselves).
. Typologies of the values of natural resources provide an
interesting analogue to these heritage value typologies. 
See Kellert () and Rolston (), as well as Satterﬁeld’s
paper in this volume.
. A third major category of values could well be added to this
framework—that of ecological values. Ecological value, as
deﬁned here, stems from the role a heritage site may play in
constituting or sustaining a natural ecosystem—as, for
instance, in shaping the ﬂow of water or other natural
resources or in maintaining species habitat. An archaeologi-
cal site could be part of a highly valued coastal environment
or watershed. As such, these ecological values could fall into
both sociocultural and economic value categories—but they
relate to diﬀerent sets of stakeholders. Because these values
and stakeholders can play a signiﬁcant role in decisions
about a site, ecological values may in some instances war-
rant classiﬁcation as a separate category of heritage value. 
A deeper exploration of the ecological values of heritage
sites is beyond the scope of this paper’s argument.
. Similar breakdowns have been made in Frey (), Throsby
(), and a World Bank report (Serageldin and Steer ).
. Externalities are a third important kind of economic value;
they are a spin-oﬀ of the other types of economic values.
Externalities are consequences of transactions and other
decisions regarding use and nonuse values, and they are gen-
erated for better (positive externalities) and for worse (nega-
tive externalities). In the sense of heritage values, externality
values result from transactions involving the use and nonuse
values of heritage as described above. Examples are the
travel costs associated with visiting a heritage site or the
increased price of land adjacent to a conserved site. For 
more background and detail, see the papers by Mourato and
Mazzanti and by Throsby in this volume.
. The terms market and nonmarket are used here as synonyms
for use and nonuse. I believe that this association makes these
categories more understandable and accepted among
noneconomists, and it follows directly from the clear
description David Throsby gives in his paper herein.
. See n. .
. Another important distinction between types of humanities
and social science methodologies is that of positivist or
phenomenological (and, more recently, “postpositivist”). 
The positivist/postpositivist distinction is diﬀerent from the
quantitative-qualitative question but is not unrelated to it—
quantitative or qualitative methods can be either positivist 
or postpositivist—and it sheds particular light on the issue 
of methods for gauging heritage values. Positivist methods
assume a value-free, objective perspective. They exchange
scientiﬁc certainty for value sensitivity. Phenomenological or
postpositivist methods, by contrast, embrace the values and
politics surrounding any epistemological eﬀort. By embrac-
ing value diﬀerences and representing the contexts of phe-
nomena being studied, postpositivist methods should be part
of any approach to assessing heritage values. This is not to
say that positivist methods have nothing to contribute to
heritage value assessment, but one can say that a strictly pos-
itivist assessment would yield a decidedly partial account of
the range of heritage values. See Denzin and Lincoln ()
and Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias ().
. The political consensus is for broader participation. Note
that this consensus is driven by a Western notion of democ-
racy and will not be accepted or relevant in some cultural
contexts. The position adopted here is to advocate broader
participation without imposing it.
. See, for instance, the strong base of research and application
reﬂected in Sanoﬀ ().
. For instance, unstructured, one-on-one interviews might be
best suited to eliciting the spiritual values of a site; the eco-
nomic use values of the same site would be more susceptible
to an economic impact study of tourist expenditures.
. More recently, conservation decision makers have also
turned to economic analysis and anthropological/commu-
nity-involvement tools to strengthen the information base
for their decisions.
. For fragments of the writings of these and other ﬁgures
from the history of the conservation ﬁeld, consult the Getty
Conservation Institute’s Historical and Philosophical Issues in
the Conservation of Cultural Heritage (Stanley-Price, Talley, and
Vaccaro ). Some historical accounts and summaries of
individual contributions to the history of architectural con-
servation are available in Jokilehto ().
. Development is used here in the World Bank sense of inte-
grated social and economic programs for poverty reduction
in disadvantaged areas of the globe. For more detail, see the
World Bank Web site outlining its various programs to
advance development: www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
thematic.htm .
. Interdisciplinary ﬁelds such as human geography, material
culture, vernacular architecture, and American studies
embrace the idea of a diverse choice of methodologies and 
a catholic approach to using them.
. See www.cr.nps.gov/aad ; see also Low’s paper in the pres-
ent volume.
. Two Web sites oﬀer information and a wealth of examples
on  and rapid rural assessment () approaches: 
The Institute of Development Studies, based in England
(www.ids.ac.uk/ids) and the United Nations University
(www.unu.edu/unupress/food). See also Bell and Morse
() for a summary.

. The overlay mapping of landscape architect and planner Ian
McHarg is an example of a methodology developed through
mapping (McHarg ).
. Publications of Common Ground (www.commonground.
org.uk) include Greeves (); for an example of mental
mapping of communities as an educational tool, see the 
Getty Research Institute project “Mapping Local Knowl-
edge” (available at www.getty.edu/research/programs/
public/lllk/ ).
. This discussion of economic methods builds on the 
outline of issues and methods published in Economics and
Heritage Conservation (Mason ). The work of economists
to measure cultural values is not dealt with exhaustively
here, even though economists’ eﬀorts to deal with cultural
value constitute one of the critical issues in this research.
Economic methods and concepts are surveyed in Throsby
(), in Klamer and Zuidhof ’s paper in Mason (), 
and in Throsby’s and Mourato and Mazzanti’s papers in 
this volume.
. More detail is presented in Throsby ().
. Throsby’s development of sustainability principles for her-
itage conservation is built on the notion of heritage under-
stood as a form of cultural capital. The “capital” metaphor is
potentially quite useful. It brings to the surface the need to
invest in heritage and to expect a ﬂow of beneﬁts from it.
Likewise, it highlights the reality that trade-oﬀs must be
made (not everything can be conserved), the reality that val-
ues must be balanced, and so forth. The notion of cultural
capital, like “values,” could become a way of linking many
of the issues raised in this research—strategic, methodologi-
cal, political, professional—because it converts all types of
heritage into a generalized unit (cultural capital), enabling
one to compare conservation resources, processes, and deci-
sions. The downside is that the capital metaphor suggests
that heritage is in some manner exchangeable—whereas
conservation professionals generally subscribe to an a priori
deﬁnition that all heritage is unique and not exchangeable.
This concept of substitutability—a fundamental part of the
concept of capital—is therefore problematic. One way of
tackling this problem is making distinctions about heritage
that is seen as “tradable” and therefore perfectly substi-
tutable with other forms of capital and even “consumable,”
versus heritage that is “sacred” and not substitutable. The
idea of tradable or nonsacred heritage highlights the fact
that conservation inherently involves trade-oﬀs against 
other social investments and priorities. This understanding
requires that heritage and conservation be seen not in
isolation but, rather, as thoroughly embedded in larger 
social contexts.
. The tradable/sacred distinction is outlined in English Her-
itage’s () discussion paper on sustainability. It also aligns
with the argument made by David Lowenthal and others
that heritage is a changeable set of things. In order for
heritage to remain relevant to contemporary society, some
things have to be continually valorized and added to the
heritage, while other things are devalorized and, in eﬀect,
destroyed. Therefore, heritage implies destruction, just as it
implies conservation. See Lowenthal in Avrami, Mason, and
de la Torre ().
. There is an extensive literature on indicators used in sustain-
able ecological development. Bell and Morse () and Hart
() are excellent sources on this.
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
Anthropological-Ethnographic Methods for the Assessment 
of Cultural Values in Heritage Conservation
By Setha M. Low
Introduction
This paper will review qualitative methods in anthropol-
ogy that are available for assessing sociocultural values at
heritage sites. In this publication, the Getty Conservation
Institute is interested in exploring existing methods that
could be applied or modiﬁed to elicit stakeholder and
community values. Through the surveying and evaluating
of these methods, a methodological approach and 
speciﬁc techniques could be identiﬁed that would help
conservation professionals and managers understand the
complexity of social relations and cultural dynamics at
play in the conservation planning and development of
heritage sites. Rapid Ethnographic Assessment Proce-
dures (s) used at National Park Service () historical
parks are highlighted as useful methods of assessment for
planning, design, reconstruction, and management of
heritage sites.
This discussion begins with a brief overview 
of qualitative methods in cultural anthropology. Ethno-
graphic and observational approaches seem most appro-
priate to the heritage conservation task because of their
individual and group levels of analysis. Two other
methodologies—constituency analysis and ethnoseman-
tics—are also applicable to heritage sites. The limitations
of each are discussed, and a third methodology, the ,
is proposed as the most inclusive and useful for solving
heritage conservation problems.  methodologies
grew out of agricultural and national park projects, and
when they are applied to planning and design problems,
they integrate elements of constituency analysis used in
landscape architecture as well as ethnosemantic method-
ologies used in historic preservation projects. The remain-
der of the discussion focuses on the  and its applica-
tion to cultural heritage conservation.
Anthropological-Ethnographic
Methods for the Assessment 
of Cultural Values at Heritage Sites
Overview of Qualitative Methods in
Cultural Anthropology
Qualitative methodologies in cultural anthropology are
characterized by their humanism and holism (a philo-
sophical position that argues that humans and human
behavior cannot be understood or studied outside the
context of a person’s daily life, life world, and activities).
Methodological strategies consonant with this deﬁnition
include: cognitive, observational, phenomenological,
historical, ethnographic, and discourse approaches to
research (Low b). Each of these approaches focuses
on distinct aspects of the social world, and the approaches
vary in terms of their appropriateness for diﬀerent
problems, their levels of analysis, and the role of the
researcher. Although these determinations are not ﬁxed
and may change over time, they provide a preliminary
framework for selecting the qualitative methods that
would be most appropriate for eliciting and assessing
sociocultural values at heritage sites. While all qualitative
methods have some utility in evaluating heritage sites,
some approaches have distinct advantages. For this discus-
sion, methodologies are arranged in order of their com-
plexity and scope of inquiry, beginning with cognitive 
and observational approaches that focus on one dimen-
sion of human activity—a mental or behavioral process—
followed by phenomenological and historical approaches
that integrate human activity with the environmental
context, and concluding with ethnographic and discourse
approaches that include human activity, environment,
and social, cultural, and/or political context. 
Cognitive approaches include both the study 
of cognition as a mental process—often reﬂected in lan-
guage—and cognition as a set of categories that structure
perception through the attribution of meaning. One
application is in the area of ethnosemantics (the study of
cognitive meaning from the culture’s own point of view),
discussed as a separate methodology later in this paper.
Semantics refers to the linguistic analysis of the structure
of meaning in a language and culture. Most semantic
work is based on the intensive interviewing of key inform-
ants to produce linguistic taxonomies, hierarchies of con-
cepts and terms that describe an individual’s understand-
ing of the world and that collectively describe the culture
(Low a). For instance, a heritage conservation profes-
sional working with an anthropologist could develop a
taxonomy of house types by asking informants to name
all the kinds of houses that exist in their town. Once a list
of all the possible house types is developed, the researcher
then asks what distinguishes each house type and repeats
the procedure until a complete linguistic map of all hous-
ing kinds and their characteristics has been produced. 
The term ethnosemantics in this paper refers to a modiﬁed
semantic procedure that focuses on the semantic structure
of one group of people in relation to their local environ-
ment. When used in studies of the built environment, the
term also incorporates the role that language plays not
only as a structural or taxonomic system but as symbolic
communication about important cultural ideas.
Observational methodologies in which overt
behavior is observed by the researcher are the mainstay 
of qualitative researchers, and they include simple obser-
vation of activities and behavioral mapping, as well as
elaborate systems of time-lapse photography of public
spaces (Whyte ), ethnoarchaeological techniques
(Kent ), and nonverbal communication strategies for
understanding the built environment (Low b;
Rapoport ). For instance, William H. Whyte spent
seven years ﬁlming street behavior with a small movie
camera perched on the top of Rockefeller Center (Whyte
). The analysis of these observational ﬁlms produced
a set of urban design principles that have governed urban
public space zoning in New York City for the past twenty
years. Ethnoarchaeological techniques combine tradi-
tional archaeological data obtained from on-site excava-
tion and stratiﬁcation analysis with historical documents
and ethnographies of local groups that may be using the
site in ways similar to their local ancestors. The idea is to
use observations of contemporary peoples’ built environ-
ment, everyday behavior, and social and ritual activities to
interpret archaeological ﬁndings (Kent ). Finally,
observation of nonverbal behavior has been used to theo-
rize about how people understand a site. Rapoport argues
that ﬁxed features of a site, such as the buildings, trees,
and elements that cannot be easily moved, and nonﬁxed
features, such as furniture, produce very diﬀerent kinds 
of meanings (Rapoport ). Nonﬁxed features are 
more important for the understanding of nonverbal
communication. In all of these cases, observational
techniques are at the core of the research project or theo-
retical explanation. 
Phenomenological approaches diﬀer in their epis-
temological point of view in that the object of study is not
separated from the act of perceiving. Studies focus on
“place” and on “how place grows out of experience, and
how, in turn, it symbolizes that experience” (Richardson
, ). The emphasis is on the individual perceiver and
his or her experience as empirical evidence of the world.
Historical approaches locate a particular site,
place, or built form in its temporal context. From a con-
servation perspective, historical approaches are very
important for architectural historians, archaeologists, and
others, because they can provide insight into past values
of the site and how perceptions and signiﬁcance have
changed over time. Conservators, however, have to bring
into consideration the values of current users as well as
those of other communities (such as experts) and past
users. While historical approaches address past users and
the study of material culture and its evolution, they do not
address the current users of the site, who are best under-
stood through ethnographic approaches. 
Ethnographic approaches are broader and
include the historical, as well as the social and political,
context of the site as a means of understanding contem-
porary sociocultural patterns and cultural groups.
Ethnographic research—the process of describing a
culture—has the ability to predict local response to design
and planning proposals accurately, and it can help 
evaluate complex alternatives through systematic cultural
understanding.
Depending on the magnitude of the geographical
area, the length of time spent, and the historical depth of
the study, ethnography produces a complete cultural
description of a site, as well as descriptions of intercon-
nected nonlocal communities and of relevant adjacent
sites. For instance, the ethnographic study of Jacob Riis
Park at the edge of Brooklyn and Queens in New York
City found that the restoration done by the National Parks
Service () of Robert Moses’s bathhouse was of little
importance to new visitors to the site, who come to the
beach to picnic in the shade and to enjoy family activities.
These new users, mostly recent immigrants from Central
and South America, are not aware of the history of the
site and do not understand the fencing oﬀ of the historic
“mall” area (with a direct view of the Empire State


Building). Instead, they are upset that so many of the few
remaining trees on the site are cordoned oﬀ. Their
response has been to ignore the fencing and to picnic
under the trees wherever possible. The ethnographic
study illuminated this source of conﬂict, providing the
possibility of better communication, design, and planning
of the historic site in the future.
Discourse approaches include social experience,
the reciprocal acts of speaking and being spoken to, and
the emergent product of that speaking, the object of the
conversation. Discourse approaches consider the object of
study, the text, the context, and the interpretation of the
object as one continuous domain. Discourse approaches
are only beginning to be used in applied settings because
of the diﬃculty of gathering the data and because of their
highly specialized forms of transcription and notation.
In Table , each methodological approach is eval-
uated by () the focus or scale of the research—individual,
group, or societal; () the degree of involvement and/or
contact with the research subject—minimal, moderate, 
or total; and () the kind of problem most often associated
with the methodology. The utility of each methodology 
is derived from the researcher’s need to answer questions
at a speciﬁc scale, in a time frame that controls the degree
of involvement, and within the domain of a particular
research problem. The application criteria derive from the
same decision variables.
These approaches are appropriate for diﬀerent
kinds and levels of research. For instance, the individual-
based methodologies (cognitive, phenomenological, and
discourse) are excellent for eliciting individual users’ expe-
riences and perceptions of the site, while the societal-
based approaches (historical and discourse) provide meth-
ods that uncover historical signiﬁcance and social change.
All of these methods answer some research problem 
of concern to the heritage conservation practitioner;
however, it is valuable to highlight the observational and
ethnographic approaches that focus on the group and the
individual within the group. These two methodologies
address the core objective—that is, to identify local site
use and disuse and, even more important, to understand
the motivations, norms, values, intentions, and symbolic
meanings underlying that use and disuse. For example,
while phenomenological research can elicit statements 
of place attachment and place identity, ethnographic
research describes the place attachment of groups within
the geographical community. Furthermore, ethnographic
approaches focus on sociocultural values as a central part
of the research endeavor. 
Ethnography combined with observational
methodologies requires considerable time in the ﬁeld to
complete—usually up to a year or more. However, work-
ing with design and planning professionals—as well as
conservation practitioners—requires brief, direct proce-
dures for understanding a particular site. Two of these
strategies have been used in historic landscape preserva-
tion projects and are discussed because of their appropri-
ateness—they combine observation and ethnography—
and because they oﬀer methodological shortcuts that
allow for short-term application during an ongoing, site-
speciﬁc project.
Constituency Analysis: A Methodology 
for Landscape Architecture
The author developed an appropriate social science
research method for landscape architecture1 as a conse-
quence of working as an anthropologist with design fac-
ulty and students. They needed a way to organize, collect,
and conceptualize social data relevant to design problems.
Constituency analysis was an attempt to integrate the
Table  Qualitative methodologies in cultural anthropology: research appropriateness.
Methodological Approach Scale/Level of Inquiry Degree of Involvement Research Problem
Cognitive Individual Minimal Rules, ideals, and perceptions
Observational Group (individual) Minimal Behavior, observable actions, and activity sites
Phenomenological Individual Total Experience of places and events
Historical Societal Minimal Social and cultural trends, comparison of sites 
Ethnographic Group (individual) Moderate Cultural motivations, norms, values, intentions, 
symbols and meanings
Discourse Individual (societal) Moderate Underlying meanings of speaking /conversation

complex, recursive process of design with social data.
Table  summarizes the ﬁve-stage design process, which
includes three social data phases, stages , , and , that
necessitate anthropological methods. The ﬁrst stage is
problem formulation, composed of client deﬁnition and
problem clariﬁcation. For any project there are a number
of possible clients and user groups, including a paying
client (often the federal government); speciﬁc user groups,
communities, or neighborhoods on or near the proposed
site; and often potential regional or national constituen-
cies that may use the site in the future. Interviews, an
analysis of inﬂuence processes, and other techniques are
necessary to generate a list of all the clients, or stakehold-
ers, involved in the design.
Once the problem and the client are deﬁned, the
designer begins to collect data on the perceptions of the
residents and future users of the site. This data-collection
stage takes the form of an identiﬁcation of constituencies,
as well as of their perceived needs, desires, and social
conﬂicts. Constituency identiﬁcation is the enumeration
and description—that is, with regard to social, cultural,
and demographic characteristics—of the kinds of people
living on or near the project site. Any number of sampling
techniques and methods, from participant observation of
local communities to a questionnaire survey of randomly
selected residents and users, can be employed to collect
such data. Once constituencies are described and catego-
rized into groups, the second task—identifying con-
stituency perceptions, needs, and desires—begins. This
information, which becomes the basis of later physical
design decisions, is more diﬃcult to collect, in that direct
elicitation techniques are not usually successful. The
methods suggested for constituency needs and desires
assessment are therefore indirect techniques that attempt
to stimulate response and opinion concerning possible
land use and physical design features; these techniques
include expert interviews, mental maps of patterns of site
utilization and perceptions, and projective tests. A ﬁnal
step in the data-collection procedure includes the identiﬁ-
cation of constituency conﬂicts concerning issues that
impact the future success of any planned change. Depend-
ing on the project, an analysis of constituency conﬂicts
may become part of the programming procedure, espe-
cially when the project objective is to resolve conﬂicting
land uses. 
The third and ﬁnal stage before implementation
and physical design is the construction of a program, a set
of speciﬁc objectives and detailed goals upon which the
physical design is based. The program orders and applies
the constituency needs and desires to physical design
decisions. Finally, an evaluation of the design, based on
original project objectives and social criteria, requires
some form of measurement of social change. A number
of anthropological methodologies have been developed
to monitor the social impact of large-scale projects,
including the  discussed below. Social change is often
measured by a questionnaire survey of previously deﬁned
outcome variables; however, qualitative techniques, such
as participant observation and structured interviewing,
can be used when the design intervention is at a relatively
small scale.
Constituency analysis is an excellent system for
integrating constituency identiﬁcation into the planning
and design process. The process of client identiﬁcation is
similar to stakeholder identiﬁcation; and constituency
identiﬁcation, constituency needs and desires assessment,
and the working out of constituency conﬂicts are applica-
ble to most heritage sites. The drawback to this methodol-
ogy, however, is that some sites do not have clear con-
stituencies—or there might be clear constituency groups
that do not, however, match or correlate with cultural val-
ues on the site. For instance, local homeowners, with con-
cerns about a nearby site, might not be visible if the analy-
ses are focused on users of the site. These reasons have led
to the development of methodologies, such as the ,
that are more ﬂexible than constituency analysis and that
Table  Constituency analysis.
Stage Tasks
Stage : Problem formulation Client deﬁnition; problem clarification
Stage : Data collection Constituency identiﬁcation; needs and desires assessment; constituency conﬂicts
Stage : Programming Data interpretation; data application
Stage : Physical design Conceptual design; physical framework
Stage : Evaluation Measurement of change; interpretation of meaning
utilize a wider set of techniques and methods. Nonethe-
less, the sequencing of stages and the emphasis on the
reiterative nature of design and planning problems are
useful in thinking about developing a cultural values
assessment process for heritage conservation projects.
Ethnosemantic Methodology: Design and
Translation at Historic Sites
Ethnosemantic techniques have been used in preservation
projects to translate local values into elements of material
culture that could then be respected and preserved. The
separation between the perceptions of architectural histo-
rians and those of the public is increased by diﬀerences in
professional and popular culture (Low ). Architects
and architecturally trained historians, as well as most con-
servation professionals, participate in a process of profes-
sional socialization that provides a common language, 
set of symbols, value structure, and code of rituals and
taboos. The public does not share this perceptual system
but, instead, holds images and preferences that are embed-
ded in its own beliefs, customs, and values. Conﬂict may
arise when these two cultures compete for control over
land use, building, landscape, and/or preservation deci-
sions. In such a situation, the methodological and concep-
tual skills of someone trained in ethnosemantics or other
anthropological and linguistic methodologies are useful
to resolve the cultural conﬂict. When conservation man-
agers and planners face decisions that they know may be
ﬁercely contested, looking for another way to translate
the cultural diﬀerences, through a method such as those
described, may solve the disagreement by locating the
middle ground or appropriate language necessary to pro-
ceed with the plan, design, or any other desired change. 
Ethnosemantic methodologies assume that cul-
ture is encoded in language that can be elicited through a
linguistic, taxonomic analysis (see the overview of qualita-
tive methods above for further discussion). Structured
questions organize responses into taxonomic categories to
create cultural domains of meanings. These methods have
been applied in a modiﬁed form to the historic preserva-
tion of buildings and landscapes. Research on the ethno-
semantic structure of Greek village houses uncovered
their traditional social status meanings (Pavlides and
Hesser ) and translated culturally appropriate details
of eighteenth-century stone farmhouses in a rural Penn-
sylvania community into standards for inﬁll architectural
design (Low and Ryan ).
Both studies began by determining the range of
architectural variation in the local community, investigat-
ing the local meanings attributed to the variation, and
then verifying those meanings through an ethnosemantic
method. Pavlides and Hesser photographed architectural
details of Greek village houses that they suspected were
symbolic of a family’s social standing based on their previ-
ous interviewing and house survey (Pavlides and Hesser
). They then presented these photographs to the
community and asked people to tell them what each
architectural detail meant. The responses of community
members were used to ensure that the researchers’
interpretation of symbolic meaning reﬂected that of the
community.
The study of historic buildings in Oley, Pennsyl-
vania, was designed to elicit what local residents thought
were meaningful characteristics of their stone farmhouses
(Low and Ryan ). The project was part of a rural
preservation program and utilized a historical buildings
survey as a guide to architectural variation in the commu-
nity. A representative blue ribbon panel was interviewed
as to the degree of “Oleyness” for each of the architec-
tural details found in the survey. The research linked
architectural elements with cultural images through the
exploration of “Oleyness” as a culturally relevant cogni-
tive domain.
Rapid Ethnographic Assessment
Procedures
Review of Rapid Assessment
Methodologies
Rapid assessment methodologies2 have been adapted
from rural and agricultural development projects in devel-
oping nations. In these contexts, multidisciplinary teams
of experts investigate socioeconomic conditions in a par-
ticular area with regard to agriculture and resource man-
agement, usually in less than a month or even a week
(Ervin ). Beebe, surveying the literature on rapid
assessment procedures, outlines three basic principles: 
a systems perspective, triangulation of methods, and an
iterative process of data collection and analysis (Beebe
). The rapid assessment is used to identify the ele-
ments of a local system and how they interrelate, through
a qualitative data collection process of uncovering local
knowledge. The semistructured interview, the expert
interview, and the focus group are characteristic elements
of a triangulated methodology. The general approach—

which is based on the assumption that researchers often
do not know the right questions in advance—is to get peo-
ple to talk rather than to answer direct questions. 
Rapid assessments diﬀer from traditional qualita-
tive research in that more than one researcher is always
involved, researcher-team interaction is critical to the
methodology, and results are produced much faster. Rapid
assessment is “especially relevant when time constraints
preclude use of intensive qualitative methods by a single
researcher and when the diﬀerent perspectives of the
team members (including local participants) are essential
for understanding the situation” (Beebe , ).  
Ervin used the term “relatively rapid” in the
context of a six-month community needs assessment for
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan (Ervin ). The research team
worked under contract to the local United Way to rank
the community’s social service priorities. Because of
time and budget limitations, Ervin used six qualitative
methods, including focus groups, key informant inter-
views, review of existing reports, Delphi questionnaires 
(a process in which experts participate in the research
anonymously, through writing), and public forums. 
The resulting report ranked community needs, such as
the elimination of hunger and greater emphasis on
preventative services. 
Rapid assessment as a speciﬁc tool for ethno-
graphic research—and in some cases at heritage sites—has
been written about in the CRM (Cultural Resource Manage-
ment) Bulletin, a periodical published by the . The
agency’s Applied Ethnography Program deﬁnes seven
ethnographic research methodologies, among them
s, that are used to investigate and describe cultural
relationships between particular local communities and
park resources and that are sometimes used to support
nominations of lands and sites to the National Register of
Historic Places ( Joseph ). The  is appropriate for
project-driven applications because it provides a great deal
of cultural information useful for planning purposes
within a short time—generally within a four-month time
frame ( ; Liebow ). The short time frame of a
 is a crucial advantage in the event of substantial pro-
posed construction, which involves major commitments
of funds, negotiation of political support, and timely proj-
ect development. 
 ﬁrst employed ethnographic research in
connection with western Native American communities
having long-standing associations with certain parklands.
These lands—natural resources and, in the case of objects
and structures, cultural resources—are required by Native
Americans or other local communities for their continued
cultural identity and survival. NPS terms these lands
“ethnographic resources” and calls the peoples associated
with them “traditionally associated” or “park-associated”
peoples (Crespi ). In providing systematic data on
local lifeways, applied ethnographic research is intended
to enhance the relationships between park management
and local communities whose histories and associations
with park cultural resources are unknown or poorly
understood (Crespi ; Bean and Vane ; Joseph
). In many newer parks,  shares jurisdiction with
other federal agencies, state and local governments, mod-
ern Native American nations, or other culturally distinc-
tive communities. The resulting complexity of planning
tasks makes ethnographic research with aﬀected commu-
nities especially helpful.   
The literature points to several kinds of beneﬁts
from ethnographic research. One is in the area of conﬂict
management—for example, where local communities
anticipate adverse impacts from new park designations or
from changes to existing parks. Wolf describes the contri-
bution made by ethnographic research to community
relations in the diﬃcult process of establishing a national
historic park around sites in Atlanta associated with the
life of Martin Luther King Jr. Ethnographic knowledge
helped management identify opportunities for compro-
mise and potential mitigating measures (Wolf ). 
The process of ethnographic research with culturally
distinctive communities aﬀected by construction projects
can give a certain credibility to agency decision making
(Liebow ).
Community empowerment is another beneﬁt, 
in that relationships established create a dialogue between
park oﬃcials and local neighborhood and cultural groups
that would not otherwise have a voice in the park plan-
ning process. Joseph stresses the collaborative nature of
the applied ethnographic research done by , where
ordinary citizens and community leaders participate
alongside elected oﬃcials, park managers, and the
researchers ( Joseph ). Low suggests that most preser-
vation problems in cultural landscapes—especially vandal-
ism, underutilization, and neglect—could be prevented
with more dialogue between the community and the gov-
ernmental agency (Low a).

A third important beneﬁt of ethnographic
research is to present and represent the cultural heritage
of local communities within the overall programming 
of park resources. Ethnographic information is useful in
presentation, particularly for parks like Minuteman, in
Massachusetts, that include existing communities within
their borders. Minuteman has endeavored to restore and
preserve farming as a traditional cultural practice within
the historic environment the park preserves and inter-
prets. Information that may be uncovered only through
ethnography, such as the gendered division of labor on
family farms, may be crucial to the continued eﬀective
management of a generations-old practice ( Joseph ).
Where the presentation of historic objects is concerned,
ethnographic information, gained from living members of
the associated cultural group, can reveal uses and mean-
ings not apparent in the objects themselves (Brugge ). 
“Most cultural landscapes are identiﬁed solely in
terms of their historical rather than contemporary impor-
tance to the community” (Low a, ), privileging his-
torical meanings over those of the geographically and/or
culturally associated communities. This oversight often
promotes friction and local disagreements that can be
solved through the knowledge produced by a .
REAP Methodology
In a , a number of methods are selected to produce
diﬀerent types of data from diverse sources that can be
triangulated to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
site. A description of each method is brieﬂy presented
below. Table  summarizes the products and outcomes 
of each method. 
PHYSICAL TRACES MAPPING 
Physical traces maps record the presence of liquor bottles,
trash, and clothing, the erosion of plantings, and other
traces of activities. These maps are completed based on
data collected early in the morning at each site. Records of
physical evidence of human activity and presence provide
indirect clues as to what goes on at these sites during the
night. Physical traces mapping presumes that there is a
base map of resources and basic features available which
can be used to locate the physical traces. Otherwise, part
of the task is to create such a map, both for the physical
traces and for the behavioral maps discussed below. 
At many archaeological sites, a base map might not be
available—a condition that would add another step to the
research process.
BEHAVIORAL MAPPING 
Behavioral maps record people and their activities and
locate them in time and space. Such maps arrange data in
a way that permits planning and design analyses of the
site, and these maps are very useful in developing familiar-
ity with the everyday activities and problems of a site.
They are most eﬀectively used in limited park areas with a
variety of social and economic uses, where the researcher
can return repeatedly to the various social spaces during
the day.
TRANSECT WALKS 
A transect walk is a record of what a community consul-
tant describes and comments upon during a guided walk 
of the site. The idea is to include one or two community
members as research team members, in order to learn
about the site from the community member’s point of
view. In most s, local consultants work with the
researcher as a collaborator. In the transect walk, how-
ever, this relationship is particularly important, in that the
method is dependent on the quality of the relationship
between the collaborator and the researcher, and on the
ability of the community member to explain and discuss
the landscape.
INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS 
Individual interviews are collected from the identiﬁed
populations. The sampling strategy, interview schedule,
and number of interviews vary from site to site. In most
cases, on-site users and residents who live near the site are
interviewed, but in speciﬁc situations, interviews might be
collected more broadly.
EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
Expert interviews are collected from those people
identiﬁed as having special expertise to comment on the
area and its residents and users, such as the head of the
vendors’ association, neighborhood association presi-
dents, the head of the planning board, teachers or
principals in local schools, pastors or ministers of local
churches, and representatives from local parks and
institutions.
IMPROMPTU GROUP INTERVIEWS 
Impromptu group interviews occur where people gather
outside of public places or at special meetings set up with
church or school groups. The goal of group interviews 
(as opposed to individual interviews or focus groups) is to
collect data in a group context, as well as to provide an
educational opportunity for the community. Impromptu
group interviews, which are open-ended and experimen-

tal, include any community members who are interested
in joining the discussion group.
FOCUS GROUPS 
Focus groups are set up with those people who are impor-
tant in terms of understanding the site and local popula-
tion. As opposed to the large, open group interviews, the
focus groups consists of six to ten individuals selected to
represent especially vulnerable populations, such as
schoolchildren, seniors groups, and physically challenged
groups. The discussions are conducted in the language 
of the group; they are directed by a facilitator and are
tape-recorded.
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
The researchers maintain ﬁeld journals that record their
observations and impressions of everyday life at the site.
They also keep records of their experiences as they inter-
act with users and communities. Participant observation
is a valuable adjunct to the behavioral maps and inter-
views. It provides contextual information and data that
can be compared to what is seen, and such observation is
said to enable accurate data interpretation.
HISTORICAL AND ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS 
The collection of historical documents and review of
relevant archives, newspapers, and magazines begins the
 process. At historically signiﬁcant sites, this process
may be quite extensive, especially if secondary sources do
not exist. The importance of a careful review of historical
documents should be emphasized, since it is through a
thorough understanding of the history of the site that
areas of cooperation and conﬂict often become clear and
identiﬁable.
ANALYSIS
Interview data are organized by coding all responses, and
then content is analyzed by cultural or ethnic group and
study question. Transect walks, tours, and interviews are
used to produce cultural resource maps for each group.
Focus groups determine the extent of cultural knowledge
in the community, and they can identify the areas of con-
ﬂict and disagreement within the community. Mapping,
transect walks, individual and expert interviews, and focus
groups provide independent bodies of data that can be
compared and contrasted, thus improving the validity and
reliability of data collected from a relatively small sample.
As in all ethnographic research, the use of interviews,
observations, and ﬁeld notes—as well as knowledge of the
cultural group patterns and local politics—are used to
help interpret the collected data.
A number of procedures are used to analyze the
data. First, the resource maps are produced by an overlay
method that combines the behavioral maps, physical
traces, and participant observation notes. These maps are
descriptive, in that they summarize activities and distur-
bances on the site. Second, a research meeting is held in
which each participant summarizes what he or she has
found in the interviews. These are general observations
that guide the researcher or research team as more precise
coding strategies are developed. This synthetic stage is
quite important, in that it provides a place to start think-
ing about what has been found. These general summaries
are used to explore theoretical approaches and to priori-
tize the coding procedure. 
The third step is to take each generalization and
break it into a set of codes that can be used to analyze the
ﬁeld notes. Once this process is completed, the interview
questions are reviewed, and a similar coding scheme is
developed. The interview coding relies on the ﬁndings of
the maps, on the ﬁeld notes ( just discussed), and on the
structure of the questions themselves. This is the lengthy
part of the analysis process, and it requires discussion of
the research team with the client and, in some cases, with
the individual stakeholders. Some coding schemes may
require multidimensional scaling and a quantitative analy-
sis, although qualitative content analysis is usually ade-
quate in a .
Because the  is a rapid procedure, the num-
ber of interviews is usually under , and therefore, they
can be analyzed by hand. The advantage of a qualitative
analysis procedure is that the data are not abstracted from
their context, and so they retain their validity and detail.
The ﬁnal step involves a triangulation of the various
analyses and a search for common elements and patterns
of behaviors and the identiﬁcation of areas of conﬂict and
diﬀerences, both in the nature of the data and in the
groups themselves.  
Application of REAPs for Heritage
Conservation Sites
Two  projects—the ﬁrst on Independence National
Historical Park in Philadelphia, which focused on the
importance of ethnicity and cultural representation in
park use; the second, an evaluation of access alternatives
to Ellis Island, New York—are presented to provide
possible prototypes for developing a methodology for
heritage conservation. The issues involved—identifying


the stakeholders, community, and local users; eliciting
their cultural values; understanding the meanings that the
site holds for various groups; and giving voice to their
concerns and perspectives—are similar to the issues
addressed by a conservation professional who must evalu-
ate a site. Each case study is presented in detail so that
conservation practitioners can adapt the procedure to
their own needs.
Independence National Historical Park:
Ethnicity, Use, and Cultural Representation 
The idea of a historical national park in Philadelphia origi-
nated with the Federal Historic Sites Act of , which
authorized the  to engage in research and educational
and service programs and to protect, preserve, and main-
tain historic buildings and sites for public use. Planning
and site acquisition began in the late s; demolition,
site preparation, and construction took place throughout
the s. 
The Independence National Historical Park’s
enabling legislation and primary historic resources focus
on Independence Hall and related structures as the scene
of the central events that resulted in the creation of the
United States of America. These structures are the
physical reminders of the epic struggle for freedom and
self-government, as they relate not only to the founding 
of the nation but also to the birthplace of modern demo-
cratic government worldwide. The Liberty Bell, an inter-
national icon and one of the most venerated objects in the
park, evolved as a symbol of liberty because of its associa-
tion with various struggles for freedom, including the
events of  to .
The historical park project became part of a
larger eﬀort in the s to renew Center City Philadel-
phia. The epicenter of the renewal eﬀort was Society Hill,
an area adjacent to the new national park. Because of the
proximity of this neighborhood to the projected park area
as well as to downtown and because of the high quality 
of much of its building stock, the city saw in the national
park planning process an opportunity to restore the
racially and culturally heterogeneous neighborhood to its
colonial-period status as a wealthy residential area. The
name Society Hill was rediscovered and put to use in mak-
ing over the district’s image. 
Sections of Society Hill were designated as 
redevelopment areas. Homeowners were given the choice
of restoring their properties according to strict historic
preservation guidelines adopted by the planning authori-
ties or of selling to the redevelopment authority. Since few
could aﬀord the costly work of historic restoration, most
sold their homes. The city then oﬀered the properties for
Table  Products and outcomes of research methods used in the REAP.
Method  Data Product What Can Be Learned
Physical traces mapping Collected trash, patterns of erosion Description of nighttime activities Identifies evening activities not 
on site observed
Behavioral mapping Time/space maps of site Description of daily activities on site Identifies cultural activities on site
Transect walks Transcribed interviews and Description of site from community Community-centered understanding 
consultants’ map of site members’ points of view of the site; local meaning
Individual interviews Interview sheets Description of responses of the  Community responses and interest in 
cultural groups the site
Expert interviews In-depth interview transcriptions Description of responses of local Community leaders’ interest in the 
institutions and community leaders site planning process
Impromptu group interview Transcription of meeting Description of group perspective, Group consensus of issues and 
educational value problems
Focus groups Tape-recorded and transcribed Description of issues that emerge Elicits conflicts and disagreement 
in small group discussion within the cultural group
Participant observation Field notes Sociocultural description of the  Provides context for study and 
context identifies community concerns
Historical and archival Newspaper clippings, collection History of the site’s relationship  Provides historical context for current 
documents of books and articles, reading notes to the surrounding communities study and planning process
sale at a nominal price to buyers who could prove that
they had the ﬁnancial resources to restore them in accor-
dance with the guidelines. The banks, the real estate com-
munity, and the news media cooperated with the city in
creating a favorable image of the redevelopment area,
thereby creating a market of aﬄuent, mostly white buy-
ers. Thus, over a period of roughly ﬁfteen years, the pre-
dominantly poor, heterogeneous community of long
standing was dispersed and replaced by a new community
of predominantly white professionals.
The social and physical upheavals involved in cre-
ating Independence National Historical Park and Society
Hill did little to foster communication with local commu-
nities. The extensive demolition and erasure of the city
fabric removed many of the settings that had meaning for
members of local communities. In particular, the uproot-
ing of the historic African-American community from
what is now Society Hill is a legacy that has made it diﬃ-
cult to build ties between the park and that community.
Nevertheless, the  supports numerous com-
munity outreach programs and has recently created the
Yellow Fever exhibit, which focuses on the heroic roles of
African Americans during this deadly plague. Further-
more, the  receives and responds to numerous requests
for park use from the many cultural and ideological com-
munities in greater Philadelphia.
In , Independence National Historical Park
began developing a general management plan that would
set forth basic management philosophy and provide
strategies for addressing issues and objectives over the
next ten-to-ﬁfteen-year period. The planning process
called for extensive public participation, including a series
of public meetings, televised town meetings, community
tours, and planning workshops. As part of this commu-
nity outreach eﬀort, the park wanted to work coopera-
tively with local ethnic communities to ﬁnd ways to
interpret their diverse cultural heritages within the park’s
portrayal of the American experience. The study, there-
fore, was designed to provide a general overview of park-
associated ethnic groups, including an analysis of their
values and the identiﬁcation of cultural and natural
resources that are used by the various groups or are cul-
turally meaningful to them.
The research team spent considerable time inter-
viewing cultural experts and surveying the neighborhoods
located near Independence National Historical Park.
Based on these interviews and observations, four local
neighborhoods were selected for study: Southwark for
African Americans, Little Saigon for Asians and Asian
Americans, the Italian Market Area for Italian Americans,
and Norris Square for Latinos. These neighborhoods were
selected based on the following criteria: () they were
within walking distance of the park (except for Norris
Square); () they had visible spatial and social integrity;
and () there were culturally targeted stores, restaurants,
religious organizations, and social services available to res-
idents which reinforced their cultural identity. The Jewish
community could not be identiﬁed with a spatial commu-
nity in the downtown area; therefore, members of both
Conservative and Orthodox synagogues in the Society
Hill area were interviewed as a “community of interest,”
rather than as residents of a physically integrated area. 
In thirty-six days of ﬁeldwork,  people were consulted
in the form of individual and expert interviews, transect
walks, and focus groups. Table  presents the product and
outcome of each method utilized.
The data were coded and analyzed by cultural
group and study question. All places in and around the
park with personal and cultural associations for the
research participants were recorded on cultural resource
maps. One map was prepared for each cultural group.
One of the goals was to involve and educate com-
munity members about the park planning process, as well
as to learn their thoughts about the park. They were con-
sidered research “collaborators” rather than informants,
and at the conclusion of the interview, they were given a
form that could be mailed back to the park with written
suggestions and comments on the park’s future use. 
RELEVANT FINDINGS: CULTURAL
REPRESENTATION
Many participants were concerned with issues of cultural
representation. Some assimilated Italian Americans and
Jews were ambivalent about presenting themselves as dis-
tinct from other Americans. African Americans, in con-
trast, saw a lack of material and cultural representation in
the park’s historical interpretation. For some, the park
represented the uneven distribution of public goods: “So
much for them [tourists, white people] and so little for us
[African Americans, working-class neighborhood resi-
dents].” Asian Americans and Latinos favored a curatorial
approach less focused on national independence which,
instead, integrated their immigration stories and colonial
struggles into a more generalized representation of lib-
erty and freedom within the American experience. Italian
Americans, too, were interested in a more inclusive repre-
sentation—one that did not end park interpretation in
 or  but continued to the present. 


Three of the cultural groups—African Ameri-
cans, Latinos, and Jews—mentioned places they would
like to see commemorated or markers they would like to
see installed to bring attention to their cultural presence
within the park boundaries. Many participants—particu-
larly Latinos, African Americans, and Asians—saw the
need for more programming for children and activities for
families. Unlike the visual, pictorial experience the tourist
seeks, residents in general were interested in the park’s
recreational potential: as a place with sociable open spaces
where one can get food, relax, and sit on the grass; or as a
place for civic and cultural celebrations. These residents
wanted the park to be a more relaxed, fun, lively place. As
a group, Latinos made the most use of the park for recre-
ational purposes in their leisure time. Latinos were partic-
ularly interested in developing the recreational potential
of the park, but their sentiments were echoed by at least a
few consultants in each of the other ethnic groups.
RELEVANT FINDINGS: CULTURAL VALUES 
The  demonstrated that the park holds multiple val-
ues for Philadelphians which are often overlooked because
of management’s emphasis on accommodating visitors.
Visitors was a problematic term, because residents using
the park do not see themselves as visitors. Treating every-
one as a visitor (read tourist) neglects an important sense
of territoriality. The resident incorporates the park into
her home territory; the visitor knows she is a visitor. To
the resident, the park is symbolically and functionally part
of the larger landscape of the city and the neighborhood.
The resident likes being surrounded by familiar sights and
places, follows his/her own rhythm in moving around the
city, and enjoys a proprietary right of access. Those sensi-
bilities are oﬀended by crowds of tourists, by the denial of
free access to historic sites (that is, when not part of a
tour), and perhaps by an emphasis on oﬃcial interpreta-
tions. The more the park sets its landmarks oﬀ from the
surrounding city, reducing everyday contact with resi-
dents, the more the objects and places lose their meaning
for residents.
Table  REAP methodology for Independence National Historical Park. (Adapted from Low et al. [ forthcoming] .)
Method Data Duration Product What Can Be Learned
(days)
Behavioral mapping Time/space maps of site  Description of daily activities on Identiﬁes cultural activities on site
site
Transect walks Transcribed interviews and  Description of site from com-  Community-centered under-
consultants’ maps of site, special munity member’s point of view; standing of the site; local meaning;
places, special events, culturally problem with using tour guides— identiﬁcation of sacred places
signiﬁcant areas ample data but seemed rote
Individual interviews Interview sheets in English,  Description of responses of the Community responses and interest 
Spanish, Vietnamese, or Chinese, cultural groups in informal in the site
with map settings
Expert interviews In-depth interview transcriptions  Description of responses of local Community leaders’ interest in the
institutions and community site-planning process
leaders
Formal/informal Interview sheets  Description of the context and Provides context for study and 
discussions; participant history of the project; description identiﬁes  and community 
observation of site needs concerns
Focus groups Field notes, and tape recordings  Description of issues that emerge Enables understanding of conﬂicts 
in English, Spanish, and in small group discussions— and disagreement within the 
Vietnamese (used facilitator and diﬃcult to organize, conduct, and cultural group
translator) transcribe
Historical documents Newspaper clippings, collection  History of the park’s relationship Provides historical context for 
of books and articles, reading to the surrounding communities current study and planning process
notes
The  of Independence National Historical
Park is a model for heritage sites where issues of ethnicity
and culture correspond with either use or nonuse. Identi-
fying relevant cultural or ethnic groups as constituencies
that live in the local neighborhood or that traditionally
have a relationship to the park, then learning about those
groups and neighborhoods through the  methods,
provides a quick but complete snapshot of the commu-
nity and its diverse values, meanings, and sense of cultural
representation. Furthermore, this  was able to distin-
guish between visitor and resident values, which on this
site were in conﬂict. One aspect of the methodology,
however, that needs to be expanded for use in the conser-
vation ﬁeld would be more emphasis on the needs of the
visitor as well as of the local community residents. 
Ellis Island Access Alternatives: 
Conflicting Cultural Values  
The research goal was to provide commentary from an
ethnographic perspective on four possible scenarios—a
bridge, subsidized ferry, elevated rail, and tunnel. For the
purposes of this project, the culturally appropriate popu-
lations included the local users of Battery Park and Lib-
erty State Park; local providers of services at Battery Park
and Liberty State Park, including vendors and small-scale
tourist services; residents of the Jersey City neighbor-
hoods adjacent to Liberty State Park; special populations
such as children, the elderly, and the physically challenged;
and “traditional cultural groups”—those people whose
families entered through Ellis Island or who are them-
selves immigrants with identities and aspirations symboli-
cally connected to Ellis Island.
Ellis Island in New York was the principal 
federal immigration station in the United States from 
to . More than twelve million immigrants were
processed there, and it is estimated that over  percent of
all U.S. citizens can trace their ancestry to those who came
through the Registry Room. In , Ellis Island closed
and was virtually abandoned until , when President
Lyndon Johnson added it to the Statue of Liberty 
National Monument under the jurisdiction of the .
The restoration of Ellis Island began in , and the Ellis
Island Immigration Museum opened in , with the
building being restored to the period of –. 
Visitors to the Ellis Island Immigration Museum
mostly arrive by ferries that leave from Battery Park in
New York City and make stops at the Statue of Liberty
and then at Ellis Island before returning to Battery Park.
There is also an infrequent ferry from Liberty State Park
in New Jersey. The cost of the ferry trip was $.–$. at
the time of this study. People who work on Ellis Island,
however, especially construction workers with trucks and
materials, drive across a temporary bridge built to enable
the earlier historic preservation work; the bridge spans the
four hundred meters from Liberty State Park in New
Jersey to Ellis Island. Senator Lautenberg of New Jersey
was able to appropriate close to $ million of the federal
budget to build a permanent bridge to replace the existing
structure. The proposed bridge would have allowed both
vehicular and pedestrian traﬃc. 
This study was begun in the summer of  and
was undertaken as part of the environmental impact
statement required under federal law to disclose and eval-
uate the impact of building and operating the proposed
bridge. Much of the concern focused on whether making
Ellis Island accessible by footbridge would compromise
the island’s historical integrity. The task was to evaluate
the impact of a bridge on the sociocultural environment
of the two places from which the existing passenger ferry
service departs for Ellis Island—Liberty State Park in Jer-
sey City and Battery Park in New York—and to consider
the impact on nearby Jersey City neighborhoods. The
author was also asked to ﬁnd out whether the research
participants were in favor of the bridge or not. The bridge
was later taken out of the federal budget, and the project
was dropped. The “temporary” bridge remains in service
to authorized vehicles and personnel.
BATTERY PARK 
Battery Park is one of approximately ﬁfteen hundred
parks, playgrounds, and other public spaces under the
jurisdiction of the City of New York’s Department of
Parks and Recreation. The park covers almost twenty-
three (.) acres of land in a tear-shaped form that
stretches among State Street, Battery Place, and the 
New York harbor. The ferry to the Statue of Liberty and
Ellis Island leaves from the end of the park. On any
summer day, the park is ﬁlled with tourists waiting in line
for the ferry.
Visitors to the park consist of various categories
of tourists, the Wall Street lunchtime crowd, and New
York and New Jersey residents who come to enjoy the
park. Tourists can be found throughout the park, although

the majority tend to convene near the ferry landing,
souvenir pushcart area, and tour bus area. Lunchtime
workers tend to sit both in the sun and in the shade of
Eisenhower Mall, around the great lawn, and in the picnic
areas. Fishermen tend to gather at the end of the harbor.
Bikers and rollerbladers use the length of the promenade.
Sunbathers can be found along the edges of the prome-
nade where there is the least shade.  
Several diﬀerent groups of park and recreation
authorities serve Battery Park.  rangers are generally
inside or at the door of Castle Clinton, directing tourists
or giving guided tours in the parks and surrounding
neighborhood. City Parks and Recreation employees
work throughout, maintaining the park. Several city
employees regularly lunch in the playground area at the
picnic tables. A police car patrols the park for security, and
often city park oﬃcers are seen talking with homeless
individuals or illegal street vendors.
There are many kinds of vendors in Battery Park.
Three pushcart vending companies—two that concen-
trate on food and one that sells souvenirs—have pushcarts
regularly in the park. One of these vending companies
also owns both outdoor restaurants. This company has
only four carts, which are within the vicinity of the east-
side outdoor restaurant. Another pushcart company
employs the majority of immigrants operating pushcarts
near the entrance to the park, Castle Clinton, and the
nearby tourist bus stop. The third company occupies terri-
tory near the tour-bus stop, as well as near the ferry land-
ing. Independent vendors are spread out between the two
ends of the park.
Street performers position themselves on the
promenade where boat lines are formed, along the wide
path to the great lawn, at the crossroads in front of the
great lawn, or between the Castle and the promenade. 
A large number of homeless people reside in the park.
The stone slabs of the war memorial oﬀer privacy to a
person sleeping on a bench. Patches of healthy grass,
bathrooms, and a running fountain in the park are
resources to the homeless residents. By evening, the
homeless residents outnumber other park users. A service
center for homeless individuals is located underneath the
Staten Island terminal, and a soup kitchen is located in the
surrounding neighborhood.
LIBERTY STATE PARK 
Liberty State Park occupies , acres of land and tide-
land along Upper New York Bay in Jersey City, New Jersey.
The site was a vast railroad yard throughout most of the
twentieth century. By the s, all passenger rail and
freight operations on the site had been abandoned. 
The State of New Jersey acquired the site and has been
gradually transforming it into a public park. The ﬁrst
phase of Liberty State Park opened in June , in time
for the national bicentennial observances. The area devel-
oped for park use so far comprises approximately three
hundred acres, mostly at the southern and northern edges
of the park. 
The southern area—which was the ﬁrst part of
the park to be constructed and opened and is the most
intensively used area in Liberty State Park—includes
grass-covered ﬁelds, a public boat launch, walkways along
the waterfront, spacious parking lots, and the park head-
quarters, which contains a food concession stand, rest-
rooms, and visitor information. The northern area has
three centers of activity widely separated by ﬂat, mostly
treeless ﬁelds. Two of the activity centers are major devel-
opments of recent years: the Liberty Science Center and
the restored head house and concourse of the Central
Railroad of New Jersey () ferry terminal, where pas-
sengers once boarded ferries for New York.
The third concentration of activity in the north-
ern area is the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island passenger
ferry dock, which is located along the Tidewater Basin.
Visitors to the two national monuments can park in the
newly constructed parking lot across Johnston Avenue,
west of the  terminal train shed, and walk across 
the street to the ferry dock, from which the ferries come
and go at roughly forty-ﬁve-minute intervals. Next to the
dock are a ticket stand operated by the ferry company, 
a ﬁlm and souvenir stand, several picnic tables, sheltered
waiting areas, several refreshment vendor carts, and
public lavatories. 
The most popular area includes the perimeter
walkways around the Liberation Monument, east of park
headquarters, and the section of Liberty Walk that contin-
ues from this ﬁeld on a trestle across the south cove. This
area is within easy walking distance of two large parking
lots and oﬀers spectacular views of the bay, the Statue of
Liberty, and the New York skyline. Liberty Walk itself has
numerous benches where people rest and enjoy the views
and the breezes.
The picnic grove is used by families, organized
groups, and some individuals alone. People can buy take-
out food at the stand in the park headquarters, but most
seem to bring picnics, and some cook on outdoor grills.
The stretches of Liberty Walk that bridge the north and
south coves are popular with people who ﬁsh, especially in


the early morning and in the evening—times when the
ﬁsh are feeding. 
The brick plaza next to the  Terminal is used
occasionally in the daytime for ceremonies, such as Flag
Day observances by the Jersey City Fire Department. In
summer, Jersey City sponsors Sunday afternoon jazz con-
certs here. On sunny evenings, people may drive down to
the plaza, parking in the free lot next to the ferry terminal,
to watch the sunset. The  Terminal is lightly used on
weekdays by people visiting the historical exhibits in the
old waiting room, using the lavatories, or just looking at
the building itself. On some weekends the terminal is used
for special events like ethnic festivals or collectors’ shows,
which may attract thousands of people.  
NEARBY JERSEY CITY NEIGHBORHOODS 
Three neighborhoods bordering Liberty State Park were
selected for study: () Paulus Hook, a small gentriﬁed 
area of brownstone row houses and corner parks; () Van
Vorst, a larger area of elegant brick and brownstone row
houses focused on Van Vorst Park, a residential square,
with some gentriﬁcation amid a highly heterogeneous
population; and () Lafayette, a mixed industrial and 
low-income residential area of tenements, wooden row
houses, public housing projects, and newer, subsidized
modular housing. These neighborhoods were selected
both for their proximity to Liberty State Park and 
because they are representative of the social diversity 
of Jersey City.
Paulus Hook is a historic, peninsular neighbor-
hood, across the Tidewater Basin from Liberty State Park.
It is bounded by Hudson Street on the east, York Street on
the north, Marin Boulevard on the west, and the Tide-
water Basin on the south. The Morris Canal Little Basin,
on the southeastern edge of Paulus Hook, is the last ves-
tige in Jersey City of the early-nineteenth-century Morris
Canal, a shipping channel that crossed the state of New
Jersey to connect the two great rivers of the Mid-Atlantic
region: the North River (the Hudson) and the South River
(the Delaware). The clearance of industrial buildings from
the lot between Hudson Street and the Hudson River has
opened up beautiful views of the river, the harbor, and the
skyscrapers of downtown New York. The open lot is cur-
rently used for public parking. The enormous Colgate
toothpaste electric sign, the face of its clock big enough to
be read from Manhattan, has been relocated from the for-
mer Colgate factory nearby to a site at the river’s edge,
just east of the open lot. A new weekday passenger ferry
service operates between the newly named Colgate Pier,
next to the sign, and the World Financial Center ferry
dock in New York.
The center of the neighborhood is made up of
three corner parks across from one another, where people
sit on benches in the shade during hot summer after-
noons. The park users are representative of the various
residents of the neighborhood: some are Polish-speaking
immigrants who are longtime residents of the area, some
are Spanish-speaking recent immigrants, and a few are
older English-speaking European Americans. The
gentriﬁed center of the community is Washington Street,
a mixed residential and commercial street, with an
expensive Italian restaurant across from law and real
estate oﬃces. There are a number of churches in Paulus
Hook, including Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and
a Polish Roman Catholic church, Our Lady of Czesto-
chowa. Each of these churches oﬀers numerous commu-
nity activities and services, including senior centers,
parochial schools, and summer children’s programs.
Van Vorst is bounded by Grand Street on the
south and by Monmouth and Brunswick Streets on the
west. The streets surrounding the park, including York,
Mercer, Montgomery, Monmouth, Varick, and Barrow
Streets, are lined with substantial row houses of brick and
brownstone dating from the middle and late nineteenth
century. The largest and most splendid houses look out on
Van Vorst Park from Jersey Avenue. Gentriﬁcation has
been under way in Van Vorst since at least the mid-s.
Many houses in the neighborhood have been refurbished
and their architectural details restored. On the same
streets, salsa music can be overheard from double-parked
cars of residents who have stopped to talk to a friend at
the local bodega or to someone sitting on a row house
stoop. Many of these conversations are in a mixture of
English and Spanish. Further down the street, elderly
African-American residents sit or stand on their stoops
conversing with neighbors who are returning home or
passing by on the way to the busy bodega. Van Vorst has a
number of churches, including various Spanish-speaking
congregations of local evangelical churches.
Lafayette is located along the western edge of
Liberty State Park. It is a residential neighborhood with
many intrusions of car repair shops, scrap metal yards,
and piles of old tires and other industrial waste. Part of
the neighborhood has small manufacturing shops side by
side with residential streets. Most of the community
members interviewed were African Americans or Spanish-
speaking Caribbean Americans who had lived in the
neighborhood for some time. Families live in brick or

stone row houses, in larger apartment projects, or in the
new, subsidized modular attached town houses. The cen-
ter of the Lafayette African-American male community is
the barber shop, where men sit, talk, and exchange news
throughout the day. The bodegas and bus stops on each
corner of Paciﬁc Street also provide opportunities for con-
versations and neighborly interchange, particularly for
women, younger men, and mothers with young children.
The major school in the area is the Assumption–All Saints
parochial school, run by Sister Maeve McDermott.
According to Sister Maeve, she is responsible for 
children in this relatively poor area. The Convent of the
Sisters of Charity has been a mainstay in the community
for over eighty years and runs the school and summer
programs for local children. There are a number of other
churches throughout the neighborhood, including the
Monumental Baptist Church, where the researchers inter-
viewed a number of the congregation, and the African
Methodist Episcopal Church, as well as other small evan-
gelical and storefront congregations.
RELEVANT FINDINGS: INTERESTS 
AND ATTITUDES 
The research focused on constituency groups; further into
the project, however, when constituency analysis did not
provide statistically signiﬁcant clustering of similar people
and points of view, a values-orientation-based analysis
was incorporated. The constituency groups provided a
guide to sampling the users and residents on the three
sites—Battery Park, Liberty State Park, and the Jersey City
neighborhoods surrounding Liberty State Park (Paulus
Hook, Van Vorst, and Lafayette)—who were consulted
concerning their perceptions of possible positive or nega-
tive impacts of each of the proposed access alternatives.
Their attitudes and concerns were collected through a
series of  data collection methods—including behav-
ioral maps, transect walks, individual interviews, expert
interviews, impromptu group interviews, and focus
groups—completed at the various ﬁeld sites (see Table ).
A total of  people were consulted:  through individ-
ual interviews in the two parks,  through impromptu
group interviews in neighborhood gathering places, and
 in focus groups both in the parks and in neighborhood
churches and institutions.
Table  REAP methodology for Ellis Island access alternative project.
Method Data Duration Product What Can Be Learned
(days)
Physical traces mapping Map of trash and clothing left at site  Description of physical condition Identifies nighttime activities that 
of site would be aﬀected by the proposed 
bridge and alternatives
Behavioral mapping Time/space maps of site, ﬁeld  Description of daily activities Identiﬁes daily activities that 
notes at site would be aﬀected by the 
proposed bridge and alternatives
Transect walks Transcribed interviews and  Description of site from Community-centered understand-
consultants’ maps of site, ﬁeld notes community member’s point ing of the site; local meanings
of view
Individual interviews Interview sheets, ﬁeld notes  Description of responses of the Community and user responses to 
constituency groups the proposed bridge and alterna-
tives 
Expert interviews In-depth interview transcriptions  Description of positions of local Community leaders’ responses to 
institutions and community the proposed bridge and alterna-
leaders tives
Group interviews Field notes, video or tape recording  Description of various Involves the neighborhood and 
community groups and their church groups in the planning
responses to the proposed bridge process; provides for public discus-
and alternatives sion of issues in the local context
Focus groups Field notes, video, or tape recording  Description of issues that merge Enables the development of a 
in small group discussion typology of responses and in-depth 
discussion of alternatives
The data were analyzed by coding all responses
from the interviews and focus groups and then by com-
paring constituency groups. Constituency groups were
deﬁned as groups of people who share cultural beliefs and
values and who are likely to be aﬀected by the proposed
access alternatives in a similar way. Correlational, content,
and value orientation analyses were utilized to present the
various positions held by consultants across the sub-
groups studied in this project.
In addition to the coding of all responses from
the interviews and the analysis by constituency, correla-
tional analyses were applied where possible. The attitudes
toward the alternatives were analyzed for content and pre-
sented as lists of arguments for and against the bridge and
the other alternatives. Finally, a value orientation analysis
summarized the various positions held by consultants
across the subgroups studied in this project. 
In Battery Park, the people the most concerned
about the negative impact of a bridge were the service
managers, city employees, park employees, ferry repre-
sentatives, and tour bus drivers—that is, those constituen-
cies with a vested interest in the success and proﬁtability
of Battery Park. The greatest diﬀerences in attitudes
about the proposed bridge were found between people
who were recreating, versus those who were working, 
in Battery Park—recreating consultants were more
positive, and workers were more negative—and between
people who were immigrants and those who were native
born—immigrants were more positive, and the native
born were more negative. Overall, Battery Park users
were most concerned about the economic consequences
of the proposed access alternatives, but there were a
number of people who were concerned about access to
Ellis Island or who questioned the social priorities of the
bridge alternative.
In Liberty State Park, constituency groups were
not predictive of attitudes toward the alternatives, with
the one notable exception of such vested interests as
Liberty State Park oﬃcials and workers, who were over-
whelmingly against the proposed bridge. The active
recreation users, such as walkers and cyclists, were more
in favor of the bridge than were the passive user groups
and organized group leaders. There was also a sharp dis-
tinction between Latino and non-Latino consultants: 
the Latino consultants were very positive about the access
alternatives, as compared with non-Latino groups. 
The same diﬀerences in attitude between user type 
(work-related use versus recreational use) and place of
origin (immigrant versus native born) found in Battery
Park were found in Liberty State Park. The two most
frequently cited value orientations were health and
recreation, and park quality—quite a contrast from the
economic ﬁndings in Battery Park—followed by aesthetic
concerns and concerns about improved access.
The residents of the various neighborhoods sur-
rounding Liberty State Park were generally in favor of the
proposed bridge and less interested in the other alterna-
tives, yet each neighborhood had a slightly diﬀerent per-
spective on the issue. Paulus Hook residents had very
mixed opinions about the proposed bridge and were con-
cerned about potential problems, such as increased traﬃc
or limited parking, that might occur. Van Vorst residents
were more positive and considered the proposed bridge a
way to increase democratic access to Ellis Island. They
saw the recreational beneﬁts of the bridge as an improve-
ment to their neighborhood. Lafayette residents were the
most positive about the proposed bridge because it would
allow them to visit Ellis Island without paying the ferry
fare, which was perceived as too high for families and
groups of children to aﬀord in this low-income area. They,
too, saw the bridge as an amenity that would add to the
beauty and recreational potential of Liberty State Park
and their local community.
RELEVANT FINDINGS: VALUE ORIENTATIONS 
Table  presents the value orientations compared across
the parks and neighborhoods. What is clear from this
comparison is that each area has slightly diﬀerent priori-
ties and concerns. Battery Park workers and users are not
at all concerned with the cost of the ferry or the bridge
but instead are concerned about the possible economic
consequences of the proposed access alternatives. Liberty
State Park workers and users, on the other hand, are con-
cerned with the health and recreation advantages and
park-quality disadvantages of the access alternatives. 
The residents of Paulus Hook, Van Vorst, and Lafayette
are most concerned with the cost of the ferry or proposed
access alternative. Cost, access, park quality, and econom-
ics were the most frequently mentioned concerns for all
groups. Table  is useful in understanding the variation
among these populations and can be used to judge how
often a concern was expressed by consultants in this study.


Integrating Anthropological-
Ethnographic Methods into Heritage
Conservation Planning and Practice
Table  outlines a research approach to heritage conserva-
tion planning that includes constituency analysis, ethno-
semantic methodologies, and s, as strategies in a
values assessment process. Although these are not the
only strategies for assessing relevant cultural values, they
are an excellent place to start. A Getty Conservation Insti-
tute report, from the “Economics and Heritage Conserva-
tion” meeting of , which was focused on the econom-
ics of value assessment, also proposes a number of other
strategies for overlaying and assessing heritage, once the
values are identiﬁed ( ). 
A ﬁnal question about who should be undertak-
ing these various projects does not have a simple answer.
The overall project—including the identiﬁcation of stake-
holders, the development of a values typology, the values
assessment process, the evaluation and ranking of values,
and a follow-up with more detailed assessment as neces-
sary—should be organized and directed by the conserva-
tion professional. But values assessment, particularly
when a  is used, is a team process.
Experienced ethnographers and ﬁeld workers
will be able to produce the necessary data more quickly
and easily than other professionals. Furthermore, the
analysis process requires considerable training and back-
ground in qualitative analysis techniques. Yet the tech-
niques involved in constituency analysis, ethnosemantic
methodologies, and s can be learned through a series
of training workshops. Local participants can become
excellent on-site ﬁeld workers, and the  process usu-
ally includes local collaborators. In fact, part of the point
of undertaking a  is to create connections to the local
community.
The best situation, if ﬁnances allow, is to bring
together a team made up of conservation professional(s),
ethnographer(s) (the number depends on language
demands), and two to three local residents and/or experts
who would like to be part of the values assessment
process. The residents and experts can be trained by the
ethnographers to assist in interviewing and mapping,
while the ethnographers would undertake the group
interviews, focus groups, and participant observation.
There are many combinations of expertise that are 
useful, and these would have to be developed for each
project on site.
Table  Value orientations by site in Ellis Island access alternative
project.
Value Battery Liberty Surrounding Total
Orientation Park State Park Neighbor-
hoods
Cost    
Access    
Park quality    
Economic    
Health and    
recreation
Choice    
Aesthetic    
Social    
priorities
Political    
Education    
Personal    
Safety and    
comfort
New    
technology
Ecological    
Not going to    
have impact
Community    
quality
One important conclusion from Ellis Island is
that all the people the researchers talked to were inter-
ested in the questions asked and were quite sophisticated
in their understanding of the problem and its conse-
quences, regardless of cultural or educational back-
ground. Thus, concerns that the general public would not
be able to evaluate the access alternatives or would not
care about the proposed changes to Ellis Island and Lib-
erty State Park were unfounded. This ﬁnding suggests
that values assessments and planning processes can be
enhanced by consultation with local populations through
the  process.

Conclusion
This paper has outlined how qualitative anthropological-
ethnographic methods can be incorporated into the
process of value assessment at heritage sites. The pro-
posed methodologies are intended to be complementary
to a parallel economic values assessment that utilizes the
techniques identiﬁed in the Economics and Heritage
Conservation meeting report ( ). The next step in
developing an integrated “sociocultural-economic”
model of valuing the signiﬁcance of a historic site
requires ﬁeld testing with clients or stakeholders and local
community groups, as well as ﬁeld testing that addresses
values conﬂicts. When this proposed methodology is
applied in a real-life case study, problems and redundan-
cies in the assessment process will become apparent. After
this test application, the conclusions of this paper should
be revisited, discussed, and evaluated, and a ﬁnal model
methodology should be proposed.
Table  Cultural values assessment procedure.
Task Methodology Specific Techniques
Identify stakeholders Constituency analysis Expert interviews, behavioral mapping, physical traces 
mapping, participant observation
Develop values typology Ethnosemantic methodology Work with panel of representatives from each constituency 
to evaluate values typology, translate values typology into local 
categories
Values assessment  Individual interviews, transect walks, focus groups, participant 
observation
Overlay values assessments Ecological planning and design process Constituency groups are represented in a process that assesses 
values and negotiates ranking of values priorities/importance
Discuss assessments with  Focus groups, impromptu interviews, group interview
stakeholders
Repeat procedure for more Constituency conflict analysis Individual interviews, behavioral mapping, expert interviews
detailed assessments of individual 
values where conflicts arise
Notes
. Adapted from Low ().
. Portions of the literature review are based on the more
extensive discussion found in Taplin, Scheld, and Low
(forthcoming).
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Economic Valuation of Cultural Heritage: 
Evidence and Prospects
By Susana Mourato and Massimiliano Mazzanti
I  ,   for cultural destinations
has become a major force in the global economy (Greﬀe
, ; Pearce and Mourato ). Tourist trips typi-
cally include cultural heritage elements that range widely,
from a journey to a historical town center to a visit to a
museum or a stroll around a historic garden. Visitors
beneﬁt from the expectations, experiences (educational,
visual, recreational), and memories oﬀered by heritage
assets; while nonvisitors may beneﬁt indirectly through
magazines, ﬁlms, or, increasingly, the Internet (virtual
visits). Even if one does not use a cultural asset at present,
investing in its conservation and maintenance retains the
possibility of being able to use it at some point in the
future. This option value of cultural destinations is akin to
an insurance premium.
Furthermore, people may attach a value to the
conservation of cultural resources for a number of rea-
sons—without ever using or visiting them. There may be
altruistic feelings associated with the knowledge that
other people may enjoy cultural heritage. Or there may be
bequest motivations accruing from the desire to conserve
cultural goods for future generations. Or there may even
be existence values—that is, beneﬁts that come from the
knowledge that cultural heritage is being conserved for its
own sake. These nonuse values are thought to be a signiﬁ-
cant proportion of the total economic value of cultural her-
itage, which may well extend beyond country borders.
Yet despite its obvious beneﬁts to society, cultural
heritage is increasingly threatened with degradation and
destruction. While some risk factors result from natural
environmental causes (such as earthquakes, landslides,
volcanism, ﬂoods, avalanches, and coastal dynamics),
human activities are arguably the main pressures behind
the decay and loss of cultural assets. These include tourist
and user pressure, unplanned urbanization, destructive
development projects, theft, vandalism, war, air pollution,
vibration, and plain neglect. 
Part of the problem is that many cultural assets
are not traded in markets: they have a “zero price” and can
be enjoyed by many without charge. In other words, these
so-called nonmarket cultural resources are valued by soci-
ety but in a way that is not translated into any market
price—i.e., they are external to markets. The impacts on
conservation of this “market failure” can be severe: under-
funding, with insuﬃcient funds generated to ﬁnance con-
servation; strong reliance on government support and
public subsidy, which leaves the conservation of many
important cultural assets at the mercy of political whims
and overstretched government budgets; overuse, with
resulting wear and tear, congestion, vandalism, and theft;
and inability to compete on the same level with alterna-
tive development projects, as the economic value of cul-
tural assets appears to be zero or very small. A notorious
example is the recent loss of the ancient city of Zeugma in
Turkey, which was ﬂooded because of the construction of
a dam. The discovery on site of some of the most beauti-
ful Roman mosaics in the Near East did not prevent the
complete destruction of the city remains. 
Paradoxically, underuse of cultural resources 
can also be detrimental for conservation. This is the case,
for instance, when the goal of preserving a site is pursued
by implementing only defensive policies, such as listing,
without investment in integrated strategies of valoriza-
tion: conservation, restoration, and demand-oriented
policies. 
Even when cultural goods and services are mar-
keted, like many cultural destinations where visitors are
required to pay an entry fee, more often than not there is a
failure to practice optimal charges—namely, fees that
would maximize visitor revenues without compromising
targets for number of visits and fees that could subse-
quently revert to conservation (Steiner ; Hett and
Mourato ; Beltran and Rojas ). For example, in
the case of the Historical Sanctuary of Machu Picchu in
Peru, where both foreign and national tourists are charged
the same, Hett and Mourato estimate that  percent of
all visitors would be willing to pay higher fees (Hett and
Mourato ). A policy of price diﬀerentiation between
foreign and national tourists was found to increase the
proﬁtability of the site by more than  percent while
simultaneously increasing visitation rates of national visi-
tors by about  percent.
Statements in the existing cultural heritage litera-
ture that attempt to motivate conservation policies by ref-
erence to large “cultural values” are commonplace (Feld-
stein ; Couper ; Hutchinson ), and the deteri-
oration or disappearance of any item of this heritage is
thought to constitute a harmful impoverishment of the
world heritage of mankind as a whole ( ).
However, apart from what can be inferred from data on
visitors and from maintenance and restoration expendi-
tures, little is known about the actual magnitude of the
economic value of nonmarket cultural resources. Even
less is known about how changes in quality aﬀect the
value of these resources. Somewhat surprisingly, there has
been little eﬀort to demonstrate these values in practice.
But there is some good news. In the last two
decades, economists have developed techniques to assess
the economic value of changes that are external to mar-
kets. In recent years, a number of these nonmarket valua-
tion methods have gained increasing popularity among
academics and policy makers, particularly since a panel of
experts led by two Nobel laureates in economics ruled
that, under certain conditions, they were reliable enough
to be used in a U.S. court of law in the context of natural
resource damage assessment (Arrow et al. ). Follow-
ing this historic decision, survey methods like contingent
valuation (Mitchell and Carson ) have ﬂourished and
have been widely used in environmental decision making
at various levels (Bateman et al. ). A contingent valua-
tion questionnaire is a survey instrument that sets out a
number of questions to elicit, among other information,
the monetary value of a change in a public good or ser-
vice. Most interestingly, its use has slowly but inexorably
extended into other ﬁelds, such as health, transport,
social, and, notably, cultural policy.1
The estimation of the economic value of cultural
heritage conservation has increasingly been recognized as
a fundamental part of cultural policy (Frey ; Throsby
; Maddison and Mourato ; Creigh-Tyte, Dawe,
and Stock ; Darnell ; Navrud and Ready ;
Nuti ; Pearce and Mourato ; Davies ). Empiri-
cally, there are at least two powerful arguments for using
economic valuation to inform macro and micro decisions
in the cultural heritage sector. On the one hand, public
institutions are increasingly being required to justify their
expenditure decisions or requests for funding in terms of
generated “consumer beneﬁts,” and those that are unable
to do so might ﬁnd their budgets cut. Furthermore, in a 
world where potential visitors are spoiled for choice, time
constrained (rather than income constrained), and getting
more sophisticated, cultural destinations are having to
renew and market themselves to compete and survive. 
A consumer-oriented approach has increasingly taken
over traditional supply-driven approaches to cultural her-
itage management and conservation, leading to ongoing
market research studies to understand demand, strong
marketing to generate awareness and attract new visitors,
and a focus on building “brand” loyalty and encouraging
repeat visits, essential for long-term survival. For these
reasons, discussed in more detail in the following sections,
demand-led approaches, such as economic valuation tech-
niques, might quickly form an integral part of the new
lexicon of the cultural industry and a useful component 
of the cultural analyst tool kit. Economic value as deﬁned
here does not deny the importance of other value dimen-
sions but has a speciﬁc, and arguably special, role to play
in cultural policy toward heritage fruition, enhancement,
and conservation.2
In essence, neglecting to take into account the
economic value of cultural heritage conservation and the
full costs and beneﬁts of policies, regulations, and projects
with cultural components can lead to suboptimal alloca-
tion of resources in the sector, investment failure, and
continuous degradation of the world’s cultural assets.
Clearly, these are complex issues that need to go beyond
the ﬁnancial aspects and be understood in the wider con-
text of raising adequate ﬁnancing for conservation and
renewal, while, at the same time, reaching out and
encouraging a demand to visit and appreciate cultural
heritage. This paper argues that economic valuation is a
necessary (although not suﬃcient) stage to achieve the
sustainable use of cultural resources and to help reach a
balanced, optimal mix of preservation, conservation, and
access, while assessing the relative opportunity costs of
each component.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The
next section, “Economic Valuation: Principles and Tools,”
presents the basic principles of economic valuation and
examines a range of economic tools for the evaluation of
cultural heritage, explaining their advantages and disad-
vantages. In the following section, the authors discuss the
role of economic valuation techniques for microanalysis
of cultural policies and cultural institutions and argue the
need for measuring (nonmarket) economic ﬂows to
inform cultural policy and management; some cultural
targets that economic valuation tools might help to
achieve are also suggested. The following section reviews

the current evidence on the application of economic valu-
ation methods to cultural goods and discusses its main
ﬁndings and implications. The ﬁnal section proposes a
new framework for the valuation of cultural heritage,
based on recent developments of economic measurement
tools and on a more integrated approach for socio-
economic-cultural evaluation. Conclusions and sugges-
tions for future research are also presented.
Economic Valuation: 
Principles and Tools 
Basic Principles
In line with standard economic theory, human well-being
is determined by people’s preferences. A beneﬁt is deﬁned
as anything that increases human well-being, and a cost as
anything that decreases human well-being. Measurement
of preferences is obtained by ﬁnding out individuals’ max-
imum willingness to pay () for a beneﬁt or for the
avoidance of a cost, or their minimum willingness to
accept () compensation for tolerating a cost or forgo-
ing a beneﬁt. The rate at which individuals are prepared to
trade oﬀ goods and services against one another corre-
sponds to the total economic value of a change in the
price or quality of a good or service.3 This is because it
forces people to take into account the fact that they are
being asked to sacriﬁce some of their limited income to
secure the change and must thus weigh the value of what
is being oﬀered to them against alternative uses of that
income. In this sense,  is a much more powerful mea-
sure of value than an attitudinal statement. While people
may say, in response to an attitudinal question, that they
“care about” many things, in practice they will only be
able to pay for a much smaller subset of these things.
 is normally expressed in the marketplace.
The market equilibrium between demand and supply of
goods and services is a reﬂection of people’s preferences
and is characterized by an optimal quantity and price.
Consumers who are willing to pay the market price of a
good or service will buy it: for those willing to pay exactly
the market price and no more, the cost of buying the
good or service—i.e., the money they spend—is just equal
to the beneﬁt they get from the purchase—i.e., the well-
being generated by the good; while those consumers who
are willing to pay more than the price will also buy that
good and get a net gain from the purchase, a “consumer
surplus,” measured by the excess of  over price. When
the price of the good exceeds the price that people are pre-
pared to pay for it, there is no corresponding welfare loss,
as people simply do not buy that good. 
A large proportion of cultural goods and services
are traded in markets: cultural tourism, performing arts,
antiques, paintings, and books are just a few examples of
cultural goods for which thriving markets exist. But even
in these cases, pricing polices are many times controlled,
noncompetitive, and arbitrary, and price discrimination is
not eﬀectively implemented (see Hett and Mourato 
or Beltran and Rojas  for examples). Further, many
market imperfections are present, such as the monopoly
power of institutions and government subsidies, which
prevent competitive pricing. 
But of speciﬁc interest to this paper are the many
cultural goods and services that are not traded in the mar-
ket and that hence do not have a price. This is due to some
of the special characteristics of cultural heritage, related
to its property rights and type of use, that prevent the exis-
tence of the necessary markets for individuals to express
their preferences. Using economic terminology, many cul-
tural assets are nonrival and nonexclusive in consumption;
in other words, the fact that one individual enjoys an asset
does not prevent others from enjoying it as well, and no
one can be excluded from its enjoyment (i.e., open access
or common property). Assets with these characteristics
are called public goods and are typically provided for
collectively by governments and paid for through taxes. 
A historical town center is a good example of a public
good: it is open-access, and large numbers of visitors can
enjoy it simultaneously. A similar case occurs when a cul-
tural good has external eﬀects (externalities) that are not
captured by the market. For example, conservation works
carried out on a historical building may have a positive
visual externality for passers-by. This external eﬀect is not
captured in any market (pecuniary) transaction.
As noted previously, these situations where the
market does not reﬂect the full welfare provided by the
good are called market failures, and they typically occur
with assets, such as cultural heritage, that have public-
good characteristics. Market failure can result in under-
pricing and overuse and lead to “free riding”—a situation
in which people can enjoy the beneﬁts of the cultural
asset without having to pay for them. Going back to the
previous example, people may derive utility from viewing
the facade of a building without having to pay for it. Mar-
ket failure provides a justiﬁcation for government subsidy
in support of culture, since commonly, the revenues col-
lected from users are insuﬃcient to cover conservation
expenditure. Hence, cultural assets can become overly

dependent on (volatile) government subsidy. The inability
of the market to reﬂect the full value of cultural goods
also means that many destructive development projects
are implemented on the grounds that they appear to gen-
erate higher ﬁnancial beneﬁts.
Evidently, the fact that many public cultural
goods are not traded in markets does not mean that they
do not have a value. The problem is how to measure that
value, given the absence of a market. In the past, taking
maintenance costs as a proxy of economic value has too
often justiﬁed cultural heritage ﬁnancing and manage-
ment. But true  to prevent damage may be larger,
smaller, or equal to maintenance or mitigation costs. This
point is best illustrated through an example.
Suppose that a town council is interested in esti-
mating the value of restoring and conserving a decaying
ancient historical house, of notable architecture, where a
famous musician lived for most of his life. Adopting the
maintenance cost approach would mean that the costs of
cleaning, repairing, and restoring the fabric of the build-
ing would be taken as a proxy for the value of its conser-
vation. But this may seriously miscalculate the true eco-
nomic value of cultural conservation. On the one hand,
restoration and maintenance practices may not prevent
damages to the structure of the house from occurring,
and some practices may even cause additional injuries. 
As a result, a part of the total value of the property may
be irreversibly lost when the original material is altered or
replicated. Furthermore, the “cost” of maintaining the
building may seriously underestimate the “beneﬁts” to the
public of conserving it, which extend beyond mere users
of the building, as the property might be valued by many
others for its historical signiﬁcance and architectural
beauty. Hence, existing ﬁgures on cultural property costs
(say, per user, per area, or per year) should always be
accompanied by and compared to similar and commensu-
rable ﬁgures on beneﬁts. Decisions should be based on a
rigorous assessment of both beneﬁts and costs and not
solely on cost considerations.4
Valuation Techniques
Recent developments in environmental economic theory
and social survey methodology have made it theoretically
defensible and practically feasible to value the economic
beneﬁts of several types of amenities not traded in
markets, such as the beneﬁts from accessing or conserving
cultural resources. There is now an extensive literature on
the methodologies for measuring the monetary values of
changes in nonmarket commodities, which is a major step
beyond standard ﬁnancial analysis that ignores many key
values that aﬀect well-being and behavior. The absence of
markets is solved by the use of either stated-preference or
revealed-preference techniques.5 Table  gives a summary
of the available methods applicable to the cultural her-
itage context.6
Table  Selected economic valuation methodologies.
Revealed Preferences Stated Preferences 
Hedonic price method Contingent valuation method 
Travel-cost method Choice modeling 
Maintenance-cost method 
Revealed-preference methods look at “surro-
gate markets”: they analyze preferences for nonmarket
goods as implied by  behavior in an associated market.
Popular revealed-preference techniques include the
hedonic price method, the travel-cost method, and the
maintenance-cost method. Although useful and theoreti-
cally sound (in the case of hedonic pricing and travel 
cost), the potential for their use in the estimation of the
value attached to cultural sites is limited: revealed-
preference methods cannot estimate option and nonuse
values and cannot evaluate future marginal changes in
cultural assets.
• The hedonic price method is based on the idea
that house prices are aﬀected by a house’s bundle of char-
acteristics, which may include nonmarket cultural factors,
such as historic zone designation (Rosen ). Other
things being equal, the extra price commanded by a house
in a historic area would be a measure of the  for his-
toric zone designation. This method is of partial and lim-
ited use in the valuation of cultural heritage: it does not
measure nonuse or option values and is only applicable to
cultural heritage elements that are embodied in property
prices. It also relies on the unrealistic assumptions of a
freely functioning and eﬃcient property market, where
individuals have perfect information and mobility.
• The travel-cost method uses diﬀerences in travel
costs of individuals making use of a cultural site to infer
the value of the site (Clawson and Knetsch ). If diﬀer-
ent individuals incur diﬀerent costs to visit diﬀerent
places, these “implicit” prices can be used instead of con-
ventional market prices as the basis for estimating the
value of cultural sites and changes in their quality. This
method also has limited applicability: it can only estimate

visitor values for cultural heritage sites and is only useful
for sites entailing signiﬁcant travel. In addition, the valua-
tion of multiattribute cultural sites and the presence of
substitute locations present methodological problems.
• As was already mentioned above, the avoided-
maintenance-cost approach has often been used to esti-
mate damages to cultural materials (for example, from air
pollution). The reason is that cost information is easier to
collect than beneﬁt information. The method consists of
calculating the cost savings implied from a reduction in
maintenance cycles due to reduced damage rates. How-
ever, as noted before, maintenance costs are not the cor-
rect measure of the beneﬁts derived by society from
reduced damage to cultural resources, and the sole consid-
eration of costs may seriously underestimate true eco-
nomic values.
In contrast with the group of techniques
described above, stated-preference methods use “hypo-
thetical markets,” described by means of a survey, to elicit
preferences where there may be no surrogate market for a
cultural good or service.7
The most popular stated-preference method is
the contingent valuation () method, which has been
widely used in both developed and developing countries,
particularly in the last decade, to determine the economic
feasibility of public policies for the improvement of envi-
ronmental quality. By means of an appropriately designed
questionnaire, a hypothetical market is described where
the good in question can be “traded” (Mitchell and Carson
; Bateman et al. ). This contingent market deﬁnes
the good itself, the institutional context in which it would
be provided, and the way it would be ﬁnanced. A random
sample of people is then directly asked to express their
 (or ) for a hypothetical change in the level of pro-
vision of the good. Respondents are assumed to behave as
though they were in a real market. In fact,  question-
naires bear some resemblance to conventional market
research for new or modiﬁed products. 
As an illustration, in the context of cultural
heritage, consider the following contingent scenario used
in a  study designed to estimate the beneﬁts of keeping
the Surrey History Centre, a local archive in the United
Kingdom, open and running (adapted from Mourato et al.
). The  scenario was preceded by questions about
perceptions and attitudes toward recorded heritage con-
servation, use of the archive, and information about the
archive’s services and resources. Both direct users and
local nonusers of the archive were interviewed.
Please imagine the following situation. Priorities for public
spending are changing in the United Kingdom. One of the
sectors that will be negatively aﬀected by government bud-
getary cuts is the libraries and archives sector that contains a
great part of our recorded heritage. Due to this situation,
unless additional resources are found, the Surrey History
Centre might close down in . As a result, all the
resources contained in this archive will be lost as collections
and may experience deterioration, or be dispersed (relocated
to a number of other institutions) or be sold. Obviously
some materials now contained in the Surrey History Centre
may also be found elsewhere: but other materials and infor-
mation are unique and might be therefore lost forever.
Now suppose that the council is considering charging every
local household an annual council tax surcharge for an emer-
gency grant to ensure that the Surrey History Centre does
not close down, that the services it provides to the commu-
nity can be maintained at their current levels, and that all
scheduled investments will continue to go ahead. It was esti-
mated that this would cost each household in the council £
per year.
Please think about how much keeping the Surrey History
Centre open is worth to you and your household. If it would
cost each household only a small amount of money, then
you might think that it was a price worth paying. On the
other hand, if it was going to be very expensive, then you
might prefer not to pay it and to have the archive close down.
Would you agree to pay an extra £ per year in council taxes
to prevent the closure of the Surrey History Centre and to
ensure that its services are maintained at their current levels?
In the example above, a dichotomous choice
elicitation question was used to uncover . That is,
respondents were simply asked whether they would be
prepared to pay or not pay a particular amount of money.
This amount was varied across subsamples—i.e., diﬀerent
people were asked to pay diﬀerent amounts. There are
many other ways of asking the  question, including
simply asking respondents what their maximum  is
(the open-ended format) or asking them to pick their
maximum  amount from a list of money amounts (the
payment card approach).
Theoretically, the  method is based on welfare
economics and assumes that stated  amounts are
related to respondents’ underlying preferences. Further-
more, unlike revealed-preference techniques,  is able to
capture all types of beneﬁts from a nonmarket good or
service, including nonuse values. Neglecting the estima-

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tion of nonuse values is potentially a serious omission, as
many cultural goods arguably generate substantial nonuse
beneﬁts, possibly with transnational and intergenerational
characteristics. As mentioned in the introduction, much of
the impetus for the acceptance of the  method was the
report of the special panel appointed by the U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration () (Arrow
et al. ). The  panel concluded that  studies
could produce estimates reliable enough to be used in a
judicial process of natural resource damage assessment
including nonuse values.
While similarities exist between  surveys and
the type of surveys conducted in other disciplines (Boulier
and Goldfarb ),  questionnaires possess some distin-
guishing features that require special consideration. This
is mainly for three reasons: 
•  questionnaires require respondents to consider
how a possible change in a good or service that is typically
not traded in markets might aﬀect them.
• The type of public and mixed goods and services
usually considered can be complex and unfamiliar to
respondents. 
• Respondents are asked to make a monetary eval-
uation of the change of interest. 
All these aspects introduce a number of questionnaire
design issues that do not occur in the case of opinion polls
or marketing surveys for private goods. Mitchell and Car-
son note that “the principal challenge facing the designer
of a  study is to make the scenario suﬃciently under-
standable, plausible, and meaningful to respondents so
that they can and will give valid and reliable values despite
their lack of experience with one or more of the scenario
dimensions” (Mitchell and Carson , ).
The design of a  questionnaire comprises three
interrelated stages. The ﬁrst and principal stage consists of
identifying the good to be valued, constructing the valua-
tion scenario, and eliciting the monetary values. In the
second stage, questions on attitudes and opinions, knowl-
edge, familiarity and use of the good, demographics, and
various debrieﬁng questions are added. The third stage
consists of piloting the draft questionnaire for content,
question wording, question format, and overall structure
and layout. These stages are depicted in Table . For a
detailed discussion, see that of Bateman and colleagues
(Bateman et al. ).
Designing and implementing  studies may
seem to be a trivial task, where all that is required is to put
together a number of questions about the subject of inter-
est. But this apparent simplicity lies at the root of many
badly designed surveys that elicit biased, inaccurate, and
useless information, possibly at a great cost. In fact, even
very simple questions require proper wording, format,
content, placement, and organization if they are to elicit
Table  Stages of CV questionnaire design.
Stage Description 
Formulating the valuation problem Identifying the policy change to be valued
Writing a credible, meaningful, and understandable valuation scenario
Choosing an elicitation format (open ended, payment card, dichotomous choice) and asking the 
question 
Selecting additional questions Questions on attitudes, perceptions, and opinions
Questions on knowledge and uses
Debriefing questions (e.g., reasons for paying or not paying, credibility of scenario, etc.) 
Questions on socioeconomic characteristics 
Pretesting the questionnaire Focus groups 
One-to-one interviews 
Verbal protocols 
Field pilots
accurate information. Writing eﬀective questionnaires in
which scenarios and questions are uniformly and correctly
understood by respondents and which encourage them to
answer in a considered and truthful manner is no easy task
(Mitchell and Carson ). To address these diﬃculties, a
set of guidelines for applying  to enhance the validity
and reliability of estimates of nonuse values in natural
resource damage assessment was developed by the 
panel (Arrow et al. ) and recently updated by Bateman
and colleagues for the U.K. government (Bateman et al.
). Following these guidelines does not automatically
warrant quality—neither does noncompliance necessarily
indicate lack of validity. They are, however, a useful refer-
ence and the best available set of recommendations for
practitioners in all ﬁelds. 
In the context of the currently available valuation
techniques, the  method and its derivatives can arguably
be considered the best available techniques to estimate the
total economic value of cultural assets that are not usually
traded in the market and where nonuse values are
thought to be an important component of value. 
Issues and Limitations
But no method is without fault, and  is no exception. 
As repeatedly pointed out by critics, a number of factors
may systematically bias respondents’ answers. Generally,
these factors are not speciﬁc to  as such but are com-
mon to most survey-based techniques and are predomi-
nantly attributable to survey design and implementation
problems. Mitchell and Carson and Bateman and col-
leagues provide an extensive review of possible sources 
of bias (Mitchell and Carson ; Bateman et al. ).
These include strategic behavior (such as free riding),
embedding (where the valuation is insensitive to the scope
of the good), anchoring bias (where the valuation
depends on the ﬁrst bid presented in a dichotomous
choice context), information bias (when the framing of
the question unduly inﬂuences the answer), or hypotheti-
cal bias (umbrella designation for problems arising from
the hypothetical nature of the  market). 
Perhaps the most often quoted criticism of 
studies (and, indeed, of all survey-based research) is 
“Ask a hypothetical question and you will get a hypotheti-
cal answer” (Scott ). In addressing this issue, a useful
approach is to examine what type of questions are likely
to deliver useful information even when they are asked in
regards to a hypothetical scenario. Carson, Groves, and
Machina show that when respondents feel their response
may inﬂuence the actions of relevant agencies and when
they care about the outcome of the valuation questions,
they will answer according to their preferences, so as to
maximize their expected well-being (Carson, Groves, and
Machina ). In order to do so, they will respond to the
incentives set out in the survey design: obviously, prob-
lems will occur when respondents feel that the survey
market provides some incentive to do other than reveal
their preferences truthfully. Unfortunately, there are a
considerable number of possible situations in which truth
telling might not seem the best way to maximize well-
being. An example of relevance to cultural heritage stud-
ies is the use of charitable donations as a payment vehicle
in  questions (as opposed to other mechanisms, such
as taxes or entry fees). In this case, respondents have an
incentive to overstate the  amounts in the survey to
secure the provision of the good, and then, once the good
is provided, they have an incentive to free ride when it
comes to actually donating the amounts stated, as pay-
ment is voluntary.8 Hence, one observes stated 
amounts that are much higher than actual payments, a
discrepancy that is not due to the hypothetical nature of
the survey market but to the fact that respondents have
been given the wrong incentives to reveal their true pref-
erences. This is the issue of “incentive compatibility,” and
determining whether a given  study design is incentive
compatible is fundamental in order to avoid misrepresen-
tation of values. In the example above, problems could
potentially have been avoided by the use of a tax or an
entry fee as the payment vehicle in the  questions, 
if at all possible.
Among the types of biases mentioned above, the
problem of embedding is arguably the one that raises
most concern for cultural valuation. Concerns regarding
scope and embedding arise from “the frequent ﬁnding
that  for a good is approximately the same for a more
inclusive good” (Fisher , ). To illustrate, if respon-
dents cannot meaningfully separate out the conservation
value of one historic house from the value of all the his-
toric houses in a region, then the validity of their
responses has to be questioned. Careful design and pretest
of questionnaires is needed to minimize the serious
potential for embedding (Bateman et al. ). In particu-
lar, when scope problems are thought likely to arise (i.e.,
when one is interested in the beneﬁts of conservation of
some parts of a cultural site but not of others, or of some
historical buildings in a city but not of others), tests can be
built into a survey design in order to see how far responses
are sensitive to the scope of the good being valued. 

Furthermore, since heritage conservation gener-
ates values for the future, a legitimate concern in cultural
heritage valuation is that of how future values might be
taken into account, since one cannot survey generations
yet to come. Of course, generations do overlap to some
extent, and part of these future values are taken into
account by the bequest motivations of current genera-
tions. But problems still arise as cultural heritage conser-
vation sometimes involves very long-term perspectives,
and future preferences with respect to art have been found
to deviate from the values held by current generations
(Frey ). It might be that, because of changing tastes,
future generations will not want to conserve as much cul-
tural heritage as does the current generation. But, in gen-
eral, it is arguably more likely that that people in the
future will value cultural heritage conservation more
highly than the living generation. Aside from changing
tastes, future generations are expected to be richer than
current generations, and hence, they are likely to be will-
ing to pay more for cultural heritage preservation. Also, it
is inevitable that, over time, some cultural heritage will
deteriorate or be lost: given increased scarcity, the value of
the heritage will naturally increase. More research is
needed on the best way to treat and account for future val-
ues. In practical terms, a sensible approach for unique and
important cultural resources is to combine economic val-
uation with a precautionary approach, which means that
any decision not to undertake preservation is aﬀorded
very careful scrutiny. 
Other authors put forward more radical criti-
cisms of  that question the basis of economic theory,
focusing on known psychological anomalies such as the
disparity between the value of gains and losses (Frey
)—that is, when  questions yield diﬀerent valua-
tions than corresponding  questions—or suggesting
that respondents may be driven by nonrational/nonmaxi-
mizing preferences, acting and behaving as citizens and
not as “consumers” when facing choices concerning pub-
lic goods (Blamey, Common, and Quiggin ; Vatn and
Bromley ). For example, Blamey states, “Respondents
often adopt a contribution model when processing sce-
nario information, rather than the purchase model
assumed by environmental economists. In contrast to the
purchase model, where an individual is assumed to ask
herself whether she is prepared to pay the speciﬁed
amount to obtain the environmental improvement rather
than do without it, the contribution model assumes that
individuals treat the environmental improvement as a
good cause, that warrants supporting. . . . This has the
important implication that individuals may be willing to
pay more to a local environmental issue for which there
are few contributors than a national issue they value more
highly, but for which the costs of the intervention are to
be shared by a proportionally larger number of people. . . .
Price fairness is assumed to be one of a number of contin-
gencies inﬂuencing behavioral promises in  studies”
(Blamey , ).
While psychological anomalies do present a prob-
lem in some instances, it is meaningless for economic
analysis to try to disentangle the realm of citizens’ value
and that of consumers’ value: the two are intrinsically
entangled when the valuation of public policy and public
goods is at stake. As citizens, individuals are still inﬂu-
enced by their values and preferences for public goods.
What is important to bear in mind is that  values are
contingent to the information provided in the valuation
scenario, and preferences are sensitive to the attributes 
of the contingent market described. This is perfectly
rational. As long as the public good and the contingent
market are correctly described, credible, and incentive
compatible, this should not be an issue. 
Finally, in order to avoid easy misunderstanding,
it is important to stress that economic valuation methods
do not pretend to assess cultural values as such but to
assess the economic values associated with cultural her-
itage—that is, the ﬂow of beneﬁts arising out of a physical
stock. Economic values relate to the enhancement of
human/individual/social well-being; they are anthropo-
centric and based on people’s preferences (Pearce ).
They lend themselves to quantiﬁcation and to the assess-
ment of trade-oﬀs between goals and resources (Robbins
). As discussed above, the economic value of cultural
heritage is a wide-ranging, complex, and multifaceted
concept, as preferences for cultural assets stem from many
diﬀerent motivations, ranging from self-interest to pure
altruistic concerns. 
Focusing on economic values, as broad and
encompassing as they may be, does not mean that other
values are less important. Economists do not claim that all
values can be measured in money terms and be captured
in actual ﬁnancial ﬂows: there will be cases where the
information is inadequate, the uncertainties too great, or
the consequences too profound or too complex to be
reduced to a single number (Hanemann ). Nor do
economists claim that economic values subsume all that is
important in cultural heritage conservation policy. Other
relevant (nonmonetary) cultural, religious, symbolic, and
spiritual values also have a role to play in decision-making

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processes. The point is that economics, as a social science,
can and should provide complementary techniques and
investigative tools to disciplines dealing with cultural
issues, for a holistic assessment of cultural values. 
 has been extensively applied to the valuation
of environmental goods and services (Mitchell and Car-
son ; Carson et al. ). However, there have been
surprisingly few applications to cultural assets, in spite of
the obvious links between questions of the conservation
of natural and cultural goods. Cultural policy and man-
agement would beneﬁt a great deal from a set of sound,
theoretically structured, and operational evaluation tools.
The next section discusses the role of economic valuation
in cultural heritage and suggests a number of possible
areas where these tools might be used successfully.
The Role of Economic Valuation 
for Cultural Policies and Institutions
It has been argued above that cultural heritage is a mixed
good, framed over a multidimensional, multivalue, and
multiattribute environment, generating private and pub-
lic/collective beneﬁts for current, potential, and future
users and even for nonusers. How resources are allocated
and consequently how institutions and services are man-
aged, organized, and provided aﬀect people’s well-being,
attitudes, and participation toward cultural heritage. In
this context, what are the cultural goals faced by policy
makers and managers that economic valuation tools
might help to inform? These goals, interrelated in many
ways, pertain to three main areas: management, ﬁnanc-
ing, and resource allocation. 
Cultural Destinations Management
As far as the management of cultural destinations is con-
cerned, economic valuation may help to inform decisions
and policies of the following type:
• assessing what type of changes/attractions/exhi-
bitions/ improvements should be introduced in cultural
destinations in order to maximize proﬁts/revenues/access
• evaluating pollution, tourism, and development
damage done to cultural destinations 
• assessing what type and degree of conservation
measures should be undertaken (e.g., restoration, replace-
ment, cleaning) 
• estimating the demand for a cultural asset and
predicting future demand trends
• assessing nonvisitors’ potential demand and
investigating the factors that might inﬂuence that demand 
• estimating price and income elasticities of
demand for cultural assets
• designing successful pricing strategies for cultural
destinations: who pays what, when, and how
• ranking cultural heritage characteristics, thus
assessing priorities for new marginal improvements
• prioritizing among competing projects at the
micro/institution level
• assessing visitor preferences both before and 
after the visit experience and evaluating repeated visitors’
experiences
• gathering information on how socioeconomic
characteristics (age, sex, membership, income, education,
attitudes) explain visitation rates and spending patterns
• identifying groups that might be excluded from
enjoying cultural heritage at certain prices and given cer-
tain management policies
• evaluating the impacts of congestion-reduction
options
Financing Cultural Heritage
As far as the ﬁnancing of cultural heritage is concerned,
the objectives that can be informed by economic valua-
tion may be listed as follows:
• assessing the existence and measuring 
for access, conservation, and improvements of cultural
heritage
• analyzing pricing policies for cultural destina-
tions: uniform pricing, interpersonal price discrimination,
voluntary prices, intertemporal price discrimination, etc.
• investigating how the prices that people are pre-
pared to pay vary across diﬀerent socioeconomic groups
(by age, sex, income, education, etc.)
• quantifying the gap between beneﬁts to the com-
munity provided by cultural heritage and costs incurred to
provide them 
• providing information for a multisource funding
strategy, based on local and national taxes, private
donations, funds, entry fees, and public/private partner-
ships designing incentive systems to motivate and ﬁnance
conservation
• investigating whether subsidies to cultural her-
itage are justiﬁed and informing how much they should be
Resource Allocation
Regarding the macro process of allocation of resources
among sites and institutions, pursued by a public evalua-
tor body, economic valuation can be used to help a num-
ber of policy decisions:
• allocating funds between cultural heritage and
other areas of public spending
• gathering information of strategic policy impor-
tance about the level of public support (ﬁnancial and
nonﬁnancial) for the cultural sector or a speciﬁc cultural
institution for the process of resource allocation
• allocating cultural budgets within competing
institutions/areas 
• measuring people’s satisfaction for existing
cultural services and then ranking institutions with
respect to benchmark parameters
• appraising and ranking interventions in the
cultural sector—for example, for competitive (grant)
allocation 
• allocating a budget within one institution/area
among competing projects
• deciding whether a given cultural asset is to be
conserved and, if so, how and at what level
• assessing which sites, within a city area or a
cultural district, are more worthy of investment and for
which the impacts are more signiﬁcant
Management, ﬁnancing, and resource allocation strate-
gies are evidently entangled, as evidenced above. Eco-
nomic valuation is of use in all three spheres, for macro
and micro cultural policies oriented toward access, con-
servation, or quality improvement goals.
Of course, economic valuation is just one among
other existing economic instruments and tools that can be
used in the cultural heritage context: its main aim is to
demonstrate that economic values exist and to measure
them. Subsequently, other economic tools can be used to
“capture” those estimated values—that is, to transform
them into actual cash ﬂows. In particular, economic
valuation might precede the use of instruments such as 
() local or national taxes aimed at ﬁnancing culture, 
() fees aimed at regulating access and raising funds, and
() voluntary donation mechanisms aimed at raising
money without imposing a fee. The focus here is strictly
on the argument that cultural economic values exist and
that there are ways to measure them validly, rather than
on capturing those values (see Pearce and Mourato 
and Bailey and Falconer  for a discussion of economic
capture instruments). 
Despite the potential, existing cultural heritage
valuation studies are scarce and limited in scope and con-
tent. The next section reviews the current body of evi-
dence and discusses the implications of its ﬁndings.
Current Evidence: Lessons and
Controversies
This review focuses on the emerging literature on the val-
uation of cultural beneﬁts by means of stated-preference
techniques (mainly ). As noted above, it is only in recent
years that  methods have started to be applied within
the realm of cultural heritage economics, and so far, very
few studies have been undertaken. A search of published
and unpublished international sources uncovered just over
thirty stated-preference studies of cultural goods.9 Appen-
dix  contains a summary overview of these studies. As
illustrated in Figure , the existing literature is strongly
concentrated geographically, with the majority of studies
coming from Europe ( percent) and with the U.K. pro-
ducing the largest share ( percent). Some  percent of
studies were carried out in the United States and Canada.
Early studies on cultural heritage valuation were
small-scale surveys, exploratory in nature and mostly
conﬁned to ﬁnding a price for the good in question using 
a then-novel methodology in the sector (see, for example,
Willis  and Martin ). Since then, some progress
has been achieved at various levels: sampling, study
design, implementation, statistical estimation, testing the
validity of the estimates produced, and exploring the
nature of people’s preferences toward cultural goods. In

Figure  Stated-preference valuation studies of cultural heritage 
by country.
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this respect, however, cultural heritage is still a long way
from the level of knowledge already gathered in other
areas, such as the environment or health. 
Existing studies vary widely, both in terms of the
type of good or activity analyzed and the type of beneﬁt
evaluated. As documented in Appendix , there are some
instances where similar types of goods were evaluated
(cathedrals, castles, archaeological sites, groups of historic
buildings, recorded heritage). However, the type of
beneﬁt estimated is usually diﬀerent, as is the sample
frame used, making it diﬃcult to make meaningful com-
parisons among studies.
While the conclusions of each study are diﬀerent,
some consistent ﬁndings emerge from the studies that
have been conducted to date. These are discussed below.
The Significant Value of Heritage
Conservation and Use
Generally, the ﬁndings suggest that, on average, people
attribute a signiﬁcantly positive value to the conservation
or restoration of cultural assets (Appendix ). The implica-
tion is that damages to cultural goods are undesirable and
that the public would be willing to pay positive amounts
to avoid them or to slow the rate at which they occur.
Mean values range from less than a dollar (for example,
Bulgarians were found to be willing to pay about $.–$
to preserve their famous monasteries [Mourato, Kon-
toleon, and Danchev ]) to over $ (for example, the
conservation of an archaeological park in Italy was valued
at about $ by local residents [Riganti and Willis ]),
with the distribution skewed toward lower value ranges.
Perhaps a more meaningful measure for comparison pur-
poses is  as a proportion of per capita gross national
product (): typical annual household  amounts for
cultural heritage conservation are calculated to range
from . percent to . percent of per capita .
The large dispersion of estimated values is due to
large diﬀerences in the type and scope of the cultural
change being evaluated, to taste and income variations in
the sampled populations, and to disparities in value elicita-
tion methods. Clearly, these values are only indicative and
should be taken cautiously, given the small number of
studies on which they are based. 
Is It a Minority Benefit?
Several of the studies depicted in Appendix  show a rela-
tively large proportion of respondents stating a zero 
(up to  percent in the case of the recreational value of
defaced aboriginal rock paintings in Canada [Boxall,
Englin, and Adomowicz ]). Some of these responses
can be considered protests against some aspect of the sur-
vey instrument (i.e., a dislike of paying taxes or a rejection
of the contingent scenario) and thus are not a reﬂection of
people’s true preferences. Others, however, are “genuine”
zero values arising from budget constraints, from lack of
interest in cultural issues, and from the fact that cultural
heritage preservation is typically ranked low among com-
peting public issues, as is shown consistently by attitudinal
questions. Hence, the welfare of a signiﬁcant proportion
of the population seems to be unaﬀected by changes in
cultural goods/activities. In some instances, the positive
estimated values are driven by a minority of the popula-
tion—typically, the users of the cultural good and the
richer and more educated segments of the population
(e.g., improving the landscape of Stonehenge in the
United Kingdom by tunneling a nearby road generates
positive beneﬁts to  percent of the U.K. population, a
group that was found to be on average wealthier and
more educated than the  percent who were not willing
to pay anything for the improvement [Maddison and
Mourato ]).
This ﬁnding has important implications for the
funding of cultural heritage goods. For example, in
instances where more than two-thirds of the population
express a zero , the imposition of a tax may be infeasi-
ble; targeted voluntary donations or entry fees may pro-
vide more appropriate means of extracting existing values
(although the former invites free-riding behavior); or, if a
tax mechanism is used, care must be taken to ensure that
the distributional eﬀects are taken into account with
oﬀsetting expenditures. In order to reduce distributional
conﬂicts, education and information policies are impor-
tant and should be targeted at increasing the consumption
of culture by aﬀecting tastes or by reducing the costs to
disadvantaged groups of consuming culture. There is
large potential for cross-fertilization between valuation of
preferences for culture and the implementation of cul-
tural educational policy. 
The link among income, education, and cultural
beneﬁts found in cultural valuation studies also seems to
suggest that the value of cultural heritage conservation
will grow as incomes and education rise. It lends some
support to the proposition that future generations might
attribute a larger value to heritage conservation than do
present generations, in part because of higher incomes
and education levels.


The Importance of Actual Users
Most of the studies summarized in Appendix  indicate
that there can be signiﬁcant values from recreation and
educational visits to cultural destinations (e.g., foreign
visitors to the Fes Medina in Morocco valued a visit at
$–$ [Carson et al. ]). Hence, policies aimed at
increasing and facilitating access to cultural sites can also
be expected to enhance economic cultural values. 
Nevertheless, it is misleading to assume from
these results that charging users optimal entry fees will
solve all the ﬁnancing problems of cultural sites. First,
user values alone may not be enough to deliver sustain-
ability for the large proportion of cultural goods and ser-
vices that are not unique in many respects and where sub-
stitute destinations exist, which explains the accumulated
deﬁcits and/or degradation experienced by many cultural
sites. Second, it may institutionally be diﬃcult to charge
optimal prices. For example, entry fees might be regu-
lated, or there might be a membership system in place
whereby members can gain free access to certain cultural
destinations in exchange for a ﬁxed membership fee. Such
a circumstance happens in the United Kingdom with the
National Trust, a charity founded in  to preserve
places of historic interest or natural beauty permanently,
for the beneﬁt of the nation. The National Trust is the
largest conservation charity in Europe, with  properties
opened to the public and . million members in .
Members account for a large proportion of all visits to the
Trust’s properties, but, as they are entitled to free access
via their membership fee, they would therefore not be
aﬀected by increases in entry fees.
A number of related issues should also be taken
into account when user pricing mechanisms are designed:
on the one hand, the eﬀect of higher prices on visitation
rates should be carefully considered and addressed, given
the current focus on making heritage available to the gen-
eral public; on the other hand, the possible trade-oﬀ
between access and conservation (i.e., too many visitors
might cause deterioration of a site by overuse) should be
analyzed explicitly, and future studies should attempt to
measure tourist carrying capacity of a site, as well as cal-
culate any possible congestion costs.
What about Nonusers? 
Studies dealing with nonuse values of cultural heritage
sites show that these can be important (Appendix ). In
cases where the relevant population beneﬁting from
improvement or maintenance of the cultural good is
thought to be sizable, possibly crossing national borders,
the total aggregated beneﬁt can be very large: even when
individual  is very small, when multiplied by a vast
number of people, a large value will be obtained. This is
the case when unique and charismatic cultural heritage
goods are at stake. For example, the estimated value of
improving the landscape of Stonehenge for the U.K. popu-
lation was found to be mainly driven by nonuse values
(mainly a desire to protect the site for future generations),
with  percent of the population never actually having
visited the stone circle (Maddison and Mourato ). 
However, as noted above, there is a trade-oﬀ, 
as the available evidence also suggests that the proportion
of those stating zero  is largest among nonusers.
Drawing from the environmental valuation literature,
nonuse values are also thought to decline with the avail-
ability of substitute sites and with households’ distance
from the site (“distance decay”). Future research should
pay close attention to the geographical limits of .
The Issue of Embedding
It was already mentioned how the issue of embedding or
insensitivity to the scope of the change being valued
might aﬀect cultural values. Indeed, in an early cultural
valuation study, Navrud, Pedersen, and Strand found that
respondents were insensitive to the scope of the air
pollution damages to the Nidaros Cathedral in Norway
(Navrud, Pedersen, and Strand ). This potential
problem has been insuﬃciently addressed by the existing
literature.
Evidently, embedding will be less of a problem
for ﬂagship cultural goods with no substitutes (e.g., the
Pyramids in Egypt). But it may distort results signiﬁcantly
when cultural goods perceived as being nonunique are
evaluated (e.g., historical buildings, castles, churches, and
cathedrals): for example, the estimated values for a partic-
ular cultural good may reﬂect a desire to preserve all simi-
lar goods and thus overstate the value of the good. And, as
Navrud, Pedersen, and Strand discussed, this type of bias
may also aﬀect the evaluation of the scope and duration
of conservation policies for a single site (Navrud, Peder-
sen, and Strand ). More research is needed in this
important area.
“Quick and Dirty” Valuation Studies
The lack of ﬁnancial resources and/or the lack of knowl-
edge about valuation methods has led to several poor val-
uation studies, in terms of consistency with economic
theory, survey design, statistical performance, and sample
signiﬁcance. This is as true for cultural heritage valuation
as it is for valuation studies in other areas. In some cases,
the lack of sound preliminary investigation—by means 
of pilot studies, focus groups, and interviews—has led to
“quick,” and consequently faulty, studies, conﬁrming the
golden rule of empirical analysis: the result one gets is
dependent on the quality of the data one inputs. More-
over, a good valuation study requires adequate ﬁnancial
and human resources, as it is a time-consuming and com-
plex activity; but, more often than not, sponsoring bodies
are unwilling to allocate enough time and resources for
practitioners to produce a good study. The recent empha-
sis on producing best-practice guidelines developed by
ﬁeld practitioners is an attempt to ameliorate this situa-
tion (Arrow et al. ; Bateman et al. ).
Whatever the budget available, good knowledge
of the theoretical underpinnings of valuation, of the les-
sons yielded by previous studies, and of survey implemen-
tation guidelines helps in achieving eﬃciency (measured
in quality of output divided by costs). Interdisciplinary
teams of economists, other social scientists, cultural man-
agers, and marketing researchers may set up valuable and
reliable cost-eﬀective studies, exploiting economies of
scale in () preparing more than one valuation study/
experiment at the same time, and () integrating the valu-
ation experiment with broader socioeconomic or market-
ing investigations.
Should Decisions about Cultural Heritage
Conservation Be Left to Experts?
A common criticism of survey-based economic valuation
approaches is that decisions about cultural assets should
not be left in the hands of the public, thought to be too
ignorant about cultural goods to possibly be able to make
sensible judgments about them. Is expert judgment an
alternative to survey- based (stated- and revealed-) prefer-
ence analysis? Cultural experts clearly play a leading role
in determining the value of cultural heritage. Nonethe-
less, relying only on experts’ judgment may be dangerous,
leading to improper allocation of resources, arbitrariness,
lobbying pressures for funding, and paternalism.
In fact, cultural valuation studies that have can-
vassed opinions from both experts and the general public
have found consensual views in many areas (Mourato et
al. ). Moreover, as has been pointed out, most valua-
tion studies have uncovered signiﬁcant cultural values
even for small changes, overcoming the fear that the pub-
lic does not know enough about the cultural sector to be
able to hold sensible values on it.
Top-down experts’ perceptions and bottom-up
public demands should be brought together and should
balance each other within the realm of cultural policy,
since cultural heritage is a complex economic good requir-
ing a comprehensive and participatory approach to man-
agement that includes all stakeholders. In the context of
valuation studies, while expert knowledge should be
sought at various stages of the research process, it is prob-
ably most useful at the designing stages of the valuation
survey, to inform the context and framing of the valuation
scenario, enhancing its credibility and the usefulness of
the results for formulating policy.
It has been discussed already how demand-led
approaches are fundamental to justifying the spending of
limited public money on cultural heritage, how resource
allocation within the sector is increasingly based on gener-
ated “consumer beneﬁts,” and how cultural destinations
are becoming more consumer oriented—investigating
and reaching new markets, encouraging repeat visits by
change and renewal, providing integrated experiences,
and striving to surpass expectations. The emerging valua-
tion literature supports this modern view: valuation stud-
ies have invariably uncovered large average values among
the lay public for cultural assets. Cultural heritage seems
to be an important part of people’s lives, and accordingly,
they are willing to trade oﬀ some of their limited income
to access it and to protect it. Many more good-quality
studies are needed to conﬁrm these early ﬁndings and to
address the several gaps in knowledge identiﬁed above. 
A New Framework for the Valuation
of Cultural Heritage
In this section, two avenues are proposed for improving
the assessment of cultural values in a more integrated and
holistic environment. One constitutes an improvement
over current economic valuation techniques that comes
from within economics; another complements and
expands standard economic valuation practices by making
use of complementary lines of inquiry from other social
disciplines. 


New Economic Tools: Choice Modeling
Approaches
Partly as a response to the problems experienced by
researchers in  studies, valuation practitioners are
increasingly developing an interest in alternative stated-
preference formats such as choice modeling ().10  is a
family of survey-based methodologies for measuring pref-
erences for nonmarket goods, where goods are described
in terms of their attributes and of the levels that these
take. Respondents are presented with various alternative
descriptions of the good, diﬀerentiated by their attributes
and levels, and are asked to do one of the following: 
() rank the various alternatives in order of preference, 
() rate each alternative according to a preference scale, or
() choose their most preferred alternative out of the set.
By including price or cost as one of the attributes of the
good,  can be indirectly recovered from people’s
ranks, ratings, or choices. As ,  can also measure all
forms of value, including nonuse values.
 has one main advantage over standard 
formats: its capability to deal with multidimensional
changes. By describing a good or policy in terms of its
component attributes, values can be obtained not only for
the good/policy as a whole but also for each of its attri-
butes. Furthermore, the method avoids an explicit elicita-
tion of  by relying instead on expressed choices or
rankings among alternative scenarios from which  can
be indirectly inferred: this might reduce the incidence of
people protesting or refusing to answer the valuation
question. 
The conceptual microeconomic framework for
 lies in Lancaster’s characteristics theory of value,
which assumes that the utility that consumers get from a
good can be broken down into the utilities of the compos-
ing characteristics/attributes of the good (Lancaster ).
Empirically, variants of  have been widely used in the
market research and transport literatures (e.g., Hensher
; Green and Srinivasan ; Hensher and Johnson
), but the method has only relatively recently been
applied to other areas, such as the environment or culture.
Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (), Bennett and Blamey
(), and Hanley, Mourato, and Wright () provide
recent and extensive overviews of  techniques and their
application to the environmental ﬁeld.11
A typical  exercise is characterized by a number
of key stages. These are described in Table .
As an example, consider an area abundant in
properties of historic interest, and suppose that the local
cultural authorities want to ﬁnd out which attributes of
the properties attract the most visitors and which are val-
ued the most. Table  exempliﬁes a  exercise that could
be used to estimate tourist demand for various historic
property attributes. Respondents are presented with two
imaginary (but realistic) property descriptions (there
could be more than two) and then asked to choose which
property they would prefer to visit (they are also given the
option of not visiting any of the properties described).
Each property is deﬁned in terms of ﬁve attributes: exis-
tence of a garden; architectural style of the house; quality
of collections (furniture, porcelain, glass, tapestries, or
paintings); visitor facilities (cafeteria/restaurant, shops),
and entry fee. Each attribute can take various levels. For
example, the garden attribute might have only two levels
(“has a garden’’ or “no garden”), while the entry fee attri-
bute might have four levels (, , , ). Typically, each
Table  Stages of a CM exercise.
Stage Description 
Selection of attributes Literature reviews and focus groups are used to select the attributes of the good to be valued that are 
relevant to people, while expert consultations help to identify the attributes that will be impacted by the 
policy. A monetary cost is typically one of the attributes to allow the estimation of . 
Assignment of levels The attribute levels should be feasible, be realistic, and span the range of respondents’  values. 
A baseline, status quo level is usually included (e.g., a no-payment level in the case of ). 
Choice of experimental design Statistical design theory is used to combine the levels of the attributes into a number of alternative scenario 
descriptions. 
Construction of choice sets The scenarios identified by the experimental design are then grouped into choice sets to be presented to 
respondents. Choice sets can have two or more alternative scenarios. 
Measurement of preferences Respondents are typically asked to choose their most-preferred alternative out of each choice set, or to rank 
the alternatives in order of preference.
respondent would be given a number of these choice sets
to answer, each with diﬀerent property descriptions.
If the s have witnessed the emergence of the
 method within the realm of cultural economics, the
ﬁrst decade of the new century may see the development
of  applications to the cultural heritage valuation arena.
This is because the many dimensions, attributes, and
values characterizing the supply and demand of cultural
goods and services lend themselves to analysis by mecha-
nisms that have the capability of dealing with situations
where changes are multidimensional, of analyzing trade-
oﬀs among them, and of eliciting separate values for the
various functions of interest. In particular, pursuing an
attribute-based valuation—by breaking down cultural
institutions and policies into a set of functions and 
services—might serve a number of objectives relevant 
to cultural policy: 
• to measure the total value associated with diﬀer-
ent cultural property or policy descriptions (i.e., proper-
ties/policies described by diﬀerent attribute levels)
• to measure the contribution to the total value of
a cultural site of single attributes, services, or functions
(of a public or private nature) 
• to determine possible trade-oﬀs among attributes
(e.g., such as the intrinsic trade-oﬀ between access and
conservation)
• to derive an implicit ranking of attributes accord-
ing to user preferences12
• to determine public support of speciﬁc cultural
property or policy scenarios
• to estimate the market share of a particular site
• to avoid some of the protests arising from direct
elicitation of  for cultural goods
Being survey based,  approaches also suﬀer
from the problems associated with survey techniques pre-
viously discussed. A further limitation of this approach
lies in the cognitive diﬃculty to respondents associated
with complex choices between bundles with many attri-
butes and levels. Previous research in the marketing and
environmental literatures by Ben-Akiva, Morikawa, and
Shiroishi (), Chapman and Staelin (), Hausman
and Ruud (), and Foster and Mourato () found
evidence of unreliable and inconsistent choices/ranks. 
In particular, respondents were found to () choose
options that are worse than others in all respects (domi-
nated options), () make choices that are intransitive (i.e.,
choose A over B, B over C, and then C over A), and ()
make inconsistent choices across choice sets (i.e., choose
A over B in one choice set and B over A in another). The
number of illogical choices seems to increase with the
complexity of the choice/ranking task (i.e., with the num-
ber of attributes, levels, choice sets, and scenarios in each
task and when choices are made between alternatives that
respondents dislike). Possible explanations for the occur-
rence of these problems include respondent fatigue, learn-
ing eﬀects, and the adoption of rules of thumb to facili-
tate the choice task (like choosing options with reference
to one attribute only, ignoring all the others). For these
reasons,  exercises should be as simple as possible, using
a limited number of attributes, levels, and choice sets, so
as to avoid overburdening respondents with information.
To summarize,  has explicit advantages over
the  method in the analysis of goods of a multidimen-
sional nature. As far as cultural heritage is concerned, 
brings together a structured economic theoretical frame-
work, a powerful and detailed capacity of evaluation, and
a great variety of application possibilities. It is suggested
here to add this comprehensive valuation technique to the
available box of cultural economic tools to be drawn upon
by cultural policy makers and cultural managers as
needed. Further research and applications to cultural
policy are therefore strongly encouraged. 
Integrating Instruments for Socioeconomic
Evaluation of Cultural Heritage 
Stated-preference techniques were argued above to be
capable of producing valid and reliable monetary mea-
sures of the beneﬁts associated with cultural heritage
access, conservation, and improvements. But the sugges-
tion that these methods produce “theoretically correct”
measures of value should not be taken as an argument for

Table  Example of a choice set from a CM exercise.
Features Property A Property B 
Garden Has a garden No garden 
Architectural style Remarkable Unremarkable 
Collections Exceptional Exceptional 
Facilities Large restaurant/shop Basic cafeteria/shop 
Entry fee  
O I would prefer to visit property A
O I would prefer to visit property B
O I would not visit any of the properties
their superiority over other evaluation tools. It is one
thing to acknowledge that  has its theoretical basis in
welfare economics (and in that sense is “theoretically cor-
rect”), but it is another thing to use that as an argument
per se for applying it to cultural values. The rightness of
an evaluation approach is to be judged neither from its
disciplinary basis (economics) nor from its theoretical
foundation (neoclassical welfare economics). Rather, it is
to be judged on the basis that its value judgments are
compatible to those society holds for cultural values, for
which economic valuation is being undertaken. 
Furthermore, nonmarket valuation remains con-
troversial. As was discussed above, the techniques are sub-
ject to a number of potential ﬂaws—on theoretical,
methodological, and empirical grounds—that are all the
more serious when studies are conducted without refer-
ence to accepted best-practice guidelines (Bateman et al.
; Arrow et al. ; Mitchell and Carson ). 
Of course, this in itself is hardly surprising, as no method
is without problems; but failure to address and resolve
these limitations may result in considerable misrepresen-
tation of the impacts of important policies, projects, and
regulations, as nonmarket valuation approaches are
increasingly used by governments, international organiza-
tions, and other public and private bodies.13
Hence, as appealing as they may seem to econo-
mists, consumer sovereignty and economic valuation
should not be the only driving engines as far as cultural
policy-making assessment is concerned, and their relative
validity should be assessed by comparison with the per-
formance of competing instruments. And herein lies the
main problem faced by decision makers and cultural man-
agers interested in applying a scientiﬁc approach to assess
the value of their policies: while economic valuation crit-
ics have been quick to ﬁnd fault with the technique, they
have been very slow to present better and viable alterna-
tives to economic evaluation. Alternative noneconomic
approaches at the moment are either incipient or nonex-
istent. Even if these alternative tools were readily identiﬁ-
able, the question would still remain of how to integrate
them in a logical, credible, and workable way. 
Despite the apparent lack of competing, analyti-
cally sound, noneconomic evaluation techniques, it is still
worthwhile to try to outline the possible structure of an
integrated approach to cultural valuation. Rather than a
radical departure from current practice, a possibility is to
use existing lines of inquiry from market research, psy-
chology, and other social sciences within an economic val-
uation study, to complement and enhance its capabilities,
using qualitative information to further our understand-
ing of economic values in the context of cultural policy. 
The following social science tools might play a
useful role in complementing economic techniques in a
new integrated approach to assess cultural values.
EXPERT JUDGMENT
With careful integration, expert judgments and public
valuation may play useful complementary roles toward
the assessment of cultural values. As noted previously,
valuation practitioners know that the preparation of a
well-structured survey needs to receive information from
many sources (i.e., experts, people working at cultural
institutions, museum managers, users, and nonusers) in
order to take into account comprehensively all the rele-
vant aspects of the problem at stake. Integrating expert
views in preliminary phases is advisable in this context
(see Mourato et al.  for an example).
Taking this practice a step further, alternative
approaches to nonmarket valuation, where elicitation 
of contingent values actually derives from small focus
groups of stakeholders (rather than from the general
public), have been proposed (Cookson ). Although
the goal of eliciting people’s  from well-informed and
interested agents is acceptable and useful, to use this
technique as the sole method to elicit values seems to be
unrealistic and to suﬀer from many theoretical, statistical,
and procedural distortions—namely, departing from a
demand-led assessment. Valuation studies should not be
inﬂuenced by experts’ perspective only, which is to be
considered among other important views. Hence, in our
opinion, the use of experts and other key stakeholders has
an important role to play, mostly in the design stages of
the economic survey instrument and in the ex-post evalu-
ation of results. 
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 
Social assessment methods were developed by the World
Bank in order to provide an integrated framework for
incorporating participation and social analysis into devel-
opment projects (World Bank ). They involve consul-
tations with stakeholders and directly and indirectly
aﬀected groups. These methods oﬀer great potential to
complement an economic assessment of cultural policies,
as issues such as gender, ethnicity, social impacts, and insti-
tutional capacity also need to be taken into account in cul-
tural policy evaluation.
The complementary use of social assessment
tools in parallel with an economic valuation methodology
will help ensure that the change in the cultural good 

(e.g., a management change aimed at increasing access) 
is acceptable to the range of people intended to beneﬁt
from it, and that gender and other social diﬀerences are
reﬂected in the policy evaluation. It is also essential to
identify adverse social impacts of cultural projects and to
determine how they can be mitigated (e.g., the local social
impacts of increases in entry fees to cultural destinations).
Impacts in disadvantaged groups (e.g., the poor, less edu-
cated groups, minority groups, and indigenous people)
are particularly important to assess and overcome. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TOOLS
Stated-preference methods are designed to uncover values
rather than motivations. Thus, experimental psycholo-
gists have argued that there is a need to go deeper into
understanding individual motivations for  than is com-
mon practice among valuation practitioners (Kahneman,
Ritov, and Schkade ; Tversky and Kahneman ;
Green and Tunstall ; Kahneman and Thaler ). 
In brief, the psychological approach claims that the set 
of assumptions deﬁning the microeconomic neoclassical
environment is too restrictive, too static, and not suﬃ-
ciently focused on the process of preference formation
and on underlying motivations. Several contributions
have emerged from this line of psychological/economic
research, with some interesting, although generally
ambiguous, results. The abstract idea of homo economicus
certainly appears in need of being extended and devel-
oped, but it does not arise as ﬂawed in its foundations.14
It seems that the entangled and complementary
realms of individual motivations and economic values
should be the joint targets of socioeconomic investiga-
tion. In other words, the joint use of economic and behav-
ioral psychology tools is both needed and encouraged. For
example, the model developed by Fishbein and Ajzen
oﬀers a way to infer behavior by a chain of connections,
starting from beliefs and then going to attitudes and inten-
tions and ﬁnally to behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen ).
Along the chain, each step is determinant and explanatory
for the following one. Stated-preference methods elicit
 measures that are “intentions of behavior.” There-
fore, an interesting way of testing the validity of stated
values is to examine closely the relationship between
them and the beliefs and attitudes held by respondents
toward the cultural good of interest and toward culture in
general, via the inclusion of adequate measurement scales
in the survey instrument. Since stated-preference studies
typically elicit varying amounts of qualitative and non-
monetary information as well as monetary values (both in
the focus group stages and in the ﬁnal questionnaires), it
would not be infeasible to expand the qualitative compo-
nent of these surveys. Another avenue already pursued by
some authors is to check whether intended behavior, as
expressed by , is a satisfactory indicator of real behav-
ior; this checking can be done in a laboratory setting (see
Foster, Bateman, and Harley  for a review).
PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAL
Participatory rural appraisal () is an approach for
shared learning between local people and outsiders
(Chambers ). The term is somewhat misleading, 
as  techniques are applicable in urban settings and can 
be employed to complement economic assessments. 
In the context of cultural heritage evaluation, these tech-
niques can enable researchers and local people to work
together in identifying, planning, and designing the best
cultural policy package. There is a wide range of partici-
patory data collection methods that can be used; these
include semistructured interviews, focus groups, non-
monetary preference ranking exercises, participant obser-
vation, transect walks, mapping exercises, and other
visual illustrations.
 techniques might constitute a valuable aid in
furthering our understanding of people’s motivations for
cultural use and conservation and in providing insights
into their behavior, particularly in what relates to uses of
cultural heritage in developing contexts. For example,
there may be values that a structured survey will not be
able to uncover properly and that only careful observation
and group exercises might identify. This might be the case
in assessing values that local communities in developing
countries hold toward their cultural heritage. 
MARKETING RESEARCH
Marketing studies are highly complementary to economic
inquiries. Marketing practitioners have decades of experi-
ence in designing surveys, in administration, and in analy-
sis, and these professionals are constantly developing new
methodological variants and survey interfaces (Malhotra
); economic valuation research could advance more
rapidly by learning from this related discipline. For exam-
ple, focus groups are still not used in many  surveys’
developmental stages, although they are standard practice
in marketing research. Moreover, the  framework
described above derives from the marketing literature,
which was subsequently extended to the economics
realm. Marketing investigation and economic studies,
although aimed at diﬀerent goals, share many common
objectives within a demand-led approach, and economies

of scale can easily be exploited by joint research.
As we can see from the above discussion, there is
a great potential for cultural experts (anthropologists,
architects, art critics, etc.), psychologists, marketing
researchers, and other social scientists to play an impor-
tant role in the process of economic evaluation of cultural
assets. Conversely, the analytic rigor and quantitative pre-
cision favored by economic valuation tools can be usefully
borrowed by other disciplines. 
For this potential to become a reality, economic
valuation instruments must break with some misconcep-
tions and be made available for routine use in the cultural
ﬁeld, for the diﬀerent purposes envisaged in this paper. 
As Nuti observes, “The real test will come when and if 
will be introduced as a routine method of evaluation in
public decisions. . . . The introduction of criteria and
methods as a routine in the control of public expenditure
[in Italy] will surely prove to be a lengthy and very frus-
trating accomplishment—this is not to say that it is not
worth pursuing” (Nuti , ). It will also be necessary
for other social scientists to be willing to collaborate with
economists in joint research eﬀorts to assess cultural val-
ues, and to bring with them to the research forum com-
plementary social research tools as suggested above, both
quantitative and qualitative in nature, where cross-fertil-
ization with economics might be feasible and desirable. It
would be important, for this aim, to develop investigation
and policy using a framework of “tools and targets.” After
a clear deﬁnition of the set of economic and of noneco-
nomic tools and of economic and noneconomic targets, 
it would be easier and more eﬀective to implement sound
strategies and sound multidisciplinary research on
cultural issues.
Integrated approaches are what cultural policy
needs. Although the development of such approaches has
proved to be highly diﬃcult in the past, the authors hope
that this paper will contribute to the clariﬁcation of mis-
conceptions, to the achievement of reconciliation, and to
the mitigation of resistances to the use of economic tools. 
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to highlight what the role of
microeconomic evaluation techniques in the cultural sec-
tor might be. Despite criticism, economic valuation meth-
ods remain among the few analytical instruments capable
of producing valid and reliable empirical measures of the
beneﬁts of cultural heritage conservation. They are there-
fore an important tool for ascertaining eﬃcient outcomes
of allocating the limited resources available for cultural
heritage. While economic valuation does not deny other
value dimensions, it does have a speciﬁc and special role to
play in cultural policy toward heritage conservation and
development.
More generally, people’s preferences should
inform and inﬂuence the ranking of public priorities, and
they should aﬀect the direction of change in policy mak-
ing in the cultural sector. If individuals would like the gov-
ernment to support the existence and conservation of cul-
tural heritage, consumer sovereignty would be violated if
the public authority did not pursue this aim. If people
express a positive economic value for future generations,
it would be odd if the government and cultural institu-
tions neglected these, however elusive, nonuse values.
Similarly, national and local governments should be cau-
tious to invest in cultural infrastructures without having a
clear indication of people’s preferences on public priori-
ties and, speciﬁcally, on cultural priorities. In most cases,
culture does not rank high in public priorities. Thus, a
careful assessment of preferences is a worthwhile exercise
for knowing where, at the margin, economic value is
highest, across sectors and within the cultural sector. To
deny these considerations to be a part of decision making
would be to deny the fact that individuals hold strong
opinions and values about cultural policy, mankind her-
itage, and future generations.
As with environmental resources, if the alterna-
tive to economic valuation is to put cultural heritage value
equal or close to zero, the cultural sector would, as a
result, be severely damaged. Ignoring economic prefer-
ences can lead to undervaluing and underpricing of cul-
tural assets. This, directly and indirectly, reduces the
amount of ﬁnancial resources available to cultural institu-
tions relative to other public priorities. It also gives an
incentive for people to perceive cultural heritage assets as
open-access resources without enforced property rights,
and not as mixed-collective goods with an attached set of
clearly deﬁned values and stakeholders. Open access, if it
emerges and aﬃrms itself as the social norm, is disruptive
for nonmarket assets.
The aim of the stated preference valuation meth-
ods discussed in the paper is not only to justify and inﬂ-
uence decisions but also to provide information, as food
for decision making in the cultural sector. Three levels of
relevancy and use for estimates of economic values were
seen to arise in the sector. The ﬁrst level is concerned with
economic-management issues at the level of cultural insti-

tutions, and the target is estimating demand schedules,
pricing schedules, and price elasticities; prioritizing
among projects; ranking potential investments; and evalu-
ating impacts of pollution, tourism, development, and so
on. The second level is related to ﬁnancial aspects and
involves analyzing pricing policies, designing incentive
systems to encourage conservation, and justifying subsi-
dies. The third level is more politically oriented, and the
target is to estimate values for gathering information of
strategic policy importance—i.e., allocation of budget to
the cultural sector and cultural institutions, reﬂecting
their relative value, and allocation of resources within the
sector where the economic value is higher.
For the future, the task is to develop and establish
a comprehensive multitool and multidisciplinary frame-
work for the measurement of cultural values, as a
response to the complex, multifaceted, and multivalue
nature of cultural heritage. The authors have argued that
economic instruments should be used as complementary
means for socioeconomic analysis, together with a range
of other tools from other disciplines. Measuring cultural
beneﬁts/values in this context should therefore be the
output of a multidisciplinary teamwork that includes not
only economists and conservation specialists but also
other social scientists. 
In what concerns the microeconomic realm, such
a framework can be built on a set of economic tools that
include revealed- and stated-preference techniques—in
particular,  and , which consistently rely on eco-
nomic theory for estimating economic preferences. In
what concerns other disciplines, it was suggested that
some existing social research tools could be integrated
and used in conjunction with economic valuation meth-
ods to provide a fuller assessment of complex cultural val-
ues that cannot be fully described and measured by any
one discipline or method. This paper identiﬁed a few, by
no means exhaustive, complementary lines of inquiry,
such as expert judgments, social assessments, psychologi-
cal measures of attitudes and beliefs, laboratory experi-
ments, participatory appraisal techniques, and marketing
research methods. It is likely that many other relevant
measurement approaches exist in other disciplines that
could be adapted for the purposes of assessing cultural
values, within the proposed multidisciplinary framework.
Hence, by using the largest possible set of theo-
retically consistent and operational tools, cultural targets
will be achieved in a more eﬀective and eﬃcient manner.
To make this framework operational, the use and wide-
spread understanding of evaluation technique targets is
necessary to close gaps between economics and other
social cultural disciplines. A deﬁnition in terms of tools
and targets is helpful insofar as it delimits the application
environment of each discipline. Building on both eco-
nomic instruments and other tools developed by social sci-
ences dealing with culture, researches can establish a com-
prehensive framework of microlevel valuation.
It is hoped that an interdisciplinary discussion
might advance and receive stimulus as a result of the ideas
developed here.
Notes
. See, for example, Kenkel, Fabian, and Tolley () for health
research examples, Maddison et al. () for transport refer-
ences, and Cook and Ludwig () for an example of an
application to crime reduction.
. It is also important to note that the concepts of economic
value and ﬁnancial value are distinct, although there are link-
ages between the two. Financial value, such as the price of
an antique manuscript sold in an auction, is part of eco-
nomic value but does not exhaust it. In many cases, the
ﬁnancial value is not even the most important part of the
total economic value of the cultural asset. As mentioned
above, economic values embrace also the broader social
value of an asset, including option values and a range of
nonuse values.
. Note that the concept of economic value is a reﬂection of
people’s preferences and therefore explicitly anthropo-
centric. An analysis of other types of values is beyond the
scope of this paper.
. In cases where a building or structure has no special cultural
signiﬁcance, the maintenance cost approach may be consid-
ered satisfactory, given the cost of conducting original valua-
tion studies and the absence of any signiﬁcant nonuse
values.
. Other methods used for measuring cultural values include
the economic-impact-analysis literature. This analysis is lim-
ited to observable eﬀects on indicators such as consumption,
employment, income, and public revenue (Vaughan ;
Greﬀe ; Martin ). Economic dimensions such as
employment are clearly important; yet, by neglecting non-
market beneﬁts, potentially powerful additional arguments
in favor of cultural heritage conservation are being ignored.
Moreover, employment is not a primary goal of cultural
policies. There are also some references to the use of multi-
criteria analysis in the context of cultural goods, but there
are no insights as how actually to estimate nonuse values
(Fusco Girard ).
. Detailed reviews of the various techniques can be found in
Mitchell and Carson (); Freeman (); Pearce, Whit-
tington, and Georgiou (); Bateman et al. (); Garrod

and Willis (); Bateman and Willis (); Hanley,
Mourato, and Wright (); Louviere, Hensher, and Swait
(); and Bennett and Blamey ().
. Other stated-preference methods, not addressed here, are
political markets (referendum) and the use of laboratory
experiments (in place of surveys).
. Of related interest, Foster et al. () provide a detailed
analysis of the extent of free riding in charitable giving in
the U.K. and of possible incentives to reduce this behavior.
. As a comparison, Carson et al. () produced a bibliogra-
phy of published and unpublished environmental  studies:
even as early as , their list had over two thousand entries
from more than forty countries.
. A variant of this approach is sometimes known, within the
marketing ﬁeld, as conjoint analysis.
. In order to reduce the cognitive burden to respondents and
to provide more information on speciﬁc details of the 
valuation, some authors have proposed to integrate 
elicitation within a multiattribute environment structured
on a so-called multiattribute analysis (Satterﬁeld, Slovic, and
Gregory ; Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic ). While
the valuation tool proposed in this paper is diﬀerent, it is
also framed over a multiattribute environment.
. The possibility of deriving an implicit ranking of attributes
(Hanley, Wright, and Adamowicz ) is relevant, as it
allows considerations on both monetary and nonmonetary
measures of value. Economic appraisal can address choices
where all of the costs and beneﬁts can be measured in
money terms, but it can also be used as a basis for making
decisions and providing information support where ele-
ments of costs and beneﬁts cannot be given money values
(Creigh-Tyte, Dawe, and Stock ).  is compatible with
a broader range of appraisal techniques in which monetary
assessments might be complemented by weighting and scor-
ing analysis (multiattribute utility) to assess the importance
of beneﬁts that are not measured in monetary terms but
that may be quantiﬁed. Weighting and scoring allow the
construction, for each option, of an index of “suitability,”
which synthesizes the ratio of quantiﬁed beneﬁts and costs.
Using the implicit survey rankings as scores/weights
reduces the subjectivity of these analyses.
. Examples of oﬃcial use of nonmarket valuation techniques
in the U.K. government are increasingly frequent: the ﬁgures
used to estimate the costs of morbidity in the context of
transport accidents, air pollution, and violent crime are
partly based on  studies (e.g., Brand and Price ); a
large-scale  study was commissioned to assess the external
damages caused by quarry activities, in order to inform the
level of an aggregates tax (London Economics ); and a
 study of the heritage beneﬁts associated with construct-
ing an expensive tunnel for a road near Stonehenge was used
as supporting evidence for the social and economic desirabil-
ity of the project (Maddison and Mourato ).
. See also McFadden () on this core point.

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Numbness and Sensitivity in the Elicitation 
of Environmental Values
By Theresa Satterﬁeld
T    of value both colloquial
and formal. This paper takes stock of recent work by
social scientists and ethicists on the subject of environ-
mental values. Its foremost purpose is to highlight the
central features of scholarly eﬀorts to (a) articulate the
environment-centered values characteristic of diﬀerent
social groups, and (b) operationalize environmental val-
ues in the context of policy decisions about land manage-
ment. Its secondary purpose is to cull from this literature
a few central tensions and problems encountered in the
study of environmental values. It is hoped that any
derived insights will be useful not just to the evaluation of
environmental goods but to scholars concerned with the
value-based assessment of cultural heritage and the prac-
tice of heritage conservation. I will begin with a review of
several exemplary and seminal studies. Then I will address
emergent critiques of conventional practices and the
exploratory methods that such critiques have inspired.
The paper closes with a few recommendations and ques-
tions that all valuation practices need address.
Valuing the Environment
The last decade has witnessed a ﬂurry of research aimed
at identifying the value of nature (broadly construed),
speciﬁc environmental goods (a northern spotted owl), or
cherished places (Yellowstone National Park). Contribu-
tions to the literature have been generated from most cor-
ners of the natural, economic, social, psychological, politi-
cal, and decision sciences, as well as from philosophy, from
which has emerged the subdiscipline of environmental
ethics. Some have sought methods that reﬂect axiomatic
deﬁnitions of value, while others assert the importance of
relativistic or subjective approaches. Some make distinc-
tions between held values (beliefs we adhere to), while
others focus on assigned values (rankings or numeric tags
that express the relative weight of one value as compared
to one or more diﬀerent values). Others still are con-
cerned with the proper representation of values that are
not only tangible (e.g., those based on the speciﬁc physical
attributes of a good) but also intangible (e.g., those based
on more nebulous qualities, such as the ability to inspire
awe or the ability to symbolize revered spiritual or cul-
tural properties). In addition, many (though not all) of
these approaches seek to provide alternatives to dollar-
centric deﬁnitions of value. Of particular concern is the
use by economists of contingent valuation () methods
wherein an individual’s (hypothetical) market preference
(i.e., “value” for) a natural good is ascertained by asking
stakeholders or survey respondents to state how much
they would be willing to pay to improve the status of a
particular environmental good—for example, to improve
the habitat of an endangered species.
Two broad-stroke (though not necessarily con-
sciously articulated) positions underpin much of the val-
ues literature. The ﬁrst can be characterized as axiomatic.
An axiomatic, or maxim-focused, approach operates on
the premise that certain categories of value are better,
“truer,” more important, more self-evident, and/or more
intellectually defensible than all others. Such prioritized
values should, as is implied or asserted, provide the basis
from which environmental policy is derived. Axiomatic
traditions are, by deﬁnition, expert driven. Determining
higher-order values is achieved by assessments, argu-
ments, or measurements produced by disciplinary special-
ists who are not necessarily attendant to the opinions of
stakeholders or nonspecialists. The second position—an
antiaxiomatic, or relativistic, one—is guided by the princi-
ple of cultural or intersubjective relativism. The point for
these practitioners is that there are no right or wrong
value positions, only diﬀerent ones. Researchers are
expected to elicit but not judge or inﬂuence these dis-
parate perspectives during the elicitation process. Their
ﬁndings are used to provide insight to those responsible
for making land management decisions or setting envi-
ronmental policy.1
Axiomatic Traditions in Environmental
Ethics
A rich body of axiomatic work on the subject of environ-
mental values can be attributed to environmental ethi-
cists. Ethics—in this case environmental ethics—are
deﬁned as the putting into practice of notions of “right”
versus “wrong” conduct toward nature (Armstrong and
Botzler ; Proctor ; Rolston ). Environmental
ethicists have considered, therefore, the philosophical
basis for assigning value (and thus right practice) by argu-
ing for diﬀerent instrumental and, importantly, intrinsic
moral values embodied in nature (and/or its component
parts). Due to consciousness, only humans are moral
agents (and thus can evaluate things); ecosystems, organ-
isms, and species can nonetheless be defended as possess-
ing certain kinds of value in and of themselves (Callicott
, , ; Nash ; Norton ; Rolston ,
; Sagoﬀ , ; Stone ). 
Among the ethical divisions central to this litera-
ture is that between anthropocentric versus biocentric
positions (Callicott ; Norton ; Rolston , ).
An anthropocentric ethic posits that nature’s worth is
derived primarily from its capacity to serve human ends. 
A biocentric ethic respects all living organisms; because
nature is alive, it is regarded as “good” in its own right and
thus deserving of moral consideration. Many nuanced
arguments exist within these broad-stroke positions—for
example, whether it is better to inculcate an environmen-
tal ethic based on the potential human beneﬁts of a
healthy environment (Norton ), on the argument that
nature has rights and thus its welfare should be taken into
account or enshrined in law, on the aesthetic attributes of
nature, on the basis of a cross-human and human-to-
nature ethic of egalitarianism, and so on (Merchant ).
These considerations, in turn, raise several questions
about humans’ obligatory posture toward nature—
namely, what are our obligations to the natural environ-
ment? And are those obligations derived from our obliga-
tions to ourselves and other humans, or are they derived
from a discrete obligation to nature (Dickson )? 
Regardless of any one ethicist’s position on the
above points, most agree that the values or attitudes
human beings hold about nature are the root cause of
environmental problems. Theirs is a fundamentally
ideational argument. It is assumed that current value sys-
tems reﬂect our disregard for nature and even our willing-
ness to dominate nature (a position typically attributed to
the Judeo-Christian tradition), which in turn legitimizes
or causes our heedless exploitation of natural systems. It
is further assumed that if people adopt a more ethical ori-
entation toward the environment, environmental prob-
lems will in part be solved (Dickson , ). 
Despite a prodigious scholarly output in recent
years, very few ethicists have put forth speciﬁc value
typologies or rankings of higher- to lower-order values.
The ﬁeld is concerned, instead, with exploring the moral
arguments for and behavioral implications of speciﬁc
ethics when put into service in multiple (applied) contexts.
Two of the more compelling examples include the land
ethic and the naturalness principle. The land ethic, ﬁrst
invoked by forester and philosopher Aldo Leopold and the
basis of much modern ecology, stipulates that (a) our
deﬁnition of community should be extended to include
the biotic community—that is, to soil, water, plants, ani-
mals, or, collectively, the land—and (b) that to destroy any
one part is to threaten the whole, humanity included
(Leopold ). Because the loss of any one (ecosystemic)
part threatens the whole, ultimate value is placed on
maintaining system integrity. One must keep all the parts
of a healthy system. Hence, the conservationists’ motto
aimed at avoiding irreversible ecological damage: the ﬁrst
rule of intelligent tinkering is to keep all the parts. 
Conserving natural value as the highest-order
value proposes, alternately, that species and ecological sys-
tems be maintained in a form that best replicates their
state in nature as it would be in the absence of signiﬁcant
human intervention (Rolston ).2 A park ranger follow-
ing a natural wildlife ethic would not, therefore, attempt
to rescue a bison falling through the ice. The bison would
be left to manage the predicament alone. But the ranger
would intervene to save fauna injured by park motorists,
as there is nothing “natural” about a car traveling through
wildlife habitat at sixty miles per hour.3
Axiomatic Traditions—Ecological Values
A second, very signiﬁcant contribution to axiomatic meth-
ods for identifying environmental values is driven by the
work of ecologists. Scientists generally think of their
work as value free, and in this sense, they do not conceive
of their work as axiomatic. But their eﬀorts are, neverthe-
less, expert driven, and their conclusions are suggestive of
practices that are themselves axiomatically defended. The
value of environmental goods for this group of scholar-
evaluators is assessed on the basis of their contribution to
the functioning of the overall system and/or for the
importance attributed to particular ecosystem service

(e.g., the provision of clean water). For modeling and
assessment purposes, emphasis is typically placed on indi-
cators of system integrity, health, carrying capacity, or
resilience. This practice can point in turn to the designa-
tion of critical habitat or draw attention to (i.e., valorize)
system functions—for instance, the waste-ﬁltering capaci-
ties of wetlands or the importance of a keystone species
to the overall health of a system. A central question for
most of these approaches is: What is the best indicator of
overall health, and/or Which indicators speak to which
components of a system—be that at the level of organ-
isms; whole populations; or the larger forest, tropical,
desert, or other ecosystems of which these are a part
(Suter ).
Prominent among the eﬀorts by ecologists to val-
orize ecosystem services is the adoption by Costanza and
colleagues of the economists’ penchant for market expres-
sions of value. “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Ser-
vices and Natural Capital” was published ﬁrst in the jour-
nal Nature and subsequently in the journal Ecological Eco-
nomics (Costanza et al. ). The paper contains a typol-
ogy of worth based on the economic contribution (or the
“total global ﬂow of $ value per year”) of diﬀerent geo-
graphic domains (marine, riverine/lake, terrestrial, wet-
land, grassland, desert, tundra, urban, etc.). Each domain
is examined for its contribution to speciﬁc ecosystem ser-
vices (e.g., gas regulation, climate regulation, water sup-
ply, nutrient recycling, etc.). The authors’ breakdown of
services is a viable schema of ecologists’ thinking on val-
ues, whereas the attention their ﬁndings draw to the func-
tions of nature normally taken for granted is oft cited. 
A summation of these features is characterized in Table .
The concluding assessment by Costanza and col-
leagues that the total global biosphere is worth, on aver-
age, $ trillion per year (nearly twice the annual gross
national product of the United States) has, however, been
very controversial. Many economists working to elicit dol-
lar value as a measure of and a means for ranking public
preferences for natural goods view the authors’ costing of
the globe as a slight to their disciplinary integrity. Ecocen-
tric-leaning ecologists, meanwhile, remain ill at ease with
Costanza and colleagues’ preoccupation with human- and
market-centric (i.e., capital-worth) perspectives as the
basis for environmental valuation.
Regardless, ecologists and, to a greater extent,
ethicists labor to argue that nature is typically under-
valued and that—if we become more fully cognizant of
the moral qualities as well as of the material, aesthetic,
and spiritual beneﬁts of nature—nature might come to be
managed by humans with respect and according to a
range of axiomatic principles. They valorize certain quali-
ties of natural systems, attributes regarded as overlooked
in a post–World War II era that prioritizes the extraction
of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources. 

Table  Summary of average global value of annual ecosystem services.
(Source: Adapted from “The Value of the World’s Eco-
system Services and Natural Capital,” by R. Costanza, 
R. d’Arge, R. de Groot, S. Farber, M. Grasso, B. Hannon, 
S. Naeem, K. Limburg, J. Parnelo, R. V. O’Neill, R. Raskin, 
P. Sutton, and M. van den Belt, , Nature , p. .
Copyright  by Nature Publishing Group. Adapted with
permission.)
Ecosystem Services Total Global Flow 
Value (/year–1 x 9)
Gas regulation ,
Climate regulation 
Disturbance regulation ,
Water regulation ,
Water supply ,
Erosion control 
Soil formation 
Nutrient cycling ,
Waste treatment ,
Pollination 
Biological control 
Habitat refugia 
Food production ,
Raw materials 
Genetic resources 
Recreation 
Cultural ,
Total ,1
. In trillions of dollars, for a total of  trillion,  billion.
Relativistic Traditions
Ethicists and ecologists have forced onto the values stage
the relevance of both a systemic/functional and a morally
resonant deﬁnition of value. The cross-fertilization with
other disciplines of these ideas is ongoing and signiﬁcant,
some of which will become apparent below. It remains
the case, however, that the study of environmental values
for policy and land management purposes is heavily
inﬂuenced by relativistic approaches or, more colloquially,
by practitioners whose central goal is the monitoring of
public opinion. This relativistic slant is partly because of
the deep tradition across the social sciences of “value-
neutral” approaches to human behavior and partly
because “the individual being is seen, for all practical 
purposes, as the originator of preference and, therefore,
of value” (Brown , ). It is also because of the role
citizen preferences play in the instigation of endangered
species legislation, the growth of environmental activism,
and the general public support for environmentally ori-
ented behavior (recycling, water conservation, wilderness
recreation, green consumerism, etc.). More important,
considerable support exists today for public consultation
as the basis of good governance and civil society. 
Following Brown and Gregory, most of the avail-
able social science valuation tools are glossed as expressed
preference approaches (Brown ; Gregory ). “Pref-
erence is used here to mean the setting by an individual of
one thing before another because of a notion of better-
ness” (Brown , –). This overarching category can
be subdivided further still into approaches that work to
identify held values (underlying values or ideals that prior-
itize modes of conduct and desirable qualities) and those
that work to measure assigned values (the relative impor-
tance or worth of an object in a given context, which is
not a characteristic of the object per se but the impor-
tance of which is derived, at least partially, from held val-
ues). Understandably, much confusion for new students of
environmental values is generated by the failure of many
practitioners to clarify whether one is talking about held
or assigned values. (To confuse the matter further, held
values can be converted to assigned values in that they can
be ranked as more or less important relative to one
another. Furthermore, norms overlap with held values to
the extent that a norm is a value that one asserts as more
important than others, as something that one should do
or act in accordance with, versus something that one
enduringly believes matters.) 
Contingent Valuation as 
Willingness to Pay
As implied above, expressed preference work is dominated
by contingent valuation surveys employing willingness-
to-pay () and willingness-to-accept () protocols
(Mitchell and Carson ).4 Resting on the economists’
assumption that dollars are as neutral a metric for measur-
ing value as is available, practitioners posit a hypothetical
market on which environmental improvements and losses
are exchanged for promised payment. It is further
assumed that preference is akin to the pursuit of individ-
ual human welfare or self-interest played out as a rational
market choice. Participant-citizens in / studies are
asked to state the maximum price they would be willing
to pay to obtain an improvement in environmental quality
(e.g., a restored bird habitat) or to state the price they
would be willing to accept given deterioration of status
(e.g., loss of said habitat). Requests to assign dollar values
to such environmental goods are generally accompanied
by technical information on the geophysical domain (e.g.,
a community watershed) in question and quantitative
details about the beneﬁts (perhaps recreational or ecologi-
cal) and costs (perhaps jobs lost or revenues forgone) of
diﬀerent policy options. Total  is the product of aver-
age or mean  multiplied by the population to which
the decision applies (a local town, users of an environ-
mental asset, a county, a nation-state, etc.). Total  is
then pitted, in a cost-beneﬁt analysis, against the costed
interests of other stakeholders (industry, government,
competing resource users, etc.).
Psychological and Social Studies of Value
Dissatisfaction with economic deﬁnitions of value and a
strong tradition in the study of attitudes and beliefs in
sociology and psychology have helped fuel many alter-
nate nonmonetary studies of value. Most of this work
emphasizes a “values held” deﬁnition. Much of it also rec-
ognizes the escalation of environmental concern over
time and across social groups and ﬁnds that values once
thought extremely radical are held by a broad variety of
individuals and groups (Dunlap and Scarce ). More
important, this body of work disavows (a) the assumption
that, taken literally, values and valuation are synonymous,
that quantitative values equal, or actually express, one’s
values, and (b) the assumption that the public majority
endorses and is satisfactorily portrayed by rational, eco-
nomic expressions of the value of nature. Most deﬁne
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value as “what we care about” (Keeney , ), as the
“basic motivations which guide thoughts and action”
(Axelrod , ), or, following Rokeach, as general goals
or orienting dispositions from which attitudes to speciﬁc
items are derived (Rokeach ; Stern et al. ).
Recall that the principal distinction between rela-
tivistic and axiomatic studies is that for the ﬁrst group, the
goal is to characterize the values held (and for ,
assigned) by the public, while for the second group, the
goal is to instantiate the wisdom of recognizing some val-
ues as more important or signiﬁcant than others and, in so
doing, overturn the historical force of a human-centric,
utilitarian worldview that promotes human arrogance
toward and dominance over nature. Yet the salient feature
of three classic nonaxiomatic studies of value is the decid-
edly ecocentric ﬂavor detected in survey responses.
As early as , Dunlap and Van Liere argued
convincingly that a “new environmental [value] para-
digm”() was emerging to supplant the dominant social
paradigm () (Dunlap and Van Liere ). The  is
that “constellation of values, attitudes, and beliefs”
thought to underpin key Western assumptions about the
human-nature interface (i.e., the beliefs that limitless
progress is possible, that faith in science and technology 
is abundant, that nature exists to serve humans, etc.). 
The  measures include twelve statement items with
either a pro- or antienvironmental cast; topically, the items
explore the tolerance expressed for limits to growth,
support for a greater balance between the human and
nonhuman world, and support for antianthropocentric
positions (Table ). Salient among Dunlap and Van Liere’s
ﬁndings is the “remarkable degree of acceptance of the
—not only among environmentalists, which was
expected, but among the general public as well” (Dunlap
and Van Liere , ).
Equally renowned (with conclusions not unlike
Dunlap and Van Liere’s) is Stephen Kellert’s broadly cross-
cultural survey work, much of which is summarized in his
book The Value of Life (Kellert ). Humans universally
recognize, argues Kellert, the importance of biodiversity
to their physical, emotional, spiritual, and intellectual
well-being. Relying on studies conducted in several North
American, European, Asian, and African nation-states,
Kellert argues that we are by nature biophilic—that is,
Table  Responses to new environmental paradigm (NEP) scale items by the general public sample (GPS) and the environmental organization sample
(EOS). (Source: Adapted from “The ‘New Environmental Paradigm,’” by R. E. Dunlap and K. D. Van Liere, Journal of Environmental
Education  (), no. , pp. ‒. Reprinted with permission of the Helen Dwight Reid Education Foundation. Published by Heldref
Publications,  th Street NW, Washington, D.C. -. Copyright © .)
Statement Agreement Agreement 
in GPS (%) in EOS (%)
. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. . .
. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. . .
. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. . .
. Mankind was created to rule over the rest of nature. . .
. When humans interfere with nature, it often produces disastrous consequences. . .
. Plants and animals exist primarily to be used by humans. . .
. To maintain a healthy economy, we will have to develop a “steady-state” economy, . .
where industrial growth is controlled.
. Humans must live in harmony with nature in order to survive. . .
. The earth is like a spaceship with only limited room and resources. . .
. Humans need not adapt to the natural environment because they can remake it to suit . .
their needs.
. There are limits to growth beyond which our industrialized society cannot expand. . .
. Mankind is severely abusing the environment. . .
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predisposed to appreciate the nonhuman world, an appre-
ciation he regards as rooted in nine core value orientations
(Table ). These nine values, considered biological in ori-
gin, signify basic structures of human relationship and
adaptation to the natural world developed over the course
of human evolution. Edward O. Wilson conceived the
term biophilia to describe the deep biological need for
aﬃliating with life and nature. The nine values are
thought to reﬂect a range of physical, emotional, and
intellectual expressions of the biophilic tendency to asso-
ciate with nature (Kellert , ).
Culture, history, and human experience may diﬀ-
erently shape the salience of these values across popula-
tions. Further, Kellert is careful to assert that his cate-
gories are labels of convenience and that he does not
mean to indicate their order of importance. Humanistic
values may be more widely endorsed by Americans than
utilitarian ones, but that is not to say that Kellert is himself
promoting the signiﬁcance of one orientation above
another (Kellert , , ).
Some scholars disagree with Kellert’s assump-
tions about biological or biophilic predispositions. They
may also ﬁnd diﬀerence where Kellert ﬁnds universality—
to wit, they interpret the ethnic-, income-, and gender-
driven diﬀerences uncovered in his book as more
meaningful than does Kellert. His typology is, nonethe-
less, consistent with a number of subsequent studies (e.g.,
Steel et al. ) and is supported, equally, by work in
other disciplines. 
Two ﬁnal well-known contributions to the ﬁeld
are Stern and Dietz’s work on the value basis of environ-
mental concern and Kempton and colleagues’ work on
the intersection of cultural models and environmental
values (Stern and Dietz ; Kempton, Boster, and Hart-
ley ). Stern and Dietz isolate those values most closely
associated with the preservation of nature and environ-
mentalism generally. Upon factor analysis of numerous
attitudinal statements, a tripartite value schema emerged
composed of egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric value ori-
entations. The ﬁrst category distinguished some people as
self-interested maximizers, the second as concerned pri-
marily with the costs and beneﬁts carried by others (altru-
istic), and the third as concerned with the costs and
beneﬁts posed for the biosphere as a whole (biospheric).
Kempton, Boster, and Hartley similarly found that most
values could be attributed to, or were deeply rooted in,
religious thought, utilitarian and human-centric self-inter-
est, and a biocentric belief in the rights of nature and
species (Kempton, Boster, and Hartley ).5 They also
found that such values were inseparable from lay theories
or models about the causes of environmental problems
(in their case, global warming). That is, study participants
were easily drawn to and persuaded by causal explana-
tions (however accurate or erroneous) most closely articu-
lated with their values orientations.
Table  A typology of basic values. (Source: From The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and Human Society, by Stephen R. Kellert. Copyright © ,
Island Press. Reproduced by permission of Island Press/Shearwater Books, Washington, D.C., and Covelo, California. All rights reserved.)
Value Deﬁnition Function
Utilitarian Practical and material exploitation of nature Physical sustenance/security
Naturalistic Direct experience and exploration of nature Curiosity, discovery, recreation
Ecologistic-scientiﬁc Systematic study of structure, function, and relationship in nature Knowledge, understanding, observational skills
Aesthetic Physical appeal and beauty of nature Inspiration, harmony, security
Symbolic Use of nature for language and thought Communication, mental development
Humanistic Strong emotional attachment and “love” for aspects of nature Bonding, sharing, cooperation, companionship
Moralistic Spiritual reverence and ethical concern for nature Order, meaning, kinship, altruism
Dominionistic Mastery, physical control, dominance of nature Mechanical skills, physical prowess, ability to subdue
Negativistic Fear, aversion, alienation from nature Security, protection, safety, awe
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Cognitive Difficulties and Moral
Conundrums in the Development 
of Valuation Practices
The above contributions to the social and psychological
dimensions of value have legitimized a much broader
conception of the term value than was heretofore com-
mon in the ﬁeld of environmental valuation. Social scien-
tists have provided evidence for the claim that expressions
of value are rooted both in utilitarian approaches to
preference (which address the question What is it that a
person values or will “pay for” because it beneﬁts him or
her as an individual?) and in ethical and deontological
approaches (which address the question What does a
person believe to be important to the greater good that is
nature and society?) (Sagoﬀ ). The enormous
advances in value identiﬁcation techniques oﬀered by
these seminal studies cannot be underestimated. How-
ever, as researchers, decision makers, and policy advisors
look for ever deeper understandings of value, and for
greater clariﬁcation as to how values inﬂuence decision
making, a new set of criticisms (and a new set of research
directions) has emerged. The next section addresses these
criticisms, in particular (a) the cognitive limitations that
most persons exhibit when facing a value-based decision
problem, (b) the inability to link values and actions, and
(c) the fact that the language and context in which values
are elicited still serves to silence many ethical values and
moral concerns. The next section examines this author’s
recent experiments with tools aimed at addressing both
cognitive and ethical variables. 
Cognitive Difficulties
The study of environmental values is increasingly
inﬂuenced by the work of psychologists and decision
analysts, who have found, overwhelmingly, that peoples’
cognitive ability is bounded. This bounding is due not to
lack of wisdom per se; it is simply the case that everyone
has diﬃculty navigating through the complexities
involved in making judgments about value or in making
decisions. The inability to manage that complexity intel-
lectually is attributed to features of human cognition.
Namely, problems arise because people routinely and
unconsciously avert complexity by relying on a consistent
set of biases or “heuristics” (rules of thumb) that make
information processing easier and simplify decisions.
Such heuristics and biases can be an elegant means to an
eﬃcient decision, but in many cases, they lead to errors or
poor-quality judgments. Cognitive diﬃculty can also be
attributed to the features of the decision task itself. Most
value studies work to identify the links between values
held and the decision or policy that such values support,
but it turns out that standard surveys oﬀer relatively poor
opportunities for respondents to think through the links
between a value stated and an action endorsed. Together
these diﬃculties suggest that how a value is elicited—the
way in which a valuation task is set up, worded, or
framed—strongly inﬂuences the outcome. 
Framing Effects
Prominent examples of framing eﬀects follow.6
• The availability heuristic, which ﬁnds that people
estimate the frequency of the occurrence of something
on the basis of how easily they can imagine or recall an
instance of it. Vivid examples (e.g., the prospect of a
wildﬁre or the thought of a charismatic species) leave us
ﬁxated on single aspects of a decision problem or cause us
to underestimate the importance of less-familiar aspects
of the problem.
• Gain/loss eﬀects, which ﬁnd that questions
worded in an apparently equivalent manner are not
always perceived as such. For example, questions framed
as gains versus losses can have an unintended eﬀect on the
outcome of a valuation task, because people tend to react
more strongly to the thought of a loss than to the thought
of a gain. As a result, higher  scores will be attributed
to the recovery from a loss of ten acres of a wetland than
to the gain of the equivalent area of wetland (Gregory,
MacGregor, and Lichtenstein ).
• Numeric expression eﬀects, which ﬁnd that informa-
tion about an environmental good or a heritage site is
over- or undervalued depending on the type of numeric
expression used to characterize a good’s status. Presenting
information in percentages (e.g.,  percent of the local
population agree that the site should be saved) instead of
on a frequency scale ( in  people agree that the site
should be saved) leads people to undervalue that informa-
tion. That is, diﬀerent representations of the same proba-
bilistic information lead to very diﬀerent valuations. This
is true with both expert and nonexpert populations
(Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor ).
• Cognitive fogging: The presentation of information
pertinent to a decision can impose mental fatigue and
thus fog the participant’s ability to juggle cognitively the
many pieces of some decisions. (It is generally agreed that
people can juggle three or four dimensions of a problem
at one time.)
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The Weak Values-Action Link
Further problems stem from what is generally referred to
as the weak values-action link. Historically, social scien-
tists have assumed that studying held values is essential
because they oﬀer a reasonable indication of expected
future behavior. Agreement with a value statement in a
survey context should mean that actions that fulﬁll that
value will be supported. Consider, for instance, Inglehart’s
evidence for an emerging postmaterialist value orienta-
tion (Inglehart ) . Adherents of this orientation pur-
port a willingness to forgo further material wealth
(assuming basic needs are met) when attaining such
wealth threatens the environment. When a respondent
declares a postmaterialist value orientation by agreeing
with the survey statement “I’m willing to accept a lower
standard of living to ensure a healthy environment,” one
is led to expect commensurate support for actions that
fulﬁll that position. Thus, postmaterialists might be
expected to agree with a reduction in timber jobs or an
increase in local tax revenues, to ensure forest health. Such
expectations are, however, not substantiated by most sur-
vey results. This ﬁnding, in turn, has several implications
for studies of environmental values. 
Evidence from a recent study of eastern Canadi-
ans’ environmental values in a forest management context
oﬀers a case in point (Satterﬁeld and Gregory ). 
In that study, Ontario’s population (a largely urban “gen-
eral public”) was randomly sampled, as were residents of
rural timber-dependent communities and residents of
timber-dependent households within those communities.
Despite the demographic and likely ideological diﬀer-
ences across these urban-rural groups, surprisingly uni-
versal support for “green” values emerged. In only one
instance do two of these three groups diﬀer as to their
stated value orientations by more than a few percentage
points. More typically, support across all groups for sev-
eral proenvironment value positions is very uniform, a
pattern that is maintained when moving from the
resounding support for species egalitarianism to more
cautious endorsements of the spiritual qualities in nature,
or of postmaterialism generally. The results are depicted
in Figure .
Figure  Environmental values: General public, timber-dependent communities, and timber-dependent households (percent “agree” and “strongly agree”
responses). * p <.. (Source: From “Reconciling Environmental Values and Pragmatic Choices,” by T. Satterﬁeld and R. Gregory, ,
Society and Natural Resources , p. . Copyright  by Taylor & Francis. Reprinted with permission.)
I think environmental problems are extremely important.
When I see or hear a story about an environmental issue, 
I pay particular attention to that story.
*All species, including humans, have an equal right to coexist 
on the planet.
*It bothers me that the world’s natural environment is 
changing so quickly.
*I am attracted to the spiritual qualities inherent in the natural 
world.
*I would be willing to sacriﬁce much of my current standard 
of living in order to help ensure that nature is not harmed.
Technological development is destroying nature.
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These results are in concordance with the work 
of Kellert and of Dunlap and Van Liere, to the extent that
environmental values, once assumed to be central to the
diﬀerentiation of social groups generally opposed to one
another, are more widely held than one might think
(Kellert ; Dunlap and Van Liere ). However, a sim-
ilarly consistent relationship between expressed prefer-
ences for management goals and actions cannot be found.
These ﬁndings are represented in Figure . At the level of
action, pronounced between-group diﬀerences emerged
in the Ontario study in response to the acceptability of
clear-cutting (a diﬀerence of .%), harvesting in provin-
cial parks (.%), the reduction of timber harvesting to
promote global environmental health (.%) or sustain-
able forestry (.%), and the importance of timber indus-
try employment (.%).
The implications for assumptions about value
studies (and the ability to sustain conﬁdence in common
methodologies) are twofold. First, resounding support for
environmental values, even strongly biocentric ones
endorsing species egalitarianism, is a relatively poor indi-
cator of support for management goals or practices. Sec-
ond, the problem is not likely to be solved by designing
better value statements for survey purposes because the
problem arises from the tendency to confuse expressions
of values that refer to an individual’s fundamental beliefs
(held values) with operational expressions of those values
in terms of context-speciﬁc objectives or the means by
which desired values are realized (Kraus ; Ladd and
Bowman ).
Figure  Management goals and actions (percent “agree” and “strongly agree” or percent “acceptable” and “very acceptable” responses).
*p <.; **p<.. (Source: From “Reconciling Environmental Values and Pragmatic Choices,” by T. Satterﬁeld and R. Gregory, ,
Society and Natural Resources , p. . Copyright  by Taylor & Francis. Reprinted with permission.)
** Timber harvests in Ontario forests should be reduced in light 
of global pressures on environmental resources.
** Sustainable forestry in Ontario will require a major reduction 
in timber harvest levels.
* Forests should be managed primarily as places for human 
recreation, such as hiking, canoeing, camping, or ﬁshing.
** The ﬁrst priority for forest managers should be to provide 
local communities with jobs in the wood products industry.
** Using managed ﬁre to control for unwanted vegetation is 
acceptable.
** Timber harvesting inside provincial parks is acceptable.
** Clearcutting to harvest timber in Ontario is acceptable.
* Spraying herbicides from helicopters or airplanes to control 
unwanted forest vegetation is acceptable.
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Language and Meaning
Also central to criticisms of value scholarship is the ques-
tion What languages are most appropriate to the elicita-
tion of value? The concern is that the linguistic style that
accompanies cost-beneﬁt analyses and dollar measures
inscribes particular forms of discourse into the elicitation
process itself. That is, the language (in most cases, an eco-
nomic one) used to measure or discuss stakeholder “val-
ues” determines the values that are “allowed” to surface
in the research context. An economistic frame insinuates
a market preoccupation and, more broadly, a rationalizing
discourse that may unintentionally exclude moral or
political imperatives (in favor of bureaucratic and techno-
scientiﬁc ones), despite the fact that key stakeholders
often defend their claims in the most profoundly moral
terms (Brosius , –). Lockwood similarly notes
that many elicitation instruments fail to “give participants
any opportunity to explore diﬀerent ways of expressing
their values.” In the absence of alternatives, participants
“must oﬀer a response that is against their preferred mode
of value expression” (Lockwood , ).
The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction
Evidence for the argument that the format and language
of valuation methods limit respondents’ ability to articu-
late the moral dimensions of value properly is particularly
compelling in the context of  studies. Such studies fre-
quently produce what are known as “protest zeros,” as
well as unusually high  amounts. These are instances
where study respondents resist the prevailing format by
entering a zero or by oﬀering an unrealistically high
value, in response to questions about the worth of an
environmental good. Quite often these entries are accom-
panied by margin comments reﬂecting the respondent’s
discontent with being asked to think of the environmen-
tal good in question in monetary terms.
Kahneman and colleagues explain this protest as
rooted in a misunderstanding, by economists, of the eval-
uator’s intent (Kahneman and Knetsch ; Ritov and
Kahneman ). Economists supportive of  methods
assume that value is easily and accurately assigned by the
respondent, who, as a rational agent-consumer, uses that
dollar assignation to express his or her preference order
for environmental goods or states. A higher dollar value,
it is assumed, will (a) be assigned to states (e.g., clean
water) preferred over and above other states, and (b)
reﬂect the true amount that people are willing to pay, in
the same sense that if you prefer car A over car B, you’re
likely willing to pay a ﬁxed amount more for car A. How
much more depends on your income and on your subjec-
tive degree of appreciation for car A.
But if, as the above work on framing eﬀects in
judgment and decision making suggests, valuations are
often inexact or labile—and thus they can change as judg-
ment conditions are altered—something other than a con-
ventional market transaction must be taking place in the
mind of the respondent. Support for this speculation was
derived, initially, from a set of results known alternately as
the scoping problem, the embedding eﬀect, or the part-
whole problem, which ﬁnds that when evaluating non-
market goods, participants are insensitive to quantity.
That is,  amounts do not change signiﬁcantly when
the value of saving one lake, versus all of the lakes in a
region, is rated. Moreover, average  correlates highly
with support for the good in question and ratings of satis-
faction derived from making a contribution. It is, there-
fore, probable that rather than treating the transaction as
the purchase of a good, respondents are in fact purchasing
something akin to the moral satisfaction achieved from
contributing to a cause. Theirs are symbolic actions that
express the intensity of their feelings about a good and
the moral importance attributed to that good.
Resistant Participants and Taboo 
Trade-offs
A second body of evidence supporting the idea that
respondents are dissatisﬁed with attempts to over-
rationalize their expressions of value by treating valua-
tion as a market transaction stems from work on 
“protected values” (Baron and Spranca ) and taboo
trade-oﬀs (Fiske and Tetlock ). Valuation exercises can
be an uncomfortable experience for many participants
because the exercises force them, whether implicitly or
explicitly, to make trade-oﬀs that may give rise to moral
and ethical dilemmas that are fundamentally diﬃcult to
resolve. A growing body of evidence suggests that many
people are deeply oﬀended by or have a profound psycho-
logical aversion to trade-oﬀs because they view a subset 
of trade-oﬀs as violating norms they seek to protect or
regard as sacred. For instance, a person who holds as
essential the protection of an endangered species might
reject outright a  or  formula that trades dollars
for that species’s survival. Such trade-oﬀs are experienced
as abhorrent because the task reﬂects back to the partici-
pant a self-portrait as morally compromised. Willingness

to make trades becomes tantamount to acknowledging
that one’s defense of bald eagles can be bought oﬀ or that
one is willing to discredit the sanctity of life by deciding
how many human lives should be saved.
In practice, this lack of a willingness to address
trade-oﬀs and incorporate them into policy decisions has
a number of results.
• Absolutism. Trade-oﬀ eﬀorts often break down
because the posed options trigger respondents into believ-
ing that they must sacriﬁce a deeply held principle in
order to participate in any negotiation or decision process.
• Quantitative insensitivity. The hallmark of pro-
tected values is the belief that scale does not matter, that
an act or management choice is taboo, regardless of scope
or occurrence. Participants may believe that destroying
one species through a single act is as bad as destroying a
hundred through a single act, and therefore, they refuse
to participate in a discussion about possible trade-oﬀs
(Baron and Spranca ).
• Denial. Study participants often refuse to believe
that one must face an unpleasant trade-oﬀ, and thus they
deny the trade-oﬀ’s necessity or suspend decision making
until a more palatable option can be found. 
• The slippery slope dilemma. Finally, trade-oﬀ resis-
tance can also be equated with the belief that any move in
a particular direction, no matter how minor, will lead to
or is symbolic of devastating future outcomes. This is
akin to legal decisions that are established on the basis of
minor infractions but which are ultimately contentious
because they hint at the undermining of such inalienable
rights as free speech.
The argument that people are not assigning value
but are, rather, avoiding trade-oﬀs or purchasing moral
satisfaction because they are denied proper opportunity
to express the ethical dimensions of the problem suggests
strongly that value scholars may have overrationalized
their practices and that, in so doing, they have failed to
address properly the moral qualities that give shape to
much of what we value. Nor is the problem unique to
economic protocols. The same might be said of some sur-
vey instruments that operate on the premise that we can
ask respondents direct questions and receive direct
answers about values. Both survey and  elicitation
contexts may be so robotic or ﬂat (aﬀectively speaking)
that they strip the valuation context of meaning. Func-
tionally, they expunge the valuation context of the very
language and style that many people use to discuss val-
ues—that is, the conversational talk and sometimes pas-
sionate argument that are part of everyday reﬂections on
beliefs and values.
One needs to consider the possibility that some
values cannot or should not be rationalized (at least not
initially); to do so is to risk marginalizing value positions
based on aﬀective investment or moral conviction. Ratio-
nalizing processes may compel respondents to avoid
expressions of value that come across, to put it bluntly, as
ﬂaky, despite the possible importance of ethical proposi-
tions about the rights of nature and spiritual investments
in natural areas. It may be that many study participants
are not especially good at giving voice to values that are
ethically charged, deeply held, privately defended, or not
available to consciousness at a moment’s notice—or per-
haps participants are not even given the chance to do so.
Tangible, rational values, such as those that specify nature
as biologically and economically beneﬁcial, are readily
deﬁned in most elicitation contexts. In contrast, less-tan-
gible expressions of value, such as the proposition that
rights should be extended to nature or that wild nature is
enchanting or sacred to some people, are relegated to
quiet corners.
Balancing Numbness and Sensitivity
This is a sobering list of problems, and it is reasonable to
assume that no single valuation tool will likely emerge to
solve all of the diﬃculties posed. Instead, it is necessary to
recognize that there is only, at best, a certain art and sci-
ence to balancing the powerful aﬀective, aesthetic, ethi-
cal, and spiritual values about nature held by many stake-
holders and the demands of complex, technical, on-the-
ground considerations of what, where, when, and how to
proceed when a balance between human and natural wel-
fare is sought. The point, therefore, is to transparently
seek balance between numbness and sensitivity. Numb-
ness may set in when study participants are deprived of
opportunities to think through the complexity of a value-
driven decision or are estranged by the style, language,
process, or value-exclusivity of an approach. Sensitivity
might alternately refer to participants who are oversensi-
tive to single features of a value problem. Perhaps they
hold fast to (or are highly sensitive to) single-item priori-
ties that they seek to protect against all others, and thus
they are unwilling to make trade-oﬀs or consider diﬀerent
management options.

In response to much of this, a new breed of value
studies is emerging that works to (a) provide contexts that
enhance participants’ ability to articulate more elusive or
impassioned expressions of value, (b) address the cogni-
tive complexities inherent in most decisions about how
best to “manage” nature, (c) create better links between
the value stated and the action endorsed, (d) place on
equal footing value dimensions that are qualitatively dis-
parate—from the deeply moral to the ﬁscally practical,
and (e) examine the conditions under which careful delib-
eration of problems is enhanced. Moreover, the entire
ﬁeld is moving, it seems, from more abstract studies and
categorizations of value to the implications of such values
for concrete, context-speciﬁc decisions about diﬀerent
planning and conservation options. An expansive mood is
afoot wherein experimentation is encouraged and conven-
tion is sometimes, though not always, subverted. What
follows is a train of research thought that reﬂects these
newer breeds of research—in particular, eﬀorts with
which I am involved or most familiar. 
Value Articulacy
Consider ﬁrst the problem of value articulacy—to wit, the
problem that some values cannot be expressed as num-
bers or declarative statements but are, instead, embedded
in the contextually, emotively, and morally rich stories and
conversations through which we deﬁne ourselves and our
actions in relation to natural systems. With this in mind,
one set of studies (Satterﬁeld ) speculated that more
inclusive portraits of value could be found in value-rich
narratives if only one could elicit such narratives from lay
stakeholders in a defensible manner. These studies
assumed that morally resonant, image-based, and narra-
tive-style elicitations would help respondents articulate a
broader range of noncost and nonutilitarian environmen-
tal values. Three elicitation tools were developed toward
this end. One of these mimicked a projective test, the
Thematic Apperception Test (). Respondents were
asked to tell a story about what the (unidentiﬁable) person
in a photograph of an old-growth grove or a clear-cut was
thinking. A second tool sought open-ended reactions, or
in some cases rebuttals, to several aﬀectively charged
“pro” and “anti” narratives about logging activities. This
task exploited the connection in the respondent’s mind
between emotional investment in a point of view and
expressions of value (Lutz ; Stocker and Hegeman
). A third device told the story of a policy dilemma
about a rare species of pine on the brink of extinction and
the desire to harvest that species because it provided an
essential ingredient known to send into remission  per-
cent of all cases of lymphoma and leukemia. Respondents
were asked to tell us how they would resolve the conﬂict
and to explain their actions on the basis of their sense of a
“just,” “fair,” or “moral” world.
Several hundred pages of written responses were
produced. Identifying the diﬀerent invoked value expres-
sions was understandably diﬃcult. Moreover, the research
sought better representation of ethical values, which
necessitated a coding scheme that spelled out such value
dimensions. Rolston’s book Conserving Natural Values was
used as a basis for developing that coding scheme (Rolston
). Each chapter was culled for discrete types of value.
Over thirty-ﬁve categories of value were generated,
though some categories were eliminated due to overlap
and due to nonmention by respondents. In the end,
twenty-ﬁve categories of value remained pertinent. These
are deﬁned in Table .
The rich, lengthy, and value-dense passages that
characterized responses to these three tasks lends cre-
dence to the claim that under “naturalistic” conditions
(i.e., conditions that mimic ordinary talk and ardor), par-
ticipants have a great deal to say about values. Consider
the following passage taken from a participant’s response
to a thematic apperception task using an old-growth pho-
tograph. It is not an exceptional passage, and like many, it
is unabashedly romantic (a discursive style ill suited to
conventional valuation exercises). Nonetheless, it man-
ages to convey meaning as deﬁned by the forest’s capacity
to invoke the ephemerality of human life, to suggest that
forests represent something larger and more enduring
than the human self. “She hiked farther, ﬁnding herself
beneath a canopy of old growth shade. She was amazed
by the immense size of the trees, which due to old age and
climate were covered in moss. Staring out at the tree, she
thought to herself, ‘It’s so old.’ She thought further about
her age in relation to the trees. It occurred to her that her
life was a very small part of the life of the earth.”
Brieﬂy stated,  expressions of value emerged
across the twenty-ﬁve diﬀerent value categories. Figure 
depicts the ordering of value categories according to their
frequency of mention across all elicitation tasks. The top
six of these categories (ecological sustainability, principles
of equity and the rights of nature, philosophical or spiri-
tual values, recreational values, aesthetic value, and life
support value) encompass the large majority (.%) of all
responses. Less-common, though intriguing, value refer-
ences include:

Table  Value Deﬁnitions. (Source: Rolston’s Conserving Natural Values () was the basis for this coding scheme. Each chapter was culled for
discrete types of value. The deﬁnitions in column two either quote or paraphrase Rolston (); column three gives page references 
to Rolston’s text where applicable. The author takes full responsibility for these deﬁnitions; they are summations of her reading of
Rolston and should be understood as such. Adapted from “In Search of Value Literacy: Suggestions for the Elicitation of Environmental
Values,” by T. Satterﬁeld, , Environmental Values , p. . Copyright  by The White Horse Press, Cambridge, U.K. Adapted 
with permission.)
Value Category Deﬁnition Pages
Ecological sustainability Valuing development that does not compromise ecosystem integrity 
Rights/equity Deliberations on the rights of nature, including: (a) basic idea that nature has rights, (b) idea –
of balance between humans and natural rights, (c) idea that rights of nature take priority over 
humans, (d) idea that human rights take priority over nature
Recreational Nature as provisioner of a physical challenge (e.g., mountaineering), as a show to be watched 
(e.g., bird-watching), as a place to build skills (e.g., scouting organizations)
Philosophical/spiritual/religious Nature as a philosophical and religious resource, as inspiration for religious/philosophical/ –
spiritual thought and experience
Aesthetic Beauty in life and landscape, admiring a rainbow/snow-capped mountain, etc. 
Life support Earth as a biological habitat/home. Biosphere as a source of climate, water cycles, photosynthesis, etc. 
Historical/evolutionary Historical value of nature and landscapes as a record of past processes (geological formation of the 
earth) and as an evolving system
Future generations Recognition of the rights of future generations to a healthy environment –
Population sustainability Concern about nature as it meets human needs; concern for the equitable division of products –
of nature among Earth’s citizens
Economic Commodity value of extracted natural resources 
Employment Valuing resource-based jobs —
Biodiversity Valuing the preservation of biodiversity expressed as variety of species (number of species present) –
and rarity of species
Place identification Nationally recognized places—e.g., “the prairies” –
Pharmacy Valuing resources in nature that can cure human illness or have the potential to cure human illness —
Wilderness Valuing the existence of wilderness or wild places –
Intrinsic Value inherent in nature in and of itself, not because it serves some human, biological, or 
ecological need
Community Recognition of humans as members of the biotic community and/or valuing the idea of a biotic 
community
Complexity Valuing the complexity and intricacy of material systems –
Scientific/intellectual/creative Valuing nature as a basis for creative or intellectual thought , 
Recovery Valuing the ability of an ecosystem to heal itself, to recover from natural or anthropogenic –
devastation
Existence Valuing the simple possibility that a natural place is out there and in good shape, though one may —
never see it
Cultural sustainability Valuing the relationship between cultural and biological sustainability –
Cultural symbolization Wildlife as cultural symbols—e.g., bald eagle for the U.S.; the maple leaf for Canada 
Charisma Valuing nature for its charm and character; emphasis on charismatic megafauna 
Oppositional forces Valuing the struggle between destructive and life- giving forces of nature 

• positive valuations of the historical and temporal
evolution of biotic life (“This tree has been around for
thousands of years.” Or “Standing and looking at the land
laid out before me, I feel a great sense of loss for our
world. It takes such a long time for a forest to grow.”)
• recovery value (“I appreciate the recuperative
powers of nature.”)
• complexity value, that is, valuing a physical place
for the intricate processes and systems that are within it
(“She takes notice of the symbiotic relationships she sees
around her, the moss and the tree body . . . an example of
the ideal interactions that occur between organisms.”)
• intellectual and scientiﬁc value—rather positive
valuations of natural phenomena as the basis (via reﬂec-
tion and study) for human intelligence and creativity.
Other responses were notable for their interweav-
ing of values—to wit, for the contributions of biotic
health to psychological and cultural health, or for the
sheer force of imagination apparent in some responses:
“Massive barked, moss-covered, ancient soldiers that pro-
tected the gates to the true muse of nature, loves poetry.”
Several explanations may be tentatively proposed
for the elicitation tasks’ ability to encourage discussion 
of a broad variety of noncost and nonutilitarian values. 
A ﬁrst plausible explanation is that allowing for ordinary,
storied talk of values during elicitation created a comfort
Figure  Most- to least-commonly-invoked categories of value across all seven elicitation opportunities (total number of mentions of value categories).
*denotes categories in which at least half of total responses were generated by conﬂict scenario; ** denotes categories in which at least half of
total responses were generated by old growth TAT; † denotes categories in which value was invoked in at least six or seven possible elicitation
conditions. (Source: From “In Search of Value Literacy: Suggestions for the Elicitation of Environmental Values,” by T. Satterﬁeld, ,
Environmental Values , p. . Copyright  by The White Horse Press, Cambridge, U.K. Reprinted with permission.)
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zone or imaginative cognitive environment, which in turn
encouraged expansive thinking about value. A second
plausible explanation noted above is that values are aﬃli-
ated with symbols. Natural phenomena, concretely imag-
ined through image (photographic) stimuli, suggest
(“symbolize”) diﬀerent meanings to diﬀerent people; val-
ues are stored in symbols to the extent that such symbols
sum up or resonate personally and socially important
qualities (Geertz , ). A third possibility is that while
some dimensions of value focus on material worth or
contributions to systemic health, other dimensions are
closely related to states or to what is sometimes called
experience—states of mind, bodily states, and other sen-
sory events. This distinction is akin to the distinction in
behavioral decision theory between decision utility (the
utility derived from assigned weights or dollar estimates at
the time of the decision) and experienced utility (deﬁned
by the quality and intensity of the hedonic experience
associated with the outcome of the decision) (Kahneman
and Snell , –). One might value a forest for its
timber, its board-feet productivity, but one might also
value a forest because, as many participants noted, a forest
provides the (quasi-spiritual) experience of “awe” or, as
other participants noted, oﬀers the chance for an intersen-
sory exchange (“the experience of hearing the sounds of
trees in the wind”) between the biophysical world and the
human ego or self. Narratives often focus on personal
experience and may, therefore, be particularly suited to
the elicitation of value states or experienced utility.
While the above research outcomes were descrip-
tively worthy, the hope was that the narrative elicitations
would provide a basis for developing better value-focused
questionnaire items—expressions that could be used in
survey contexts to improve researchers’ capacity to pre-
dict the relationship between the values held by a respon-
dent and the endorsement of a related action or policy
choice. But breaking the narrative elicitations down into
their value-component parts for the purpose of survey
work seemed to defeat the original purpose. That is, the
narrative wholes seemed greater than the sum of their
parts, and so using these individual value statements
(extracted from the elicited narratives) did not strengthen
the relationship between preferred actions and values
rated as very important in a survey. 
The response to this dilemma unfolded in two
stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the belief that the narrative whole
was greater than the sum of its value-component parts
was tested by comparing the impact of four forestry-
related value narratives (none longer than one page) and
four parallel sets of value statements on support for land-
management practices. The value positions articulated in
the narratives were exactly the same in number, order,
and principle as the value positions articulated by the sur-
vey-like statements. Only the style of delivery diﬀered—
that is, values as narratives versus values as statements.
The results were surprising: the impact of the forest-man-
agement narratives on the policy choices was very diﬀer-
ent from the impact of the statements, despite the sub-
stantially identical content. Support for the policy options
between the two conditions (narrative and statement)
diﬀered by as much as forty percentage points. The pat-
tern of impact was not always consistent, just vastly diﬀer-
ent. Thus, it was concluded that task participants listened
to and responded diﬀerently to (i.e., did something cogni-
tively diﬀerent with) narratives as compared to statements
(Satterﬁeld ).
Shanahan and colleagues conducted a similar
experiment (Shanahan, Pelstring, and McComas ).
They, too, developed surveys using “ordinary talk” or nar-
rative passages instead of conventional belief statements.
Speciﬁcally, they compared survey items drawn from Riley
Dunlap’s above-mentioned new environmental paradigm
() to respondents’ evaluations of story outcomes
(Dunlap and Van Liere ). Shanahan and colleagues
aﬃrmed an abiding respect for surveys, but they also
found that narratives are a “distinct communication
context that may provoke diﬀerent thoughts and feelings
than simple belief statements” and that “narrative mea-
sures can tap into diﬀerent constructs [as compared to]
typical attitude measurements” (Shanahan, Pelstring, and
McComas , , ).
In the second stage, it was recognized that the
above, open-ended elicitation results were limited by their
descriptive but not analytic outputs. As such, they do not
lend themselves easily to the statistical rigor and represen-
tativeness of surveys. Value literacy may refer to partici-
pant capacity to verbalize multiple dimensions of value,
but literacy should also include some understanding of
what verbal descriptions mean at the level of speciﬁc pol-
icy options and how widespread or representative those
policy judgments are. It was therefore surmised that when
surveys are necessary, value elicitors might instead use
“pathways” of questions (thematically linked sets of ques-
tions). Pathway work is rooted in the constructed prefer-
ence paradigm (described below) and can be used to cre-
ate something akin to a step-by-step narrative7 that more
closely follows the reasoning that connects values with
actions (Satterﬁeld and Gregory ).

Constructed Preferences and 
Pathway Surveys
Constructed preference approaches are born of the prob-
lems and criticisms cited above, which note that framing
eﬀects, trade-oﬀ diﬃculties, cognitive fogging, and deci-
sion complexity pose a challenge for analysts and valua-
tion researchers working in real-case contexts. The
researcher is caught between the need for informed
choice and the knowledge that relatively subtle cues can
inﬂuence judgments. These approaches have therefore
redeﬁned decision making and valuation practices as
actively constructive processes that must avoid unrealistic
cognitive demands by oﬀering the decision maker consci-
entious supplementary and contextual help in the teasing
out of good-quality judgment information. This is turn
helps move concerns about framing eﬀects from the pas-
sive stance of avoiding judgment errors to the active con-
struction of an improved and appropriately defensible
decision context (Gregory, Lichtenstein, and Slovic ;
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson ; Payne, Bettman, and
Schkade ; Slovic ).
In practice, constructed preferences can be
accomplished by the use of a decision pathway survey
(Gregory et al. ; Satterﬁeld and Gregory ). By way
of example, let’s return to the ﬁndings noted above,
where residents in disparate Ontario communities (from
the very urban to the very rural and timber dependent)
appeared to similarly endorse several key environmental
values and yet disagreed strongly about speciﬁc forest
management practices. Monitoring public opinions and
values by eliciting agreement or disagreement with sim-
ple statements may disembody values and thus mask the
situational richness and overall narrative train of thought
that takes a respondent from point A (a stated value or
objective) to point B (a considered management action).
Expressions of environmental values may be of merit in
and of themselves, but if values research is used to inform
policy, then the products of this research must be shown
to apply to speciﬁc applications or contexts. Pathway sur-
veys work to strengthen this link, conveying more clearly
the reasoning behind respondents’ decisions. 
Following the insights of constructed preference
theories, the pathway approach attempts to assist partici-
pants in completing the following three fundamental deci-
sion steps:
• Framing the decision, in terms of recognizing the
key contextual elements of the decision situation. In a for-
est policy context, the decision frame might involve speci-
fying exactly what is being proposed, whether the action is
novel or routine, whether it threatens wildlife habitat, and
whether it beneﬁts some communities and not others. 
• Deﬁning key objectives, which requires carefully
noting what concerns arise in the context of the decision. 
• Making trade-oﬀs among these objectives, which is
diﬃcult because it requires an explicit recognition of the
conﬂict across desired objectives, as well as knowledge of
the facts of the situation. Thinking about trade-oﬀs is
complicated by the nature of the objectives in conﬂict. As
noted above, some values hold special meaning and thus
are resistant to trade-oﬀs. Or it might be easy to measure
the eﬀects of some value priorities (e.g., the number of
jobs provided) but not of others—say, the importance of a
less-discrete eﬀect, such as loss of aesthetic or cultural
value through the physical disruption of a site. 
In such pathway surveys, all participants are
asked an initial question to establish broad distinctions or
paths of opinion (e.g., “Do you prefer ‘a’ or ‘b’?”). They
are then asked a set of questions meant to tease out the
reasons behind their initial response, including an exami-
nation of the objectives behind their preference (“Is that
because you want ‘x,’ ‘y,’ or ‘z’?”) and any concerns (risks)
that may explain their reasoning (“In thinking about ‘a,’
do you worry about ___ or ____?”).
The following decision pathway questionnaire
began by presenting a scenario detailing plans to log a
remote tract of land containing sixty- to eighty-year-old
trees and thereafter to replant that land with a mixed com-
bination of tree species. All respondents were initially
asked about the desirability of “controlling nature” by
managing competing vegetation among newly planted
trees. Each response was followed by a series of related
questions about respondents’ reasoning processes; these
questions varied according to the person’s previous
responses, thus forming a decision pathway. This
approach allows the researcher to challenge basic value
judgments about controlling nature with more complex
questions about forest management and about why con-
trolling for unwanted vegetation is seen as undesirable or
not. It determined what kind of vegetation management
is acceptable and under what circumstances, and it asked
about the risks thought to accompany certain manage-
ment practices (e.g., the spraying of herbicides). More-
over, these constellations of linked questions helped
unpack generally stated principles about controlling
nature and the appeal of related actions, such that infor-
mation about trust, risks, and rationalizations associated
with diﬀerent management alternatives was revealed.


Thirteen potential decision pathways were available to
survey respondents. Figure  illustrates this; ﬁve paths
(path numbers , , , , and ) attracted most respon-
dents, while others attracted only a few participants, or
none at all.8
Ultimately, pathway studies take standard survey
methods to a nuanced (i.e., less abstract) level by helping
respondents think through conﬂicts or vagueness in 
their answers and stated value positions. The step is an
important one because, as found above, participants who
uniformly support a biocentric vision of nature cannot be
assumed to demonstrate a similarly uniform endorsement
of management directives. Simple, even radical, expres-
sions of environmental values may have so permeated 
our collective imagination that it is easy to invoke their
theoretical importance when asked for agreement with 
a survey item. But when such invocations fail to predict
related actions, it becomes essential to move beyond the
idea that the richness of environmental values can be
understood through responses to discrete “sound-bite”
sentences in a survey.
Figure  Decision-pathways map—selected pathways. Questions  and  (marked by *) were each asked twice, on two different pathways. (Source: 
From Vegetation Management in Ontario’s Forests: Survey Research of Public and Professional Perspectives, by S. Johnson, T. Satterfield, J. Flynn,
R. Gregory, C. K. Mertz, P. Slovic, and R. Wagner [Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, Canada: Ministry of Natural Resources, ], p. . Copy-
right  by Queen’s Printer for Ontario. Reprinted with permission.)
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Narrative Valuation as a 
Constructed Preference
The decision pathway approach oﬀers a defensible
approach for addressing the problems of framing eﬀects
and of the weak link between values and actions, as well
as the cognitive diﬃculties posed by complex decisions. 
Its narrative-like, step-by-step method is also promising.
However, the full beneﬁt of narrative expressions is not
necessarily embodied in this approach, because the
emphasis in pathway studies still rests heavily on “ratio-
nalizing” one’s thinking by systematically breaking deci-
sion problems down into their component parts and sub-
jecting those parts to examination. 
Given this, it is worth comparing the beneﬁts of
presenting a decision problem using a “just-the-facts”
rationalizing style typical of some constructed preference
exercises as well as of many cost-beneﬁt studies, to the
beneﬁts of using a narrative style characterized by the
experiential language of storytelling, including the
retelling of a believable sequence of events by use of ﬁrst-
person narration and image-based description. 
Reference to the narrative literature points to the
hypothesis that narrative decision frames would better
serve the need to clarify background information, incul-
cate expansiveness of thought, and engage participants via
use of a meaningful and relevant language. Embedding
multiple types of value (from the ethical to the technical)
within a narrative may be optimal because narratives are
said to trigger dual modes of cognitive processing (a ratio-
nalistic mode and a narrative-experiential mode). Theo-
ries of dual modes of processing can be traced to Aristo-
tle’s Nichomachean Ethics and are best expressed contem-
porarily by the work of Bruner and Epstein (Bruner ;
Epstein ). Both have proposed that human cognition
relies upon two modes of thought: “a paradigmatic or
logico-scientiﬁc” mode and “a narrative mode that deals
instead with good and believable stories.” More impor-
tant, “eﬀorts to reduce one mode to the other or to ignore
one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture
the rich diversity of thought” (Bruner , –). 
Narrative valuation tools also seem compatible
with constructive methods because narratives, by deﬁni-
tion, are largely built around plots or event structures that
can be analogously used in valuation contexts to outline
the attributes of a problem (Rimmon-Kenan ). The
attributes of a problem can be clearly stated as features of
the plot but are also memorable due to their linkages to
one another; the plot structure provides an overall cogni-
tive map of the problem (Kearney ). Further, when
judgment problems are complex and ethically challeng-
ing, study participants have also been shown to impose
their own narratives to help manage decisions. For exam-
ple, Pennington and Hastie discovered that jurors con-
structed narrative-like summations of trial evidence, sum-
mations that equipped participants to process their judg-
ments of guilt or innocence (Pennington and Hastie ).
Ease of processing might also enhance knowledge inte-
gration, which is akin in valuation contexts to the bring-
ing together of multiple dimensions of value in order to
generate a summary judgment. A coherent and interest-
ing story may increase comprehension of the text’s main
ideas, allowing participants to answer complex questions
about content and apply the information to new situa-
tions (Kearney , ). This ability is fundamental to
value analysts’ concern for respondents’ capacity to work
with the value attributes of a problem and link those
attributes to a judgment about policy. Finally, a possible
reason for the eﬃcacy of narratives in valuation contexts
is their ability to facilitate task engagement by opera-
tionalizing a language that is consistent with lay talk of
values. Engagement of participants can be achieved by
employing emotion to add meaning to otherwise abstract
information and by concretizing information through the
use of imagery and anecdote (Finucane et al. ; Kida
and Smith ). Oatley similarly ﬁnds that it is through
eﬀectively engaging devices that we enter into the world
of the narrative (Oatley ). By seeing the problem from
the narrator’s point of view, we take the problem on as
our own and endeavor to solve it from a less-distanced
perspective than might be typical of cost-beneﬁt or survey
practices.
A study of the values underpinning decisions
about reducing the productivity of hydroelectric dams to
enhance salmon runs was designed to test these specula-
tions. Two decision problems were developed; one
employed a rationalist style, the other a narrative style.
Both versions contained parallel information about two
quantitative value dimensions (about changing salmon
populations and changes in the cost of hydroelectric
power) and two moral value positions (about the meaning
of salmon to the community and about the spiritual
importance of the dam and the river to the community).
Sample texts from the two conditions were as
follows: The rationalist text opened with an introduction
of the problem, which was quickly followed by a refer-
ence to the geographical setting and case: “A large number
of hydroelectric dams have been built in the Paciﬁc North-

west over the past seventy years to generate electricity. . . .
The Monroe River is representative of many river systems
that produce power and salmon.” This text later includes
the following: “Key policy decisions involve concerns 
such as the timing of power production (e.g., letting more
water through dams on a regular basis would decrease the
amount of power produced but also increase spawning
habitat and food availability for young salmon). . . . 
The expectation is that increased water ﬂow will raise the
number of returning salmon on the river by at least
twofold (, salmon instead of the current ,) and
possibly as high as tenfold (or approximately ,
salmon).”
The narrative text opened with the introduction
of the narrator and an evocation of place: “There is a lot
of talk around here lately about salmon habitat and hydro-
electric dams. I am reminded of this as I drive along the
road that borders the Paciﬁc Northwest’s Monroe River.”
The text later includes the following: “My neighbor, an
engineer, has taught me a thing or two about how dams
and their hydroelectric technology can be managed in
ways that kill fewer young salmon. She says that increas-
ing water ﬂow around the dams would help. Right now
only about , salmon are making it back per year, but 
if more water is released through the dam, salmon habitat
and food availability will improve, and more young
salmon can survive the passage to the ocean and return
years later to spawn. My neighbor also thinks that an
increase in water ﬂow could increase the salmon popula-
tion by at least twofold (about , ﬁsh a year compared
to the current ,) and by as much as tenfold, or about
, returning salmon a year.”
The results of this test were compelling: After
reading the background text (narrative or rationalist),
respondents were asked to evaluate eight policies based
on diﬀerent high/low manipulations of the four value
dimensions. The eight polices represented a  fractional
replication, which made the value dimensions uncorre-
lated across the eight policies.
Multiple regression analysis allowed us to isolate
the values that actually inﬂuenced or drove the decision
(versus relying on participants’ self-reports about which
values mattered). It turned out that participants in the nar-
rative condition were highly sensitized to high/low
manipulations of value attributes in the policy options.
Beta weights for the narrative condition indicate that two
dimensions (the cost of hydroelectric power, and salmon
population) signiﬁcantly predicted policy support. A third
dimension (spirituality) also had some inﬂuence. Con-
versely, in the rationalist condition, respondents were
insensitive to changes in value-attribute levels. Support
ratings were random, in that there was little or no rela-
tionship between the four value dimensions and policy
support ratings, save for some nonsigniﬁcant inﬂuence
from cost (Satterﬁeld, Slovic, and Gregory ).
In sum, in this initial test of the eﬃcacy of narra-
tives for valuation tasks, narrative valuation frames appear
to improve respondents’ ability to read about a subject,
consider a range of values as diverse as cost and spiritual-
ity, and then link that content to a speciﬁc policy choice.
This may strike many as a controversial conclusion. The
very notion that narratives have something to contribute
to valuation eﬀorts may strike many as anathema to
eﬀorts that “impose” a rationalist style so as to disabuse
lay stakeholders of errors in their thinking. And yet valua-
tion research has been hampered for some time now by
public and expert dissatisfaction with tools that are exclu-
sionary and ill equipped to accommodate the many
diverse expressions of value (from the economic to the
deeply ecological). It may be that doing something as sim-
ple as valorizing value expressions in judgment contexts
by putting that information into the mouths of narrators,
by understanding the impact of diﬀerent aﬀective tones,
by being clear about the appropriate use of narration and
quantiﬁcation, or by animating tasks such that decision
contexts are concrete and easily imagined by participants,
changes entirely participants’ ability to evaluate and judge
a technically and ethically complex problem.
Valuation Processes and Group
Deliberation
One ﬁnal development in the ﬁeld of environmental valu-
ation is the emergence of group-based deliberation. Con-
structive (and narrative) processes assume that better deci-
sions will be made as researchers are able to isolate the
conditions under which people think clearly and imagina-
tively about their values, and do so from an informed,
decision-focused context. One can think of this shift as a
move toward ever-greater deliberation and forethought at
the level of cognition and decision making. But delibera-
tion is a multifaceted term, and increasingly (for students
of environmental values), it has come to mean not just
cognitive competency but also deliberative governance or
democracy. Deliberative democracy, it is argued, should
be achieved not via the “totality of the preference of indi-
vidual members” (i.e., the aggregation of their prefer-
ences elicited through increasingly reﬁned methods) but

through processes of civic engagement wherein people
come together to learn, deliberate, and debate the means
for achieving a common good. Representative voting is
central to the ﬁrst, or aggregate preference, concept of
democracy; it comes closest to the economists’ assump-
tion that democracy equals the sum of individual choice
or welfare (the “I want ___ and am willing to pay for it”
equation). In contrast, the second, “civic engagement”
concept comes closest to civic republicanism (among
other traditions), wherein the citizens’ ability to reﬁne
their judgments in dialogue with one another is central.
“Citizens engage in deliberation not so that each can
determine or reﬁne his or her own interests, but so that
together they can discover a good that is not simply a
function of their individual” preferences (Sagoﬀ , ). 
Venues for citizen participation in policy deci-
sions have long been popular—from focus groups to citi-
zen advisory boards to citizen juries—but little of this
work has been formally structured around the identiﬁca-
tion and/or assignation of value. Of late, however, and in
deference to these civic traditions, the context for value
elicitation is moving from that of the individual to that of
the group. Some practitioners have sought a halfway point
such that valuation exercises are conducted in groups
where extensive debate and deliberation are encouraged.
Participants have to face and consult one another in the
examination of a decision problem. But conclusions still
rest on data collected from participants using a voting, or
individual preference, model. The construction of prefer-
ences in small group contexts has also been used; in this
process, an amalgam of one aspect of deliberative democ-
racy (group dialogue) and several aspects of improved
cognition or learning via decompositional analysis is
achieved (e.g., Gregory ). 
Others are more inﬂuenced by Habermas’s phi-
losophy of communicative ethics, which addressed con-
ceptions of competent and legitimate communication
and the conditions under which latent manipulation
occurs (Habermas ). Latent can mean subtle, uncon-
scious, or unintentional actions that encourage one way
of thinking about a problem (e.g., via the unexamined
assumption that an economic frame is neutral or ethically
inclusive) or by the practice of token participation, where
citizens are encouraged to present their views only to
learn that the decision had already been made. Several
recent volumes evaluate actual participation processes
(many of which are decision- but not value-focused)
according to the Habermasian principles of “fairness”
(which focuses on ideal speech conditions) and “compe-
tence” (the quality of public understandings and agree-
ments under the knowledge conditions provided) (Renn,
Webler, and Wiedemann ). Practitioners of the
Habermasian school have not historically conversed with
descendants of the attitudinal-psychology and judgment
and decision making practitioners reviewed above. But
one can see that “fairness” follows closely the concerns
with language noted above in this section, especially
latently coercive language, and that competence has
something in common with valuation scholars’ eﬀorts to
simplify, cognitively speaking, complex decisions. 
The citizen-jury model of public participation is
especially promising with regard to the identiﬁcation of
value; it is more structured or systematized than most
other practices (e.g., advisory boards) and thus fulﬁlls
some of the features of constructed processes (Armour
; Crosby ). A jury provides a venue in which citi-
zens might ideally observe or learn about value from lay
and expert bodies (economists, ethicists, social scientists,
and biologists, as well as community activists articulating
multiple normative positions). The jury might, with con-
sultation, identify the desired expert witnesses them-
selves. They might also select the questions posed to the
“value” witnesses, given the decision problem at hand.
After several days of hearings, the jury would be charged
to reach and defend a decision based on the values
selected as most relevant to the decision context/prob-
lem. As in a court of law, this deliberative process would
take into account parameters established by relevant legal
frameworks (e.g., the Endangered Species Act or the
National Environmental Policy Act) and regulatory stan-
dards (e.g., clean air or water standards). In a heritage val-
uation context, the witnesses might be multiple stake-
holders (from art conservators to local stakeholders
invested in the fate of a particular heritage site or public
monument); whereas the regulatory parameters could be
established by professional bodies not unlike the Ameri-
can Institute for the Conservation of Historic or Artistic
Works or by professional codes for practice and ethics. 
Conclusion
Sorting one’s way through the environmental values liter-
ature is a nearly impossible task. Articles in the published
literature that include “environmental values” as key-
words number in the thousands. Nonetheless, a few domi-
nant trends are discernible. First, economic and especially
preference-centric/ deﬁnitions of environmental val-

ues dominate the ﬁeld. Though  methods are not the
express focus of this paper, it is virtually impossible to dis-
cuss or understand the environmental values literature
without some reference to , because almost all other
work is deﬁned as against (or capable of improving upon)
this dominant method. 
Second, much of the literature can be distin-
guished as either axiomatic (primarily by ethicists or ecol-
ogists) or relativistic (primarily by economists, psycholo-
gists, sociologists, and anthropologists). Axiomatic practi-
tioners do not necessarily identify themselves as such, but
their work is ultimately oriented to “right” or “best” prac-
tices, however deﬁned. Rolston’s work on “natural value”
parallels most closely debates in heritage conservation
about the primacy of aesthetic value (versus, say, histori-
cal or deliberate commemorative value) (Rolston ).
But neither Rolston nor any of his contemporaries has
oﬀered an explicit schema for enhancing one’s experience
or enhancing appreciation of the natural, economic, 
or spiritual qualities of nature. There is no equivalent 
in the environmental values ﬁeld of Kenneth Clark’s
guidelines for appreciation. This lack is due both to the
newness of the ﬁeld and to the timidity produced by the
predominance of relativistic approaches to environmental
valuation. 
This brings me to my third point: Generally
speaking, relativistic approaches dominate, but the extent
to which practices can be fully defended as “unbiased” is
compromised at best. That is, the undeniable focus on
human attitudes and preferences—what people want or
believe—is compromised by the fact that environmental
values (particularly in the form of dollar metrics) are not
clearly deﬁned in the minds of respondents and as such
are vulnerable to manipulation. Information processing
errors and/or cognitive errors produced by the use of
heuristics to simplify complex or unfamiliar questions are
notably common. Valuation practitioners are thus sus-
pended between the desire to be objective and the need to
(a) provide information necessary for a more informed
examination of value, and (b) ensure that the task is cogni-
tively doable. 
Fourth, this conundrum has inspired an ongoing
period of innovation. Many now acknowledge that if
the method of elicitation aﬀects outcome, it is better to
proceed with a framework that clearly exposes the
researcher’s methodological rationale and, equally, ren-
ders visible the context and thinking (on the respondents’
part) that lead to the value elicited. Constructed prefer-
ences and narrative valuation practices are generally
aimed at this goal. Valuation problems are simpliﬁed or
broken down into their component parts such that partici-
pants can examine the multifaceted nature of their deci-
sion. When this is done, value elicitation processes
become decision-focused exercises wherein the link
between a value held, a value assigned, and the support or
basis for a ﬁnal decision or policy is clariﬁed.
Fifth, the rebellion against cost-centric
approaches is, in part, a rebellion against the overly ratio-
nalist language of  and cost-beneﬁt analysis generally.
The concern is that such discursive frames silence or ren-
der invisible expressions of moral conviction, enchant-
ment, awe, or the kind of spiritual reverie that underpins
the many reasons we value nature. Group deliberation
processes may come to address this problem. This is true
in part because the Habermasian tradition of communica-
tive ethics is attentive not to good cognition per se but to
the democratic use of language in participatory venues. 
Ultimately, all valuation exercises must clarify and
defend whether they mean to be axiomatic or relativistic,
whether they mean to valorize those qualities that are
underrepresented or silenced, whether they mean to iden-
tify categories of value meaningful to either expert or lay
populations (versus elicit decisions that are value based),
and whether they mean to think of valuation eﬀorts as the
summation of individual preferences or the product of
group-based deliberation. 
Notes
. A cautionary note: like any broad-stroke distinction,
discussion of these two positions—the axiomatic and the
relativistic—is meant to facilitate the reader’s grasp of a rich
and varied literature; the border between the two
approaches is less clear than my portrait implies.
. The distinction between diﬀerent ethics is not always clearly
deﬁned; Leopold’s ethic might be subsumed, for instance, by
a natural ethic, in that maintaining a natural state may in
some cases serve the maintenance of a system’s parts.
. For a review of multiple ethics and their implications for
defending value, see especially Armstrong and Botzler 
and Rolston .
. Much recent work on contingent valuation has abandoned
 methods in favor of choice processes and the costing of
observable (or revealed) behavior, such as the travel costs
one invests to get to a wilderness area, national park, recre-
ation facility, and so on. 
. Merchant () similarly delineated identiﬁed egocentric,
sociocentric, and biocentric value systems. 


. Many of these studies stem from the work of Tversky and
Kahneman () and of Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky
(). 
. I follow, here, Cohan and Shires’s claim of “a linear
organization of events” as a deﬁning feature of a narrative
(Cohan and Shires , –, quoted in Franzosi ). 
In the subsequent section, I elaborate further on what 
I mean by narrative.
. Because there could be as many pathways as there are
respondents, the survey designer seeks to characterize in
detail only those pathways that depict major opinion
streams held by respondents.
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Cultural Capital and Sustainability Concepts 
in the Economics of Cultural Heritage
By David Throsby
Introduction
Traditionally, the work of conservationists in the ﬁeld of
tangible cultural heritage1 has covered a range of tasks,
including identiﬁcation, classiﬁcation, certiﬁcation, inter-
pretation, protection, maintenance, and restoration. The
decisions that they make concerning, for example, what
counts as heritage or which items should be accorded
privileged status (e.g., as listed buildings) have been based
on their professional and technical expertise. Economists
have recently begun to ask questions about the economic
ramiﬁcations of such decisions. For example, Françoise
Benhamou has pointed to the resource implications of
the unconstrained enthusiasm for listing historic buildings
in France (Benhamou ). Sir Alan Peacock has sug-
gested that conservationists’ control of the heritage pol-
icy agenda may be out of step with the preferences of the
community whose taxes are ﬁnancing the recommended
policy measures (Peacock ).
At the same time, when economists themselves
become involved in heritage matters, they have been
accused by conservationists of adopting a narrow econo-
mizing attitude to heritage decisions, turning attention
away from the essential cultural values of heritage toward
a more market-driven approach. For example, Daniel
Bluestone points out that programs for restoring and
redeveloping historic sites are often driven more by an
imperative to create incomes, employment, tourist
revenues, and so on than by a desire to enhance intrinsic
cultural worth; he argues that looking to ﬁnancial out-
comes to justify expenditure on such programs may
compromise the very heritage values upon which the pro-
grams are based (GCI , –). Although an econo-
mist’s approach to heritage is in fact more sophisticated
than one simply focusing on ﬁnancial revenues and costs,
the criticism does have validity in highlighting the prob-
lems raised by the economic necessity of reducing all 
values to material terms.
The “Economics and Heritage Conservation”
meeting organized by the Getty Conservation Institute 
in December  showed that questions of value do
indeed underlie these diﬀering standpoints (GCI ). 
In broad terms, the meeting concluded that if it is possible
to identify both the economic and the cultural values 
generated by, say, a particular heritage item, then it may
be possible to reconcile the two positions. More particu-
larly, the meeting discussion suggested that the concepts
of cultural capital and sustainability could be used to 
link an economic approach to heritage with the essential
cultural purposes that the conservation profession strives
to pursue.
How might such a link be forged? Later in this
paper, more detailed deﬁnitions and analyses will be
given, but for these introductory purposes, the connec-
tion could be spelled out intuitively, as follows. We could
characterize conservationists as interpreting heritage
items as stores of cultural value—that is, as things that
have been inherited from the past which are valuable in
themselves and which yield value to those who enjoy
them in one way or another, both now and in the future.2
Economists in turn can readily comprehend that artifacts,
artworks, buildings, sites, and so on have the characteris-
tics of capital assets and that the depreciation, mainte-
nance, restoration, and so on of such assets can be ana-
lyzed as economic processes.3 Given that heritage as
capital has some characteristics (such as the production 
of cultural value) that are diﬀerent from those of other
sorts of capital, it seems that a notion of “cultural capital”
to describe heritage might be able to integrate its principal
economic and cultural characteristics.
Moreover, both conservationists and economists
are concerned with the long-term nature of decisions
relating to signiﬁcant capital items, invoking the notion 
of “sustainability.”4 This concept has speciﬁc connotations
in an environmental context that relate especially to the
preservation of natural assets for future generations; so,
for example, the harvesting of ﬁsh stock is “sustainable” 
if the catch is controlled so that the total population of
ﬁsh is maintained into the future. In more general usage, 

a sustainable solution to a problem is one that is not a
quick ﬁx but is likely to provide a more permanent or last-
ing remedy. The antithesis of sustainability—namely,
“unsustainability”—is also widely recognized. For exam-
ple, a country’s rapid rate of economic growth in the
short term might be described as unsustainable if it is not
based on fundamental strength and is not likely therefore
to be maintained over a longer period. It is thus not diﬃ-
cult to see that since the very same principles of long-
term decision making, concern for future generations,
and so on are important for the disciplines of both conser-
vation and economics in their respective analyses of cul-
tural heritage, the idea of sustainability could well pro-
vide a link between the economist’s and the conservation-
ist’s approach to the problem.
The task of this paper, then, is to sharpen the
analytical articulation of these two concepts—cultural
capital and sustainability—in their application to the eco-
nomics of cultural heritage, and to consider ways of mak-
ing them operational so that they can be applied to real-
world phenomena. The latter requirement means con-
fronting problems of empirical measurement—i.e., how
can we assess the economic and cultural value of heritage
and of the services that heritage produces, and how can
those values be incorporated into an empirical analysis of
decisions relating to cultural heritage, such that sustain-
ability principles are eﬀectively served?
The layout of this paper is as follows: In the fol-
lowing section, under the heading “Cultural Capital,” the
concept of cultural capital is analyzed in detail, beginning
with deﬁnitional questions and then considering the place
of this concept in an economic and a cultural discourse.
In this discussion we look particularly at whether any par-
allels may be drawn between our formulation of cultural
capital and concepts of natural capital used in ecological
economics. Then in the next section, “Sustainability,” we
discuss the deﬁnition and elaboration of sustainability in a
heritage context, drawing again, where appropriate, on
corresponding ideas in relation to environmental preser-
vation and enhancement. We suggest that the most useful
way to articulate the sustainability concept here is as a set
of principles or criteria against which particular cases may
be judged. Finally, in the section called “Application,” we
look at prospects for ongoing work. The question of
measurement is the most obvious one to be considered,
with reference to methodologies for assessing both eco-
nomic and cultural value. The sorts of criteria that might
be used to select case studies for application of these vari-
ous ideas are discussed.
Cultural Capital
Definitional Issues
The concept of capital in economics is almost as old as
the discipline itself. In formal terms, capital can be deﬁned
as a stock of goods that gives rise to further goods and
services over time. The principal form of capital identiﬁed
in economics is physical capital, meaning plant, machinery,
buildings, equipment, and so on, all of which provide a
ﬂow of services yielding other commodities that may be
consumed or may themselves be capital items leading to
still further commodities. Thus, for example, an automo-
bile plant is a capital item yielding a ﬂow of services that,
when combined with other inputs such as labor, will pro-
duce further goods, namely cars. In this case the cars are
themselves capital assets to the individuals who purchase
them, because they, in turn, are combined with other
inputs (gasoline, labor) to yield services of transport that
enter the individuals’ ﬁnal consumption.
In economics the concept of capital invokes the
notion of investment, which is the process of adding to
the capital stock. At the beginning of any time period,
individuals, ﬁrms, or the economy as a whole are assumed
to possess an endowment of capital goods, which may
depreciate or deteriorate through wear and tear and
which may be replaced or augmented by new investment
during the time period under consideration.
Economists also identify two further forms 
of capital: human and natural capital. Human capital
represents the accumulated education and experience
embodied in people which enables them to be more pro-
ductive. Investment in this form of capital implies educa-
tion through on-the-job training, learning by doing, and
so on, all of which yield future rewards in the form of
improved productivity and higher earnings for the indi-
vidual and for society. Natural capital refers to the stock 
of natural resources, such as air, land, water, and the life-
supporting ecosystems that govern their operation. 
We shall be returning to the concept of natural capital
later in this paper.
In considering the phenomenon of capital in eco-
nomics, we must be clear about the distinction between
stocks and ﬂows.5 The stock of capital, as its name sug-
gests, refers to the quantity of capital in existence at a
given time, measurable as the number or value of capital
items in a given situation. This capital stock gives rise over
time to a ﬂow of services that, as noted above, may enter
ﬁnal consumption immediately or be combined with
other inputs to yield further goods and services. Take the
historic town center of Dublin, for example, a precinct
that has been redeveloped as a cultural and commercial
center that preserves the architectural features of the orig-
inal buildings. The collection of buildings and the rela-
tionships among them make up the capital stock, and the
ﬂow of services they provide can be seen in the continu-
ing beneﬁts enjoyed by those who visit the precinct or use
it during their everyday lives. In any analysis of capital in
economics, it is essential to identify whether the capital
concept being used refers to a stock or a ﬂow variable.
It should not be diﬃcult to accept that tangible
cultural heritage of the sort described above can be con-
sidered a form of capital. Heritage items such as a paint-
ing by Rembrandt or a historic building can be seen as
assets: both required investment of physical and human
resources in their original manufacture and construction;
both will deteriorate over time unless resources are
devoted to their maintenance and upkeep; and both give
rise to a ﬂow of services over time that may enter the ﬁnal
consumption of individuals directly (e.g., when people
view the painting in a museum or visit the historic build-
ing) or that may contribute to the production of further
goods and services (e.g., when the painting inspires the
creation of new artworks or when the historic building
is used as a commercial oﬃce space). In other words,
heritage items can be interpreted as capital assets with 
the standard characteristics of ordinary physical capital
in economics.
Is it suﬃcient simply to classify tangible heritage
as physical capital, or is there something else about her-
itage items that distinguishes them from other items of
physical capital? Recently, suggestions have been made
that heritage items are members of a class of capital that
is indeed distinct from other forms of capital; this class has
been called cultural capital.6 The distinction lies in the type
of value that is embodied in these assets and is yielded by
the goods and services they produce. A historic building
such as Notre Dame Cathedral or the Taj Mahal is not just
any building: certainly it has the characteristics of an
“ordinary” building as an item of physical capital, but in
addition, it has historical and other attributes that an
“ordinary” building does not have. These attributes can be
described as the building’s cultural value, and the same
type of cultural value can be attributed to the ﬂow of
services it provides. This notion of the cultural value of
certain goods and services such as heritage can be set
alongside the more familiar concept of their economic
value. Later in this paper, we shall be more explicit about
what comprises both economic and cultural value; for
now it is suﬃcient to assume that cultural value can be
measured according to a unit of account that plays a role
comparable to that of a monetary scale in measuring eco-
nomic value. It is also assumed that an item’s cultural
value is separate from, though not unrelated to, its eco-
nomic value.
Accepting these interpretations, then, we can
provide a formal deﬁnition of cultural capital as an asset
that embodies a store of cultural value, separable from
whatever economic value it might possess; the asset gives
rise to a ﬂow of goods and services over time which may
also have cultural value (i.e., which are themselves cul-
tural goods and services). The stock of tangible cultural
capital thus deﬁned comprises cultural heritage as speci-
ﬁed above. Intangible cultural capital exists in ideas, tradi-
tions, beliefs, and customs shared by a group of people,
and it also includes intellectual capital, which exists as lan-
guage, literature, music, and so on. In this paper, as noted
above, we restrict attention to tangible cultural capital.
Questions of Value
Bearing in mind that the value of an item of cultural
capital may relate to its asset value as a stock of capital or
to the value of the ﬂow of services to which it gives rise,
let us turn attention to the types of economic value attrib-
utable to heritage assets. We can distinguish between use
and nonuse values. Use value refers to the direct valuation
of the asset’s services by those who consume those ser-
vices—the entry fees paid by visitors to historic sites, for
example. Nonuse value refers to the value placed upon a
range of nonrival and nonexcludable public-good charac-
teristics7 typically possessed by cultural heritage. In brief,
these nonuse values may relate to the asset’s existence
value (people value the existence of the heritage item
even though they themselves may not consume its ser-
vices directly); its option value (people wish to preserve 
the option that they or others might consume the asset’s
services at some future time); and its bequest value (people
may wish to bequeath the asset to future generations).
These nonuse values are not observable in market trans-
actions, since no market exists on which the rights to
them can be exchanged, although their magnitude can
nevertheless be evaluated, for example, by asking people
how much they are willing to pay to ensure that these
beneﬁts will continue to be available to them. Because
these values arise outside of market processes, they can be

referred to as examples of nonmarket values.
Taken together, the use and nonuse values
deﬁned above make up what we refer to as the economic
value of a heritage asset or of the goods and services to
which it gives rise, i.e., the value of these items as assessed
by an economic analysis. It is important to note that eco-
nomic value in this sense diﬀers from ﬁnancial value (“the
bottom line”) since the latter does not include nonmarket
eﬀects. Nevertheless, both are expressed in the same
terms, i.e., in monetary units.
The diﬀerent types of economic values identiﬁed
above can be illustrated with reference to Venice. A range
of direct economic impacts can be attributed to this his-
toric city, including the contribution of its cultural capital
stock to the net value of the output of goods and services
produced by the city’s economy. A signiﬁcant proportion
of these direct use values is generated by tourism, which
provides the tangible revenue base upon which the local
economy is sustained. In addition, Venice gives rise to all
three of the nonmarket beneﬁts noted above: people all
over the world care deeply about the continued existence
of Venice, even if they have never been there; many
would be willing to pay something simply to preserve 
the option of visiting it at some time; and the city is surely
regarded as part of Italy’s and the world’s cultural patri-
mony, which must be passed on intact to future genera-
tions. All of these use and nonuse values can be identiﬁed
for Venice as a whole and, at a more speciﬁc level, for
individual components of Venice, such as particular build-
ings or (collections of ) artworks contained within its
boundaries.
So much for the economic value of cultural capi-
tal. By deﬁnition, an item of cultural capital also embodies
cultural value, and any valuation of the item as a stock of
capital would, in principle, account for this value sepa-
rately from its economic worth. Similarly, the cultural
value of the ﬂow of services it produces could, again in
principle, be identiﬁed. What are the dimensions of the
cultural value that might be embodied in or produced by
an item of cultural heritage? Whether the approach to
assessing cultural value is absolutist (Etlin ) or rela-
tivist (Connor ), certain elements might be identiﬁed
as contributing to the aggregate cultural value of the
item, including
• aesthetic value: beauty, harmony
• spiritual value: understanding, enlightenment,
insight
• social value: connection with others, a sense of
identity
• historical value: connection with the past
• symbolic value: objects as repositories or conveyors
of meaning
To illustrate, the cultural value of Uluru (Ayer’s Rock) in
Central Australia to both indigenous and nonindigenous
people can be seen to comprise all ﬁve of these character-
istics: it is a beautiful and spiritual place, providing a sense
of identity to both the traditional owners and to other
Australians and providing strong historical links and deep
symbolic value within Aboriginal culture.
If the economic and cultural value of cultural
capital can be separated, what is the relationship, if any,
between them? Consider ﬁrst the asset value of an item 
of tangible heritage such as a building of historical signiﬁ-
cance. The asset may have economic value that derives
simply from its physical existence as a building without
regard to its cultural worth. But the economic value of
the asset is likely to be augmented, perhaps signiﬁcantly
so, because of its cultural value. Thus we can see a causal
connection: cultural value may be a signiﬁcant determi-
nant of economic value. So, for example, individuals may
reveal their willingness to pay for the embodied cultural
content of this asset by oﬀering a price higher than that
which they would oﬀer for the physical entity alone. 
In other words, a heritage building may embody “pure”
cultural value, according to the assumed scale proposed
earlier, and also have an economic value as an asset
derived from both its physical and its cultural content.
Other forms of tangible cultural capital may be construed
similarly, although the signiﬁcance of the elements may
diﬀer. Artworks such as paintings, for example, may
derive much of their economic value from their cultural
content, since their purely physical worth is likely to be
negligible (a piece of canvas, some bits of wood).
Likewise, the economic and cultural value of the
ﬂow of services produced by the cultural asset would
likely be closely related. In the case of the historic build-
ing, for example, its use value, measured as the entrance
fees paid by visitors, would be expected to be greater the
higher the cultural value people place on the experience
of visiting it (other things being equal). Its nonuse values
would be similarly related to the building’s perceived cul-
tural worth. Thus the overall economic value of the ﬂow
of services provided by the asset would be expected in
general to be closely correlated with its cultural valuation,
even though those economic and cultural values can be
separately deﬁned.8

Nevertheless, despite the likelihood of correla-
tion between economic and cultural value when assessed
for some particular heritage item, there is no reason to
suppose the correlation will be perfect. Indeed, instances
can be readily imagined where high cultural worth is asso-
ciated with a low economic valuation, and vice versa.9
Asset Management
Bearing in mind that “value” when applied to cultural cap-
ital embraces both economic and cultural connotations,
we can ask how far we can go in applying conventional
asset management techniques and investment theory to
the assessment of cultural heritage. To do so requires
some further terminology and concepts.
Consider ﬁrst the notion of investment. A capital
asset is created by investment; the capital cost of the asset
includes the costs of all the resources used up in its manu-
facture. An asset already in existence has a value that
depends on a variety of factors, including its age, its condi-
tion, its original cost, and so on. Accountants have various
ways of assessing the value of already existing assets that
need not concern us here.10
Next consider an asset’s earnings. An asset yields
a time stream of beneﬁts and costs into the future: the
beneﬁts are represented by the value of the services the
asset provides, the costs by the value of resources used up
in producing those services, including the costs of main-
taining the asset itself. The ﬂow of net beneﬁts into the
future can be represented as a rate of return to the initial
capital cost or to the current asset value of the capital item
by expressing the (annual) net beneﬁts as a percentage of
the capital value. But it has to be remembered that a dollar
in a year’s time is not the same thing as a dollar now. This
is so for two reasons. First, people prefer present over
future consumption and so would rather have a dollar
now than to have to wait a year for it; in other words, peo-
ple would need more than a dollar in one year’s time to
make it an amount equivalent to a dollar today. Second, if
a dollar now is invested at the going rate of interest, it will
have grown to more than a dollar one year from now;
hence again, future monetary amounts are equivalent to
something less when expressed in terms of their present
value. Therefore, in any investment appraisal, future
beneﬁts and costs have to be discounted to bring them to
equivalent terms at time zero (the present). The discount
rate is the rate at which this discounting occurs. Econo-
mists distinguish two diﬀerent concepts of the discount
rate, which correspond to the two reasons for the diﬀer-
ence between present and future value. The ﬁrst measures
the preference of an individual or of society for consump-
tion now rather than in the future. This is called the indi-
vidual or social time preference rate; the higher the rate of
discount, the greater the preference of the individual or
society for consuming now rather than later, other things
being equal. The second concept is the opportunity cost
rate, deﬁned as the best alternative risk-free rate of return
available to the investor at time zero. This rate reﬂects the
fact that the initial capital investment or value of the asset
at time zero could have been invested elsewhere and
would have yielded a rate of return; thus an opportunity
cost is incurred by having these funds tied up in the asset
under consideration. There has been a long and some-
what inconclusive debate among economists as to which
of these is the “correct” discount rate to use in evaluating
investment projects, how large or small it should be in 
particular contexts, and, indeed, whether some entirely
diﬀerent basis for comparing present and future values
should be found. Nevertheless, whatever method of
discounting is used, when the future time stream of net
beneﬁts yielded by an asset is brought back to a single sum
measured at time zero, the resulting amount is called the
net present value () of the asset’s earnings.
Armed with all these concepts, economists and
accountants have developed techniques for assessing
whether or not a decision to invest in a particular capital
asset or project is warranted. There are several methods
for evaluating capital investment decisions, including 
• the payback method—that is, how long does it take
for the asset’s earnings to repay its initial capital cost? 
• the beneﬁt-cost ratio and NPV method—that is, do
aggregate net beneﬁts, suitably discounted, exceed the
capital cost?
• the internal rate of return method—that is, what dis-
count rate just matches aggregate discounted net beneﬁts
with the initial capital cost? 
All of these methods fall into the general category of
investment appraisal techniques called cost-beneﬁt analysis,
widely used by economists in analyzing and informing
investment decisions in the private and public sectors.
There seems no reason why these methods could
not, in principle, be applied to the appraisal of cultural
capital. Heritage items such as historic buildings have an
existing asset value, require real resources in their mainte-
nance, and yield ﬂows of beneﬁts into the future. Thus
the evaluation of a heritage project involving, say, restora-
tion of a site could aim to identify all the market and non-

market beneﬁts and costs involved and then use one or
another of the techniques outlined above to compare
investment in this project with other competing heritage
projects or with other (nonheritage) alternative invest-
ment opportunities. It is important to repeat, however,
that since cultural capital is distinguished from ordinary
physical capital by the cultural value it generates,
evaluation methods applied to heritage projects should 
be focused on both the economic and the cultural value 
of the projects under study. This requirement becomes 
an empirical and measurement issue to which we shall
return below.
Parallels with Natural Capital
The deﬁnition of cultural capital has much in common
with the way in which natural capital was deﬁned at a sim-
ilar stage in its development. Indeed, it is useful to review
the development of that deﬁnition in the ecological eco-
nomics literature. The origins of considering “the envi-
ronment” as capital go back, in fact, to the great nine-
teenth-century political economists such as David Ricardo
and Thomas Malthus, who were concerned with the con-
tribution of agricultural land to the production of goods
and services in the economy. But contemporary formula-
tion of the concept of natural capital to describe “the free
gifts of nature” dates from the late s and the emer-
gence of the subdiscipline of ecological economics during
the s. In a series of contributions,11 the elements of
natural capital have been identiﬁed and are now generally
agreed to be the following components: () renewable nat-
ural resources such as ﬁsh and forest stocks, () nonrenew-
able resources such as oil and mineral deposits, () the
ecosystems that support and maintain the quality of land,
air, and water; and () the maintenance of a vast genetic
library, referred to as biodiversity. Within these concepts
we can distinguish between the stock of natural capital
(the ﬁsh and forest populations, the mineral deposits, etc.)
and the ﬂow of environmental services they provide (the
harvesting of ﬁsh and timber, the recycling of waste mate-
rials, erosion control, aesthetic services of landscape,
etc.). In some formulations, the ﬂow of services is
referred to as natural income, reﬂecting the capital/income
distinction discussed above.12
The parallels between natural and cultural capital
now start to take shape. Tangible cultural capital that has
been inherited from the past can be seen to have some-
thing in common with natural resources, which have also
been provided to us as an endowment; natural resources
have come from the beneﬁcence of nature, cultural capi-
tal has arisen from the creative activities of humankind.
Both impose on us a duty of care, the essence of the sus-
tainability problem, which will be discussed below. Fur-
thermore, a similarity can be seen between the function 
of natural ecosystems in supporting and maintaining the
“natural balance” and the function of what might be
referred to as “cultural ecosystems” in supporting and
maintaining the cultural life and vitality of human civiliza-
tion.13 Finally, the notion of diversity, so important in the
natural world, has a perhaps even more signiﬁcant role to
play within cultural systems. It is a characteristic of most
cultural goods that they are unique, and this applies par-
ticularly to tangible heritage; all original artworks, for
example, are diﬀerentiable from all others, all heritage
buildings and sites are individually identiﬁable as distinct.
Thus, cultural diversity is perhaps even more far-reaching
than is diversity in nature. It has often been noted that
diversity is a fundamental characteristic governing the
functioning of culture in society ( ); hence,
much of the analysis of biodiversity might be applicable
to a consideration of cultural heritage.
Apart from the matter of sustainability, there are
two important issues raised by the debate over natural
capital which are of relevance in the heritage context. 
The ﬁrst relates to valuation of capital stocks. In natural
capital theory, the valuation question has been a matter of
considerable controversy. A recent attempt at quantifying
global natural capital by Costanza and colleagues
(Costanza et al. ) attracted much criticism from com-
mentators (El Serafy ; Toman ), who objected to
alleged double counting and to the apparently inﬁnite
price being placed on several items. Nevertheless, the
exercise was fruitful if for no other reason than that it
focused attention on the diﬃculty of, as El Serafy put it,
pricing the invaluable (El Serafy , ). Similarly, eﬀorts
to value the stock of cultural capital are likely to be
fraught with danger—a danger that will be compounded
by the fact that not only an economic measure but also
some form of cultural valuation must be sought.
The second issue relates to the relationship
among diﬀerent forms of capital and to the extent to
which one is substitutable for another.14 In the natural
capital debate, a great deal of attention has been devoted
to the possibilities or otherwise for substituting physical
for natural capital. Essentially the argument is that if
human-made capital can produce the same goods and
services as natural capital, then we need not be so con-
cerned about maintaining levels of natural capital in the

future (e.g., preserving stocks of exhaustible resources),
since physical capital can be substituted for it. Positions
taken in this debate range from zero substitutability at one
end all the way through to perfect substitutability at the
other. The likely consensus is that while some aspects of
the services provided by natural capital may be replace-
able by manufactured capital, there are other aspects that
cannot be.15 Thus, for example, while new human-made
technologies may go some way toward replacing natural
energy sources, it is diﬃcult to see how species loss could
be made up through additions to physical capital, espe-
cially under conditions of uncertainty as to the future
beneﬁts that diﬀerent species might provide.
In the case of cultural capital, provision of the
economic functions of cultural assets is readily imaginable
through substitution by physical capital; the services of
shelter, amenity, and so on provided by a historic building
could as well be provided by another structure without
cultural content. However, since, by deﬁnition, cultural
capital is distinguished from physical capital by its embod-
iment and production of cultural value, there would be
expected to be zero substitutability between cultural and
physical capital with respect to its cultural output.16
Sustainability
Definitional Issues
The concept of sustainability is most often invoked in the
context of the environment, where the term sustainable is
generally linked with the word development. Sustainable
development marries the ideas of sustainable economic
development, meaning development that will not slow
down or wither away but will be, in some sense, self-per-
petuating, and ecological sustainability, meaning the preser-
vation and enhancement of a range of environmental val-
ues through the maintenance of ecosystems in the natural
world. Furthermore, the term sustainable development
embraces an interpretation of “economic development”
that supersedes former notions of economic growth
measured only in terms of increases in per capita ;
sustainability in this context embraces the wider concept
of “human development,” focused on the individual as
both the instrument and the object of development and
measured by a variety of indicators of quality of life and
standards of living that go well beyond measuring simply
material progress.
Most thinking and writing about sustainable
development over the last decade acknowledges its debt,
explicitly or implicitly, to the deﬁnition of the term put
forward by the World Commission on Environment and
Development (the Brundtland Commission), which
speciﬁed sustainable development as “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
( , ). A subsequent United Nations commis-
sion, the World Commission on Culture and Develop-
ment, which reported in , carried these developmen-
tal ideas through to the arena of cultural development,
where, again, the long-term needs of future generations
for access to cultural resources can be seen as important
( ).17
It is apparent from the accepted deﬁnition of sus-
tainable development that a key element of this concept is
equity in the treatment of diﬀerent generations over time.
The term intergenerational equity, or intertemporal distribu-
tive justice, is used to refer to fairness in the distribution 
of welfare, utility, or resources between generations.
Although the principles of intergenerational equity can be
applied to relations between any series of generations at
any time, practical interest in it has focused, not surpris-
ingly, on the concern among those of us alive today for
the well-being of future generations. Intergenerational
equity can be considered in relation to cultural capital
because the stock of cultural capital is what we have
inherited from our forebears and what we will hand on to
future generations. Intertemporal equity issues arise in
regard to access to that capital; in fact, it may be suggested
that equity of access to cultural capital should be regarded
as just as important as equity in the intergenerational dis-
tribution of beneﬁts from any other sort of capital.
We take up a more detailed consideration of
intergenerational equity as it relates to cultural capital in
the next section.
Intergenerational Equity and 
Dynamic Efficiency
Economists have deﬁned intergenerational equity with
reference to the maintenance of an equal level of welfare
or utility between generations, expressed as per capita
consumption or as endowment of resources or capital
stock (Young ). Prima facie, therefore, the intergener-
ational equity dilemma is a classic intertemporal alloca-
tion problem—that is, a choice between present and
future consumption. Casting this problem as one involv-
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ing fairness or justice makes some economists uneasy,
because of their unwillingness to make or assume value
judgments on behalf of others; such hesitancy derives
from a view of economics (especially neoclassical
economics) as an objective, or value-free, science. So
some economists have framed the intertemporal resource
allocation question as one of eﬃciency rather than of
equity,18 requiring maximization of the net present value
of beneﬁts that the resources generate (Tietenberg ,
). In a series of papers, Solow and Hartwick have 
shown that if the net income, or “rent,” from natural
resources can be invested in a certain way, eﬃcient growth
paths for an economy can be achieved (Solow , ;
Hartwick , a, b). Pearce and Atkinson carry
this proposition further by developing a sustainability test
for an economy that requires the total capital stock (physi-
cal plus natural) to remain constant over time (Pearce and
Atkinson ).19
However, framing the problem of intergenera-
tional resource allocation in this way raises diﬃculties, in
particular the proper choice of discount rate to apply to
future net beneﬁt streams.20 Even if the conceptual prob-
lems of whether the rate is a time preference or an oppor-
tunity cost indicator are solved, the determination of a
single number to encapsulate the complex processes
involved is something of a tall order. But, more impor-
tant, it can be argued that seeing intertemporal resource
allocation solely as an eﬃciency question does not dispose
of the equity issue entirely. For example, any positive dis-
count rate, however low, will mean that some future
beneﬁts will be eﬀectively reduced to zero, inevitably giv-
ing what many would regard in ethical terms as undue
weight to the preferences of the present generation. Thus,
there is an inescapable question relating to the fairness of
alternative outcomes that cannot be dealt with by an
analysis that looks only at eﬃciency.
There are several ways in which the ethical basis
of intergenerational judgments can be approached. A util-
itarian view might look to the maximization of total social
utility, where individuals’ ethical positions were reﬂected
in the measure of their own welfare; in such a case, admit-
ting altruism, disinterested demand, bequest values, and
other such variables into individual utility functions
would allow the self-interest of people alive today to
incorporate their interest in the well-being of later gener-
ations. Alternatively, a contractarian approach following
Rawls might be proposed, in which members of future
generations are given equal weight in Rawls’s “original
position”—that is, the vantage point from which the
choice of a social welfare function is viewed (Rawls ;
Page , –; Becker ). Nevertheless, despite the
theoretical appeal of these sorts of paradigms, they hardly
provide operational decision rules to guide social choice
when intergenerational equity problems arise.
The foregoing discussion has been framed in
terms of intergenerational issues in the treatment of natu-
ral resources. How do those issues fall out when applied
to cultural capital? To begin with, we can note that both
the Hartwick-Solow and Pearce-Atkinson models assume
perfect substitutability between natural and physical capi-
tal. However, when it comes to cultural capital, this
assumption will often not hold, as we have noted already.
Indeed, Solow himself concedes that “it makes perfectly
good sense to insist that certain unique and irreplaceable
assets should be preserved for their own sake; nearly
everyone would feel that way about Yosemite or, for that
matter, about the Lincoln Memorial, I imagine” (Solow
, ).
Moreover, the critical diﬀerence between 
cultural and other forms of capital lies in its generation 
of cultural as well as economic value. Thus, the applica-
tion of eﬃciency criteria to intertemporal investment
decisions in cultural capital raises the prospect of a dual
evaluation of the time stream of beneﬁts, with both
economic and cultural beneﬁts having to be considered
and with possibly diﬀerent discount rates for each. For
economists, the identiﬁcation of use and nonuse values
and their conversion to present-value terms, once the
discount rate issue is resolved, is a straightforward matter.
For conservationists, in contrast, the identiﬁcation and
measurement of cultural value and its aggregation into
the equivalent of a net present value of cultural worth
present formidable conceptual and operational diﬃcul-
ties. For both economists and conservationists, there may
ultimately be a further choice: if economic and cultural
valuations produce diﬀerent rankings of projects, some
means of trading oﬀ the diﬀerent beneﬁts will have to be
considered if resources are suﬃcient to allow only a sub-
set of the projects to be pursued.
Turning to equity issues in the process of resolv-
ing intergenerational problems, we can see a closer paral-
lel between natural and cultural capital. We have men-
tioned this already in the context of fairness in access to
cultural resources, which can be seen in the same terms as
access to the beneﬁts provided by natural resources. In a
wider context, just as the maintenance of natural capital is
regarded as essential to the achievement of economic and
social objectives in a resource-using world, so also might

the maintenance and accumulation of cultural capital be
seen as critical to the same objectives. Again, ensuring that
future generations are not denied the cultural underpin-
nings of their economic, social, and cultural life as a result
of our short-sighted or selﬁsh actions now is a matter of
fairness for which the present generation must accept a
moral responsibility.
The Application of Sustainability
Principles to Cultural Capital
While intergenerational equity is a key element of
sustainability, the long-running debate about ecologically
sustainable development has indicated that other criteria
need to be taken into account in making the concept
relevant and operational. Therefore, let us now broaden
the scope of sustainability to incorporate other aspects 
of this concept and consider their application to cultural
heritage. An appropriate way for us to proceed will be to
deﬁne a set of principles covering the signiﬁcant criteria 
to be taken into account and to consider how the manage-
ment of cultural heritage might be evaluated in the
context of those principles. In this section, such a set of
criteria is proposed which, it is hoped, can form the basis
for judging sustainable cultural asset management and
investment decisions in subsequent real-world applica-
tion. The suggested criteria may be interpreted as specify-
ing the requirements to which heritage decisions should
conform if they are to lead to sustainable outcomes. 
Without loss of generality, these decisions may be charac-
terized as involving investment in projects relating to the
creation, preservation, restoration, renovation, classiﬁca-
tion, maintenance, reuse, interpretation, or whatever 
else, of cultural capital. It is intended that these criteria
should apply equally within economic and cultural
discourses and, indeed, that they should provide a bridge
between the two.
The suggested criteria are as follows:
GENERATION OF TANGIBLE AND 
INTANGIBLE BENEFITS
As we have noted, cultural capital generates a time stream
of beneﬁts that provide the rationale for the investment
project under consideration. A generalized cost-beneﬁt
approach may be taken in order to estimate the overall
impact of the project. In this assessment, sustainability
would require the analysis of net beneﬁts to take account
of both use and nonuse values, and of both economic and
cultural value generated by the project. 
If the alternative to investment in the project is
investment in another project, the two projects should be
evaluated as far as possible on the same basis. If the alter-
native is not to undertake the investment project, then the
assessment should be based on a comparison of the with-
and without-project situations.
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
This principle requires that the interests of future genera-
tions be acknowledged. This acknowledgment might be
pursued in several diﬀerent ways. In quantitative terms,
respect for intergenerational concerns might suggest
adoption of a lower discount rate than might otherwise
be accepted on time-preference or opportunity-cost
grounds in the process of reducing both economic and
cultural beneﬁt streams to present-value terms. In qualita-
tive terms, the issue of fairness itself should be explicitly
considered in terms of the ethical or moral dimensions of
taking account of the likely eﬀect of the project on future
generations.
INTRAGENERATIONAL EQUITY
Heritage decisions have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the welfare
of the present generation. Consideration should be given
to the distributional impacts of the costs of the invest-
ment project under study, in case a regressive incidence
can be identiﬁed. Furthermore, intragenerational equity
also refers to equity in access to the beneﬁts of cultural cap-
ital across social classes, income groups, locational cate-
gories, and so on. If serious inequities are identiﬁed, the
possibility of corrective or compensatory action might be
raised, if indeed such action is feasible. Overall, in regard
to this criterion, a sustainable project will be one leading
to no adverse distributional consequences, in either eco-
nomic or cultural terms, with respect to the incidence of
either its costs or its beneﬁts.
It might also be suggested that an intra-
generational equity issue arises in the processes involved
in actually making the investment decision. It may be
appropriate for stakeholders aﬀected by the decision to
have some input into these processes. This concern raises
the matter of empowerment of those whose interests are
aﬀected by heritage decisions; general considerations 
of sustainability would suggest attention to the fairness 
of decision-making procedures in this context.
MAINTENANCE OF DIVERSITY
Just as biodiversity is seen as signiﬁcant in the natural
world, so also is cultural diversity important in maintain-
ing cultural systems. The diversity of ideas, beliefs, tradi-

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tions, and values yields a ﬂow of cultural services that is
quite distinct from the services provided by the individual
components. Indeed, diversity could be seen as one of the
most important attributes of cultural capital in the large,
because it has the capacity to yield new capital formation.
For example, to the extent that creative works are inspired
by the existing stock of cultural resources, a greater diver-
sity of resources will lead to the creation of more varied
and more culturally valuable artistic works in the future.
Thus, assessment of speciﬁc investment projects should
pay attention, in terms of this principle, to the contribu-
tion to cultural diversity that the project is likely to make.
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
As a general proposition, the precautionary principle
states that decisions that may lead to irreversible change
should be approached with extreme caution and from a
strongly risk-averse position, because of the imponder-
ability of the consequences of such decisions. In the natu-
ral world, this principle is invoked in regard to decisions
that might result, for example, in the extinction of species.
Similarly, the destruction of an item of cultural heritage is
a case of irreversible loss, and the precautionary principle
should again be applied. The principle does not assert that
such decisions are never to be taken but, rather, that it is
appropriate to exercise a higher level of care in cases
where irreversibility is involved, while bearing in mind the
other principles of sustainability that assist in determining
the decision.
RECOGNITION OF INTERDEPENDENCE
Finally, an overarching principle of sustainability is the
proposition that no part of any system exists indepen-
dently of other parts and that the interconnectedness
between speciﬁc items of cultural capital and the beneﬁts
they bestow should be examined in any project appraisal.
In other words, the role of heritage items as components
of what might be termed the cultural infrastructure of a
city, a region, or a country should, according to this prin-
ciple, be explicitly recognized and its importance be
identiﬁed as a distinct element of the analysis.
In summary, the above set of principles provides
a checklist of criteria against which to evaluate decisions
relating to cultural capital investment projects, so as to
assess the degree to which they are sustainable. The crite-
ria could be used to rank heritage projects or to compare
them with projects in other (nonheritage) areas. In the
ﬁnal section of this paper, we consider prospects and pro-
posals for empirical application of these criteria to actual
case studies.
Application
The Task Ahead
The concept of cultural capital as a means of representing
heritage and the principles of sustainability that we have
enumerated above provide a solid theoretical foundation
that links the economist’s and the conservationist’s
approaches to heritage decisions. The next step is to give
these theoretical ideas some practical reality. How can
they be made operational in a way that continues to
recognize the importance of both an economic and a
cultural interpretation of heritage in the real world of
conservation?
In order to focus the analysis, let us suppose that
the task ahead of us—that is, the decision to be made—
concerns a project. For example, a project might involve:
• the restoration of an artwork; the work might be
a freestanding single work, such as an old master painting,
it might be a collection of artworks, or it might be an
immovable work or works integral to a building or site,
such as the frescoes in the St. Francis Basilica in Assisi or
rock paintings in Arnhem Land
• the restoration or redevelopment of a historic
building, perhaps also involving a decision as to its possi-
ble listing
• the redevelopment (and possible reuse) of a
historic or cultural site, precinct, location, urban space,
and so on
Other examples of projects might be imagined.
In each case, the focus of the project is an item or collec-
tion of items of cultural capital, and the project itself can
be conceived of as a process of investment of economic
resources and conservation expertise—that is, an invest-
ment involving both economic and cultural inputs. 
The investment might be interpreted as maintenance
investment (as in the case of restoration or preservation)
or as new investment (as in a reuse or redevelopment
project) or as both. The questions to be asked can be
framed as follows:
• What are the economic and cultural returns to
that investment?
• Does the project meet the sustainability criteria?
• Do the economic and cultural returns justify pro-
ceeding with the project, in comparison with alternative
ways of using the same economic and cultural inputs?
To address these questions, we need to develop 
measures of the economic and cultural value of the proj-
ect. Possible methodologies are discussed below. We note
at once that techniques applicable to an assessment of the
economic returns to heritage projects are well developed,
being readily adaptable from other areas such as the evalu-
ation of environmental amenity. However, suitable
methodologies for systematic cultural assessment of her-
itage are more speculative. We deal with the economic
and cultural assessments in turn, and then we consider
how the sustainability principles enunciated above can
provide a means for integrating the two.
Methodologies for Economic Assessment
We can distinguish three categories of economic eﬀects of
the project which have to be measured: the capital costs,
the use values, and the nonuse values.
The capital costs are the measurable opportunity
costs of all resources committed up front to the project. 
In a project involving the restoration of an artwork, these
costs might cover the time allocation of experts and tech-
nicians, the costs of materials, and so on. For an urban
redevelopment project, signiﬁcant construction costs
might be involved.
An issue arises in connection with the treatment
of ongoing maintenance costs following an initial invest-
ment. For example, the cleaning of St. Paul’s Cathedral in
London involved not just the once-over cleaning and
restoration cost (the “capital cost” of the project) but also
an annual and ongoing level of maintenance to ensure
that the beneﬁts of the initial investment would not be dis-
sipated over time. In some cases, such continuing mainte-
nance costs can be netted out of the time stream of
beneﬁts in the overall project appraisal; in other cases, 
it may be appropriate instead to include the present value
of the time stream of maintenance costs into the initial
capital cost of the project.
The use values of a heritage project comprise the
values of all identiﬁable directly used goods and services
that the project generates. When these outputs are sold to
consumers, the use values can be measured as the
expected total net revenue from sales; thus, for example,
entrance charges levied on visitors to a historic site, net of
administration and other operating costs, could be taken
as one of the use values arising from a project to restore
or redevelop the site. Similarly, the rental value of housing
or other property in a historic town center project could
be taken as one of the values-in-use of such a project.
We have already noted that nonuse values are likely
to form an important part, and perhaps the most
signiﬁcant component, of the economic value created 
by cultural heritage. It is important, then, to pay 
particular attention to the methodologies for assessing
such eﬀects. Three methodologies for assessing demand
for nonmarket goods can be discussed: contingent valua-
tion methodology (), travel cost assessments, and
hedonic pricing.21
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHODOLOGY
 is one of the most widely used means of measuring
nonmarket beneﬁts in economic analysis.22 It involves
asking people their willingness to pay () for the
beneﬁts received or their willingness to accept compensa-
tion for their loss. The asking may take place under quasi-
experimental conditions or, more commonly, may be
administered through sample surveys of individuals
drawn from the population of those experiencing the
beneﬁt in question. Thus, for instance, the nonuse value
of a community cultural center or museum in a local area
might be assessed on the basis of a survey of a sample of
residents of the area. The survey might be conducted by
telephone, mail, or personal interview. Respondents
might be asked hypothetically to indicate the maximum
ﬁnancial contribution they would make to a fund to sup-
port the cultural center, or they might be asked whether
or not they would contribute a ﬁxed amount to such a
fund. Either way, an analyst could use the results to esti-
mate a hypothetical demand function for the nonuse
beneﬁts of the center.
There are a number of biases that may aﬀect
responses in  studies. The most obvious is the so-
called “free-rider problem”—that is, people have an incen-
tive not to reveal their true preferences for a public good if
they know they cannot be excluded from enjoying its
beneﬁts once it is provided. In other words, individuals
can escape payment by concealing their true  and yet
still enjoy the beneﬁts of consumption. Other biases may
arise through the hypothetical nature of the questions, the
possibility that responses may be based on insuﬃcient or
incorrect information, and the diﬃculties of ensuring that
responses on single issues are consistent with an individ-
ual’s overall budgetary position.23 There are ways of
circumventing these biases, or at least of mitigating their
eﬀects, through careful experimental design. For example,
the free-rider problem may be controlled for by deliber-
ately providing respondents with incentives to understate
or overstate their  through altering their assumed
liability to pay their nominated amount; by these means,

those respondents who free-ride can be distinguished
from those who do not, and an estimate can be made of
any bias due to this eﬀect.24
The use of  was given some endorsement by
the ﬁndings of an expert panel appointed by the U.S.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to
review the applicability of the technique in determining
liability claims following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in
Alaska in . The panel, cochaired by Nobel laureates
Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow and including Edward
Leamer, Roy Radner, Paul Portney, and Howard Schu-
man, found that “ studies can produce estimates reliable
enough to be the starting point of a judicial process of
damage assessment, including lost passive-use values,”
provided that such studies are carefully carried out, with
due attention paid to the biases and other problems aﬀect-
ing the technique (Arrow et al. ).
Overall, it can be said that since the nonuse 
values from cultural heritage are very similar in kind to
those arising from environmental amenity, the fact that
many successful applications of  in the environmental
sphere have now been carried out augurs well for the
further application of the same techniques in the heritage
ﬁeld.25
TRAVEL COST METHODS
Individuals may reveal how much they value the beneﬁts
provided by an environmental or cultural site by the
amount they are prepared to pay in making the journey to
visit it. Studies have been carried out on visitors to partic-
ular sites, asking how much time they spent traveling to
them and what ﬁnancial outlays were involved. From the
results for many respondents, a demand curve for the
beneﬁts of the site can be established. There are, however,
a number of diﬃculties with this approach. Not all sites
require a lot of traveling to visit them, and often multiple
purposes are involved in the trip: for example, how does
one allocate the cost of visiting Paris between the Louvre,
the Eiﬀel Tower, and the Pompidou Center? Furthermore,
even if reasonable estimates can be made by these meth-
ods, they would seem to relate more to direct use value
(even though not accruing directly to the site in question)
rather than to nonuse values. Thus, the application of
travel cost methods in the present context would appear
to be limited.
HEDONIC PRICING
Hedonic pricing approaches are based on indirect infer-
ence of the value of nonmarket eﬀects from market data.
For example, the costs of aircraft noise in an urban envi-
ronment or the beneﬁts of water views can be inferred
from analysis of house prices, in situations where all other
contributory factors can be held constant. Such
approaches have some potential for application to her-
itage projects, but their use is limited to situations in
which a reasonably wide spread of market data can be
found. So, for example, it might be possible to assess the
inﬂuence of heritage values on property prices, including
the eﬀects of listing, by these means. An illustration is the
study by Moorhouse and Smith, who investigated the
inﬂuence of architectural styles on the prices of nine-
teenth-century terrace houses in Boston (Moorhouse and
Smith ). Another application is that of Chanel and col-
leagues, who used hedonic methods to analyze the auc-
tion prices of artworks (Chanel, Gerard-Varet, and Gins-
burgh ). Despite the validity of such studies in terms
of what they set out to do, they suﬀer from the fact that,
again, they essentially measure private, individual beneﬁt
rather than wider public-good eﬀects.
Having outlined the measurement techniques
available to assess the economic beneﬁts and costs of her-
itage projects, we should note ﬁnally that the estimates
made can be drawn together within a standard cost-
beneﬁt framework, as foreshadowed in the previous sec-
tion. That is, the results of the economic analysis of a
speciﬁc heritage project could in principle be represented
in terms of any of the standard summary measures listed
earlier—as a  estimate, an internal rate of return, a
cost-beneﬁt ratio, and so on.
It is important to be clear as to the distinction
between the marginal beneﬁt yielded by the project and
the total beneﬁt of the heritage item itself. An illustration
should make this clear. Suppose the project is the restora-
tion of the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican. An economic
evaluation of the project would look at the costs involved
in the restoration work and at the additional beneﬁt the
restoration would bring over and above the beneﬁts
yielded by this heritage item in the absence of restoration.
In other words, the relevant beneﬁt estimate with respect
to this project is not the total use and nonuse value of the
Sistine Chapel but, rather, the marginal beneﬁts due to the
restoration project—that is, how much additional beneﬁt,
attributable to the restoration work, is gained? Such mar-
ginal use beneﬁt might be represented, say, by additional
revenue generated because more visitors come to see the
restored work. Marginal nonuse beneﬁt might be repre-
sented by increases (if any) in general  for existence,
option, and bequest values following the restoration.

Methodologies for Cultural Assessment
It has been a theme of this paper that, in parallel with any
assessment of the economic value of cultural heritage, an
assessment of the cultural value of the project must be
carried out, and that the cultural evaluation should be
accorded, in some sense, an equal weighting with the eco-
nomic analysis. We suggested earlier that, in principle, a
“cultural cost-beneﬁt analysis” might be imagined, where
time streams of cultural beneﬁts might be compared with
the cultural resources devoted as inputs to the project.
To move from the theoretically plausible to the
operationally feasible in this respect is a sizable jump,
because, as we have already noted, no simple or universal
metric for representing cultural value is available in the
same way as money can be used as a means of aggregat-
ing economic worth. A clear message arising from the
December  meeting on economics and heritage con-
servation at the Getty Conservation Institute was that
conservationists and culturalists need to develop system-
atic approaches to assessing cultural value. The report 
of the meeting noted that “the cultural disciplines and
conservation professionals were challenged [by the discus-
sion] to elaborate on existing tools and devise additional
tools to evaluate noneconomic, cultural values. It was
observed that the culturalist ﬁelds lack a unifying body 
of theory regarding values or the role of conservation in
society” (GCI , ).
It may prove most productive, as foreshadowed
earlier, to approach the question of assessing cultural
value by trying to deconstruct the aggregate concept of
cultural value into its constituent elements. If so, it may
then be more plausible, with respect to any project, to
provide an evaluation in terms of speciﬁc criteria or com-
ponents of value, such as the aesthetic, spiritual, historic,
and other characteristics of the project. It is diﬃcult to
comprehend quantitative scales against which such evalu-
ations might be made, but it is rather easier to imagine
qualitative measurement methods that might have some
claim to unambiguous deﬁnition. For example, it might
be possible to agree upon ratings according to levels of
signiﬁcance, importance, and so on, especially if they are
assessed in comparative terms (object A is “more signiﬁ-
cant” against a criterion of, say, historical importance than
object B).
Some illustration of these sorts of approaches
may in fact be drawn from the cultural economics litera-
ture. Frey and Pommerehne derived rankings of the
“quality” (read “assessed cultural value”) of visual artists’
work by reference to consensus judgments of experts, and
they used the results as an explanatory variable in a
demand equation for artworks (Frey and Pommerehne
, –). The present author disaggregated the
notion of the “quality” (again, read “assessed cultural
value”) of theater performances into several criteria, and
he found that consistent judgments of consumers could
be measured against qualitative scales (Throsby ).
There may be scope in the assessment of the cultural
value of heritage to apply somewhat similar methods to
gauging the consensus views either of experts or of con-
sumers more generally.
Integrating Economic and Cultural
Assessments
The economic and cultural assessments carried out as dis-
cussed above provide much of the information necessary
to assess the project against the sustainability criteria put
forward in the previous section on sustainability. It would
be appropriate for these criteria to be applied one by one
to the project. In some cases, additional information may
be needed: for example, an assessment of distributional
eﬀects in terms of the intragenerational equity principle
might require a range of data on the project’s possible
impacts. In some cases, perhaps, the required information
may be too diﬃcult or too costly to acquire, and some cor-
ners may have to be cut. In the end, it has to be acknowl-
edged that sustainability is not a black-and-white concept
but a matter of degree, and that assessing the extent to
which a particular project meets sustainability criteria will
always be a process requiring judgment and discretion.
It may also arise in some applications that a sus-
tainable project might nevertheless pose some trade-oﬀ
between its economic and its cultural valuation. For
example, suppose two heritage investment projects are
under consideration, and only one can be chosen. Project
A may rank highly on economic outcomes but poorly in
cultural terms; project B might be the reverse. Some way
of representing society’s preferences between economic
and cultural outcomes would be required in order to
resolve the dilemma of choice. The point to be made is
that it should not be assumed that, in such circumstances,
the economic assessment should automatically dominate
the decision, if the full concept of sustainable use of cul-
tural capital is to be properly served.


Case Studies: The Next Stage
This paper has laid out the theoretical basis upon which it
is possible to interpret heritage as cultural capital and to
assess its sustainability characteristics. The paper has also
suggested some approaches to making these ideas opera-
tional. The empirical application of these approaches is to
be tested by reference to several case studies of heritage
projects. It is suggested that the key tasks of the case stud-
ies will be:
• to identify the asset characteristics of the cultural
capital involved in the project
• to measure the components of the economic and
cultural evaluations of the project
• to analyze the project’s outcomes against the
agreed criteria for sustainability
• to arrive at an overall conclusion integrating the
economic and cultural values of the project
As far as possible, case studies should be chosen
to cover a representative variety of project types, regions,
political or institutional jurisdictions, and so on. Given the
extensive research requirements needed to undertake 
a full economic analysis, the inclusion of one or more
projects for which a comprehensive economic assessment
has already been undertaken would seem to be desirable.
In such cases, the case-study analysis could involve, ﬁrst, 
a critical appraisal of the economic evaluation (are all
costs and use and nonuse values included, and does it
measure what it sets out to measure?) and, second, 
a review of existing work on the cultural value of the
project (how successful is the cultural evaluation, and 
is it accorded appropriate weight in the ﬁnal analysis?).
The case study might then be able to propose ways of
furthering the original analysis, especially by recasting 
it in a sustainability framework.
Notes
The author is grateful to Michelle Lowe and Michael Tooma for
research assistance in the preparation of this paper and to Randall
Mason and Marta de la Torre for comments on an earlier draft.
Responsibility for the views expressed, however, rests with the author.
. For the purposes of this paper, cultural heritage is deﬁned as
movable artifacts, artworks, and other items such as are con-
tained in museums and other collections, and immovable
heritage such as archaeological sites, buildings, or groups of
buildings, locations, precincts, etc., of historical or cultural
importance (Throsby b). For further discussion of the
deﬁnition of heritage, see contributions to Hutter and Rizzo
() and to Schuster, de Moncheaux, and Riley (); see
also Prott () and Klamer and Zuidhof (). For the
cultural criteria used in World Heritage classiﬁcation, see
Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World
Heritage Convention as promulgated by .
. See, for example, President’s Committee on the Arts and the
Humanities ().
. See Throsby (); Barker ().
. Some examples of cases where sustainability is seen as
important from a heritage conservationist perspective are
English Heritage () and Rosvall ().
. This distinction was originally created by Irving Fisher, who
referred to the ﬂow as “income” deriving from the capital
stock; see Fisher (), ﬀ.
. The use of the term cultural capital in economics diﬀers from
the concept now widely used in sociology following Bour-
dieu (), where cultural capital refers to an individual’s
competence in high-status culture. Bourdieu’s usage relates
to characteristics of human beings and, as such, is very close
to the economic concept of human capital (Becker ).
For further discussion of the use of the term both within
and beyond economics, see Throsby (a, ).
. A public good is deﬁned in economics as a good characterized
by nonrivalness (one person’s consumption does not dimin-
ish another’s) and nonexcludability (once the good is pro-
vided for one person, it is available to all, and no one can be
excluded from consuming it). National defense is often cited
as a paradigmatic case of a pure public good.
. The title of a recent World Bank report is suggestive of the
distinction between cultural and economic value. The
report, called Very Special Places: The Architecture and Econom-
ics of Intervening in Historic Cities, explicitly identiﬁes archi-
tectural and economic values in the redevelopment of urban
heritage in developing countries. See Serageldin ().
. For further discussion of the relationship between economic
and cultural value, see Throsby (), chapter .
. There is an emerging literature on the accounting valuation
of both movable and immovable cultural assets; see, for
example, Carnegie and Wolnizer () and Carman,
Carnegie, and Wolnizer ().
. See El Serafy (), Costanza and Daly (), Berkes and
Folke (), Folke et al. (), Hinterberger et al. (),
Wackernagel and Rees (), Barbier (, –), and
England ().
. See n. .
. The interactions between these systems and the economy
should also be noted; see Throsby ().
. For further discussion, see the references on the nature 
of natural capital cited in n. .
. Note that Pearce () argues that natural and manufac-
tured capital are complements in the early stages of

economic growth but that they are substitutes at later
stages, when natural capital is above a minimum threshold
level.
. Note that some counterexamples could be suggested—for
example, where a historic building is replaced by a new one
that has little or no cultural value initially but that, for one
reason or another, acquires cultural status over time.
. For a more detailed consideration of sustainability as it
relates to a broad interpretation of culture, see Throsby
(, a).
. Thus Solow (, ) suggests that “whether productive
capacity should be transmitted across generations in the
form of mineral deposits or capital equipment or technolog-
ical knowledge is more a matter of eﬃciency than of
equity.”
. Proops et al. () extend the Pearce-Atkinson model 
to account for international trade; see also Rennings and
Wiggering ().
. Mourmouras () points to other ﬂaws in applying
eﬃciency criteria to renewable resource allocation between
generations. 
. Overviews of methodologies for measuring demand for
nonmarket goods in a cultural heritage context can be found
in Pagiola (), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (), and
Klamer and Zuidhof ().
. See Mitchell and Carson (), Braden and Kolstad (),
Hausman (), and Portney et al. ().
. This source of bias may lead to overstatement of . For
example, if an individual is asked how much she would pay
to a fund to preserve the Egyptian pyramids, then subse-
quently to similar funds for the Taj Mahal, the Great Wall of
China, and the Leaning Tower of Pisa, the sum of all the
nominated amounts may exceed an aggregate amount she
would be prepared to contribute to heritage in general.
. This approach was suggested by Bohm () and was 
used, for example, by Throsby and Withers () in a 
study of  for the beneﬁts of public support for the arts 
in Australia.
. Applications of  to the evaluation of cultural projects
include studies of the Musée de la Civilisation in Quebec
(Martin ), the Royal Theatre in Copenhagen (Bille
Hansen ), the “open museums” in Naples (Santagata
and Signorello ), and the rehabilitation of Fez in
Morocco (Agostini ). 
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